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The Semantics of Measurement
Abstract
This thesis examines linguistic phenomena that implicate measurement in the nominal
domain. The first is morphological number, as in one book vs. two books. Intuitively, the
contrast between singular and plural forms of nouns finds its basis in whether or not some
thing measures 1. Chapter 2 develops a formal account of morphological number centered
around this measurement. Diﬀerent classes of words and diﬀerent languages employ diﬀerent
criteria to determine whether or not something measures 1 for the purpose of morphological
singularity.
The second component of the project takes a closer look at the semantics of quantizing
nouns, or words that allow for the measurement or counting of individuals. Chapter 3 develops
a typology of these quantizing nouns, identifying three classes of words: measure terms (e.g.,
kilo), container nouns (e.g., glass), and atomizers (e.g., grain), showing that each class yields
a distinct interpretation on the basis of diverging structures and semantics.
The third component of the project investigates our representations of measurement,
modeled formally by degrees in the semantics. Chapter 4 accesses these representations
of measurement through a case study of the word amount, which is shown to inhabit yet
another class of quantizing noun: degree nouns. This case study motivates a new semantics
for degrees. Formally, degrees are treated as kinds; both are nominalizations of properties.
The properties that beget degrees are quantity-uniform, formed via a measure. Treating
degrees as kinds ensures that they contain information about the objects that instantiate
them.
iii
This new semantics for degrees highlights the four basic elements of the semantics of mea-
surement. First, and perhaps most obviously, we have measure functions in our semantics.
These measure functions translate objects onto a scale, allowing for the encoding of grad-
ability. Scales are composed of the second element in our measurement semantics: numbers.
Numbers, specifically non-negative real numbers, are taken as semantic primitives. The third
element, kinds, often provides the objects of measurement. Kinds are abstract, intensional
entities, so the fourth element in our measurement semantics, partitions, delivers maximal
instances of the kind (i.e., real-world objects) to be measured. With measures, numbers,
kinds, and partitions, we have a semantics of measurement.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Central to theories of natural language are speakers’ mental representations of the words they
use, together with the ways these representations are employed in computing the meaning of
the sentences that contain them. Identifying the mental representations of our speech and the
computational system that manipulates them informs not just the cognitive underpinnings
of language, but also how the mind works more generally. The current project focuses on a
constellation of linguistic phenomena, those that appeal to or facilitate measurement, as a
means to further our understanding of language and the psychological systems that shape it.
Although its scope is ostensibly limited to grammatical measurement, this project deals
with fundamental questions that aﬀect the analysis of every noun phrase in every language.
By identifying how it is that we use language to count, parcel, and measure the world around
us, we stand to uncover how that world is represented in our minds.
1.1 Background
This dissertation is written so that each chapter may stand more or less on its own, which
means that the relevant theoretical background is presented as-needed in the context of the
relevant discussion. However, certain assumptions about the general framework of composi-
tional semantics underlie the proposals that are developed. Here, we review those assumptions
and survey some of the data that motivate the current study.
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1.1.1 Measurement
When we use language to describe and interact with the world around us, we reference entities
and ascribe to them properties. Measurement stands at the core of this process. Measurement
provides the means to answer the question of how much. It aﬀords us the ability to specify
and make reference to discrete quantities. It allows us determine properties of individuals,
and, by identifying properties, also to ascribe them to individuals. What follows is a brief
survey of the ways that natural language makes use of measurement
Measurement gives rise to gradability, which precipitates properties that are held not
wholesale, but rather to a specific extent or point along some scale. Extents are abstract
representations of measurement, like three feet or forty pounds or the cardinality ten; they
are often referred to as ‘degrees’ in the literature on the semantics of gradability (Kennedy,
1999). A measure function µ maps an individual (or an event) onto the set of non-negative
real numbers, [0,+∞]. Adopting a platonistic approach to numbers in our ontology (more
on this in Chapter 2), measure functions receive the semantic type ⟨e, n⟩. Minimally, degrees
contain information about the measure that determines them and some value of that measure;
degrees may be represented as the pair of coordinates <µ, n>, where n is in the range of µ.
The degree of length three feet may thus be written d<µft,3>.
Our focus here will be on measurement in the nominal domain, where individuals are
the object of measurement. This is not to say that measurement does not occur elsewhere
in language. In the verbal domain, measurement most often concerns properties of events.
For example, the following sentences communicate information about the events that are
described. In (1), the speaker describes the extent of time a running event took; (1-b)
additionally compares that extent to some contextually determined standard. In (2), the
speaker describes intensity. In both cases, degrees are measured.
(1) a. John ran the race in fifty minutes.
b. Mary quickly crossed the finish line.
(2) a. Mary loves Bill a lot.
b. John hit the pole so hard his teeth fell out.
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Conceiving of time as a scale, even tense and aspect involve measurement. In (3), event times
are compared; the time of an event is an extent along the time scale, which is determined by
measurement.
(3) a. John had finished cooking dinner before Mary came home.
b. Sue hasn’t finished Crime and Punishment yet.
Work on event semantics has motivated the ontological reality of events (Davidson, 1967).
Events (or eventualities) are abstract, structured entities. Individuals participate in events,
and events determine the existence of individuals. While much work remains to be done on
the way that events are named, measured, and ascribed properties, the more we understand
events, the more they align with individuals in their structure and behavior (see Schein, 1993;
Lasersohn, 1995; Casati and Varzi, 1996; as well as the papers collected in Do¨lling et al.,
2008). For example, Bach (1986) models the domain of events Ds directly after the domain
of individuals De proposed by Link (1983) (and summarized in the following subsection).
Given this similarity, we stand to inform our understanding of measurement as it pertains to
events once we make sense of measurement as it pertains to individuals, which are the object
of measurement in the nominal domain and the topic of this dissertation.
Within the nominal domain, perhaps the most pervasive use of measurement concerns
counting. Cardinal numerals delimit discrete quantities of individuals like three books or
fifteen hamburgers. Whenever we use a cardinal numeral, we invoke the cardinality measure
µcard, which maps a (plural) individual to its cardinality. Perlmutter (1970) goes so far a to
argue that indefinite a is the spell-out of unstressed one, so that µcard rears it head in most
every nominal. This measure also plays a central role in determining morphological number,
that is, the choice between singular and plural forms of nouns (the topic of Chapter 2).
Beyond counting, English possesses a wide range of nominals, let us call them ‘quantizing
nouns’, that package individuals into discrete quantities. Appearing bare, without a deter-
miner, nouns cannot be used to name specific individuals. For example, bare carrots cannot
identify a specific quantity of carrots. However, when bare nouns appear with a quantizing
noun, suddenly specific reference becomes possible: one bowl of carrots identifies a quantity
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of carrots, just like one kilo of carrots or one pile of carrots. However, bowl and kilo and
pile vary both in their behavior and in the character of the objects they ultimately reference.
A bowl of carrots is a bowl; a kilo of carrots is carrots; a pile of carrots is at once carrots
and a pile. It would seem, then, that within the set of quantizing nouns there are distinct
subclasses with diverging semantics that yield salient diﬀerences in interpretation (the topic
of Chapter 3).
Some quantizing nouns, for example bowl, invoke measurement only indirectly, through
their ability to contain discrete quantities. Others, like kilo, directly name a measure in
their semantics (e.g., the kilo measure µkg). Yet others, like pile or grain or drop, serve
not to discharge measurement, but to mediate counting by delivering stable minimal parts
that may serve as arguments to the cardinality measure µcard. Consider, for example, the
contrast between one oil and one drop of oil. In the former, we have no idea what to count;
in the later, drop delivers this information. While their strategies may diﬀer, these quantizing
nouns cohere on the basis of their ability to delimit and make reference to discrete quantities
of stuﬀ.
In addition to using measurement to carve up the world around us, language aﬀords the
ability to reference abstract representations of measurement directly via yet another subclass
of quantizing nouns: degree nouns, the paragon example being the word amount. In (4),
amount serves not to name specific carrots, but rather a specific amount thereof, say one
kilo or two bags or thirty. Under its most plausible interpretation, the sentence asserts that
diﬀerent carrots were eaten each day, but when measured those carrots evaluated to the same
amount. For example, the sentence could assert that each day for a year the speaker ate two
carrots.
(4) I ate that amount of carrots every day for a year.
Here we have the means to directly reference degrees, abstract units of measurement, through
the use of the degree noun amount. In other words, degree nouns reference degrees. By
getting clear on the semantics and behavior of degree nouns, we stand to arrive at a better
understanding of degrees themselves (the topic of Chapter 4).
Our investigation of measurement within the nominal domain sheds light on the way that
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language determines reference to specific quantities. By identifying the means by which mea-
surement transpires via language, together with the representation of measurement itself, we
make clear the mechanism that underlies measurement in the semantics of natural language.
Ultimately, we arrive at a deeper understanding of the nominal system, as well as of the basic
building blocks of semantics.
The remainder of this section gives background on the ontology of things that get mea-
sured and parceled out. We begin with a brief summary of the domain of individuals and its
representation of pluralities, then we turn to the representation of kinds and sortal properties,
together with the machinery that identifies kinds and properties with the individuals that
instantiate them.
1.1.2 Plurality
Here we make explicit the basic assumptions concerning the semantics of plurality. For
starters, the term ‘plurality’ is used as a label for collections of entities like the books or
Bill and Sue. Work in plural semantics focuses on the inference patterns that result when
pluralities are referenced, and on the structure of the domain of individuals that these infer-
ence patterns necessitate. The foundational work on this topic is Link (1983), who adopts
a mereological account of the logical structure of plurality. Here, we consider a simplified
version of Link’s theory.
Link (1983) observes that if a conjunction of individuals serves as the subject to a plural
predicate, then each conjunct may serve as the subject to the singular counterpart of the
predicate. That is, the sentence in (5) entails (5-a-c), so that each member of the plural
subject Alan, Bob, and Charlie is said to be a man. This reading is the distributive
reading of (5): the property of being a man is distributed among the members of the plural
subject. For a predicate such as men to apply distributively to its plural subject, it must be
the case that its singular counterpart (i.e., man) is true of each member of the plural subject.
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(5) Alan, Bob, and Charlie are men |=
a. Alan is a man.
b. Bob is a man.
c. Charlie is a man.
If we conceive of the plurality consisting of Alan, Bob, and Charlie as a set, then the property
of being men applies to each non-singleton subset as well. Conceived of as a mereological
sum, the property of being men applies to each part of the plurality. For now it makes little
diﬀerence whether we model pluralities as sets or sums; either way, the inference in (6) holds.
To allow for the transition into the framework of mereotypology that takes place in Chapter
3, we follow Link in treating pluralities as sums.
(6) Alan, Bob, and Charlie are men |=
a. Alan and Bob are men.
b. Alan and Charlie are men.
c. Bob and Charlie are men.
To derive these patterns of inference, Link makes certain assumptions about the domain
of individuals De. The singular domain consists of atomic individuals. In the case of the
singular predicate man, its denotation is a subset of this atomic domain; in other words, the
denotation of a singular predicate the set of atoms that hold the named property (i.e., the
property of being a man), as in (7).
(7) Let [[Alan]] = a,
Let [[Bob]] = b,
Let [[Charlie]] = c.
Assume no other men. Then, [[man]] = {a, b, c}
Given the assumptions in (7), we know that the predicate man denotes the set containing
Alan, Bob, and Charlie. Singular predication may be modeled as a process of set inclusion like
in (8): for the predication to hold and thus the sentence to be true, the individual referenced
by the subject must be a member of the set denoted by the predicate.
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(8) [[Alan is a man]] = 1 iﬀ
[[man]](a) = 1, i.e., iﬀ
a ∈ {a, b, c}
To achieve a general theory of predication, Link proposes that the process of set inclusion
should hold whether the subject is an atom or a plurality. In other words, predication aligns
with set inclusion whether the argument is an atom or a sum or atoms. Now, in (5), we
are looking for a single individual that is a member of the predicate men. If the domain of
individuals only contains atoms, then there can be no single individual that corresponds to
Alan, Bob, and Charlie (and that is a member of [[men]]). Likewise for (31a-c), there are no
individuals in the predicate men that correspond to any of Alan and Bob, Alan and Charlie,
or Bob and Charlie.
To construct a domain of plural individuals out of a domain of atoms, Link introduces
the ‘sum’ operator +, corresponding to English conjunction. Here a note on terminology is
in order: ‘individual’ refers both to atoms (e.g., John) and sums (or ‘pluralities’; e.g., John
and Bill). We return to this point presently, once we arrive at the structure of the plural
domain.
(9) [[and]] = λxλy. x+y
where a+b = Supremum{a, b}
For any two individuals x, y, their sum x and y is the smallest plural individual that
has x and y as parts: x+y
A predicate P may be closed under +, sum formation, by the ‘star’-operator *. * composes
with a 1-place predicate P; *P is the closure of P under +. Thus, the denotation of *P is
every possible sum of atoms in the denotation of P, as in (10).
(10) Where [[P]] = {a, b, c},
[[*P]] = {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}.
Once we close the domain of individuals under sum formation, suddenly we have modeled
plural individuals in our ontology. Two atoms, say j and b, may comprise a sum, j+b; the
7
a+b+c
•
⇐ Sums
a+b a+c b+c
• • •
• • • ⇐ Atoms
a b c
Figure 1.1: A complete atomic join semilattice S
latter is a plural individual, the former two singular individuals.
The plural domain *D is structured on the basis of sum-formation, which yields a complete
atomic join semilattice S on the basis of D.In Fig. 1.1, each of the nodes • in S represents
a distinct element of the domain of S. S is built up from the basic elements, or atoms,
represented as the bottom layer of the semilattice. Atoms are then combined using + to form
sums, the remaining elements of S. In Fig. 1.1, a+b represents the sum of the atoms a and
b; a+b is an individual in S.
Building S up from atoms via sum-formation introduces a natural order on the domain
of S: the individual a+b has the atoms a and b as parts. Link represents this order by the
part-of relation ‘≤’; each line in S indications this ≤ relation. Thus, the line connecting
the atom a with the sum a+b represents the fact that a is part of a+b (a ≤ a+b). If an
individual has only one part, itself, that individual is atomic; otherwise, it is non-atomic. For
this reason, a+b is non-atomic.
Within the framework of mereology, we can access the set of atoms that comprise any
individual via the atom function AT, modeled in (11).
(11) AT(a+b+c) = {a, b, c}
The cardinality function µcard counts the number of elements in a set; AT delivers the atoms
to be counted. Observe the behavior of µcard in (12).1
(12) a. µcard(AT(a+b+c)) = 3
b. µcard(a) = 1
1See Schwarzschild (1996) for the motivation behind identifying any atom with the singleton set that
contains it, which allows µcard to apply directly to the atomic individual a.
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Returning to Alan, Bob, Charlie and men, Link continues to assume that the 1-place
predicate man refers to man atoms. However, the plural predicate men includes in its refer-
ence man sums, or pluralities. In other words, if the world consists of only three men, Alan,
Bob, and Charlie, then the plural predicate men denotes the closure of the predicate man
under +, as in (13).2
(13) a. [[man]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[men]] = {a, b, c, a+b, b+c, a+c, a+b+c}.
Finally, we have a domain in which to find the plurality Alan, Bob, and Charlie. The plural
individual is a+b+c, and to ascribe the property of being men to this individual we include
it in the set in (13-b).
(14) [[Alan, Bob, and Charlie are men]] = 1 iﬀ
[[men]](a+b+c), i.e., iﬀ
a+b+c ∈ {a, b, c, a+b, b+c, a+c, a+b+c}
Thus, including in our domain sums of individuals like a+b+c allows predication to always
proceed in terms of set inclusion. By building plural predicates out of singular ones via the
*-operator, we capture the entailment facts associated with distributivity: if Alan, Bob, and
Charlie are men, then the the plural individual they comprise is a member of the plural
predicate men, which means that atomic parts of the plural individual are members of the
singular predicate man. We return to the semantics of plurality in Chapter 2.2. For now, the
most important takeaway is the terminology: both atoms and sums are labeled ‘individuals’
in our domain.
1.1.3 Kinds
Throughout this investigation of measurement, we will see that in most cases, kinds serve as
the stuﬀ to get measured. In fact, only the cardinality measure applies directly to the sorts
of individuals defined above in the explication of plurality. Otherwise, we use nouns to name
2Here we depart from Link (1983), who has a more conservative view of plural predicates, for reasons that
will be made clearer in Chapter 2 once we discuss semantic plurality in the context of number marking.
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kinds, whose instances are then measured. This makes sense: a kind is the individual correlate
of a property; it is an abstract concept that instantiates as stuﬀ in the world. Measurement
provides the means to reference discrete instantiations of kinds. Here, yet another note on
terminology is in order, as well as some background about the general theory of kinds that
is assumed.
Nouns lead dual lives. Under one guise, they are function-like properties that serve as
predicates, which delimit a class of objects that hold the relevant property. For example,
in (15-a), the noun bears names the set of bears and the existential construction is used to
assert that John likes some members of that set. In (15-b), the set of bears serves as the
restrictor to the quantifier every : every member of this set is said to have come up to the
speaker and eaten honey.
(15) a. There are bears in the zoo that John like.
b. Every bear came up to me and ate some honey.
Under another guise, nouns are argumental: they name individuals directly. Consider the
sentences in (16). In (16-a), the sentence ascribes the property of being widespread not to
individual bears, or even to collections thereof, but to the bear kind.
(16) a. Bears are widespread.
b. John doesn’t like bears.
We use the term ‘kind’ rather liberally. Most transparently, ‘kind’ refers to natural kinds
like species of animals or types of plants. The bear kind, written bear, is a single entity;
individual bears realize the bear kind by holding the property of being a bear. One way
to conceive of kinds is as saturated properties: the bear kind is the nominalization of the
(unsaturated) property of being a bear, written bear. A property determines the set of
individuals that hold that property; the bear property determines the set of bears. By
nominalizing this property, we shift from a set of bears to the concept of being a bear, a
single ontological entity (see Krifka, 1995, for discussion). The domain of kinds, Dk, is a
subset of the domain of individuals, De.
Natural kinds divide into subkinds, for example subspecies. Brown bears and polar bears
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and teddy bears instantiate various subkinds of the bear kind. Crucially, each of these
subkinds is itself a kind. The polar bear property determines the set of polar bears, which
instantiate the polar bear kind. For our purposes, any concept that relates to real-world
objects through a property in this manner will be labeled a generalized kind, or ‘kind’ for
short.
Through the modification of kinds, language allows for the construction of new concepts:
red wine or cold spring water or bears John likes. While these constructed concepts might
not always correspond to natural kinds, they enjoy a similar ontological reality: concepts
are the saturated correlates of unsaturated properties. By collapsing over the distinction
between ‘kinds’ and ‘concepts’ (Krifka, 1995), or ‘conventional’ and ‘formal’ kinds (Pelletier
and Schubert, 1989), both bear and bears john likes are conceived of formally as gener-
alized kinds.3 To repeat, they cohere on the basis of their relationship to abstract concepts,
properties of individuals, and real-world objects.
The framework of Property Theory (Chierchia and Turner, 1988) makes this relationship
explicit and allows for a formal definition of kinds. First, consider the motivation for and role
of Montague semantics: Type Theory delivers a general system of semantic categories (Mon-
tague, 1973). We start with primitives, individuals and worlds, and then using a constrained
mode of composition we construct functions. Individuals, type e, model objects in the world;
functions, which characterize sets of individuals, model properties. Property Theory adds
the idea that propositional functions may be injected into the domain of individuals in a
retrievable way. In other words, every function may have an individual correlate.
As predicates, nouns denote functions that characterize sets of individuals. Using lambda
notation, the noun bears qua predicate receives the semantics in (17). It denotes the charac-
teristic function of being a bear, which delimits the set of (possibly plural) individuals that
hold the bear property. Asserting that Yogi is a bear, we apply the function in (17) to him
and attribute to Yogi membership in the set of bears.
3Collapsing over the distinction between what are at times called law-like, conventional, or established
kinds and sortal concepts should not be taken as a dismissal of this distinction. Established kinds like bear
stand apart from sortal concepts like bears john likes on the basis of two phenomena: 1) established kinds
but not sortal concepts may serve as arguments to kind-level predicates, and 2) established kinds but not
sortal concepts exhibit scopelessness in episodic sentences. For fuller discussion of this distinction, see Carlson
(1977b); Dayal (1992); Chierchia (1998b); as well as Chapter 4 below.
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(17) [[bears]] = λx. *bear(x)
As arguments, nouns denotes kinds. To map the function in (17) into the domain of individ-
uals, we must reimagine it as a semantic whole, not something in need of an argument. Here
an example with verbs might be more illustrative. Take the verb runs. It names the predi-
cate runs, which delimits the set of individuals (or events) that runs is true of. Used as an
argument, we nominalize the verb: running. Nominalized, verbs may serve as arguments.
(18) a. Running is good for your health.
b. John loves running.
The same process that nominalizes verbs so that they may serve as arguments transforms
a predicative nominal into an individual. From the property of running, something that is
true of individuals, we get the concept of running, an entity in its own right. The same holds
for bears: from the property of being a bear, we get the bear kind. Formally, the nomi-
nalization operator ‘∩’, also called the ‘down’ operator, turns a function into an individual.
The equivalences in (19) hold. For our purposes, any nominalized property will count as a
generalized kind.
(19) a. bear = ∩λx. *bear(x)
b. running = ∩λx. *runs(x)
To access the individuals that instantiate a kind, the predication operator ‘∪’, also called the
‘up’ operator, turns nominalized properties (back) into their characteristic functions. The
equivalences in (20) hold.
(20) a. ∪bear = ∪∩λx. *bear(x) = λx. *bear(x)
b. ∪running = ∪∩λx. *runs(x) = λx. *runs(x)
Using ∩ to nominalize properties into their corresponding individual correlates, i.e., into
their corresponding kinds, we map functions into the domain of individuals. To repeat:
kinds are individuals, just of a special sort. They exist within the domain of individuals. By
predicativizing these individuals with ∪, we retrieve a property from its individual correlate.
Two main considerations motivate Property Theory. First, conceived of as functions
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from worlds into sets of individuals, two properties may be logically equivalent without being
identical. To evidence this fact, Chierchia and Turner (1988) submit the properties named by
being bought and being sold ; given the meaning of buy and sell, these two properties should
delimit the same set of individuals: anything sold is necessarily bought, and vice versa. But
despite their relationship to the same class of individuals, the concepts of being bought and
being sold are distinct (Thomason, 1980; Bealer, 1982). In other words, a concept contains
information beyond what a classical set theoretic representation of properties can deliver;
Montague semantics mandates a “too-extensional” notion of property (Turner, 1987, p.456).
The nominalization process creates individuals, which themselves may hold properties; these
individual correlates of predicate functions may stand apart even if the functions share the
same extension.
This ability to ascribe properties to concepts (and indirectly to properties) serves as
another motivation for Property Theory. Standard typed logics are designed to avoid Rus-
sell’s Paradox, which means they preclude self-predication. But Property Theory allows self-
predication: functions have individual correlates (i.e., the kinds to which they correspond), so
in principle a function may take its own individual correlate as an argument. This is a good
result: natural language permits self-predication. Parsons (1979) gives the example in (21),
where we ascribe the property of being self-identical to the property of being self-identical.4
The logical form for (21-b) appears in (22).
(21) a. Everything has the property of being auto-identical.
b. The property of being auto-identical has the property of being auto-identical.
(22) [λx. *auto-identical(x)](∩λx. *auto-identical(x))
Chapter 4.1.1 gives further background on the semantics of nominalization and its treatment
of kinds in the context of degree semantics. There we will see that the same process that
gets us the bear kind from the property of being a bear delivers abstract representations
of measurement from the property of measuring specific extents. For now merely note that
4Chierchia and Turner (1988) also identify cases of self-predication in mutual belief scenarios (Cresswell,
1985), the semantics of perception (Barwise and Perry, 1983), and other nominalization phenomena (Chierchia,
1982).
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the domain of individuals is rich, containing not just real-world objects like books and bears,
but also the corresponding concepts. These concepts, formalized as nominalized properties,
receive the name ‘kinds’. Given their abstract nature, it should come as no surprise that
kinds so often serve as the stuﬀ that gets measured: to reference specific instances of a kind,
we must minimally understand what counts as an instance, together with how much/many
of those instances are relevant. Quantizing nouns play a central role in the instantiation of
kinds.
1.2 Previewing the proposal
Measurement underlies many foundational issues in the study of natural language semantics;
this dissertation directly contributes to making sense of three such issues. The first is mor-
phological number, as in one book vs. two books. Intuitively, the contrast between singular
and plural forms of nouns finds its basis in whether or not some thing measures 1. Chapter
2 develops a formal account of morphological number centered around this measurement. At
the crux of the proposal is a one-ness presupposition attributed to singular morphology. Dif-
ferent classes of words and diﬀerent languages employ diﬀerent criteria to determine whether
or not something measures 1 for the purpose of morphological singularity.
The second component of the project takes a closer look at the semantics of quantizing
nouns, or words that allow for the measurement or counting of individuals. Chapter 3 develops
a typology of these quantizing nouns, identifying three classes of words: measure terms (e.g.,
kilo; Lønning, 1987), container nouns (e.g. glass; Partee and Borschev, 2012), and atomizers
(e.g., grain; Chierchia, 1998a), showing that each class yields a distinct interpretation on the
basis of diverging structures and semantics. Superficially, each class may compose with a noun
denoting some substance (i.e., kind), for example water or rice, and allow for the measuring
of discrete quantities of that substance. However, a kilo of water is water, whereas a glass of
water is a glass; a grain of rice is at once both rice and a grain. The proposal that results
specifies how these diﬀering interpretations arise by attributing categorial and functional
diﬀerences to the subclasses of quantizing nouns. This proposal successfully predicts a wide
range of facts concerning the distribution and behavior of these classes of words: optional
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vs. obligatory co-occurrence of substance nouns and numerals, the functional status of the
particle/preposition of, and constraints on the monotonicity of the measure at play.
The third component of the project investigates the representations of measurement,
modeled formally by degrees in the semantics. Chapter 4 accesses these representations
of measurement through a case study of the word amount, which is shown to inhabit yet
another class of quantizing noun: degree nouns. By investigating the exceptional behavior of
amount and locating this behavior within the landscape of nominal semantics, we motivate
a new semantics for degrees. Degrees are shown to behave like kinds in the readings they
precipitate and the manner by which they compose with the structures that contain them.
Formally, both kinds and degrees are the nominalizations of properties. The properties from
which we build degrees are quantity-uniform, formed on the basis of a measure. Treated as
nominalized properties, degrees contain information about the objects that instantiate them,
which delivers an existential interpretation for degrees, just as for kinds.
Chapter 5 concludes with a brief discussion of how the general program that results may
be extended to yet more domains: a general system of degree semantics, mass nouns, and
classifier languages.
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Chapter 2
The Semantics of Morphological Number
We begin our investigation of measure in natural language with an investigation of number
morphology, a phenomenon that ostensibly finds its value on the basis of an evaluation of
whether or not some thing measures 1: one book contrasts with two books, firstly on how
many objects are referenced and secondly on the numeral and number morphology expressed.
In the first case, we imagine a single book and find a noun in the singular form; with two
books, we imagine more than one book and the noun appears morphologically plural.
Already we see that the numeral plays a central role in determining the number mor-
phology of the nouns with which it occurs. In English, the contribution of the numeral can
be summarized as follows: W ith one, use singular morphology; with all other numerals, use
plural. However, describing this pattern and deriving it within a standard framework of com-
positional semantics prove to be divergently diﬀerent tasks. First we must understand the
means by which we count with numerals, and the eﬀect numerals have on the determination
of morphological number. Doing so necessitates not only a semantics for numerals, but also
an account of morphological number such that it is sensitive to the numerals present. The
task becomes even more diﬃcult once we expand our sights beyond English.
This chapter develops a semantic account of morphological number in the presence of
numerals.1 In addition to accounting for number morphology on basic nouns like book in En-
glish, the approach extends to cover data from two seemingly disparate domains: 1) number
marking on measure terms like kilo, which is determined by the numeral co-occurring with
1This chapter expands on the proposal put forth in Scontras (2013a,b).
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these terms: one kilo of apples vs. two kilos of apples; and 2) cross-linguistic variation in
patterns of number marking: numerals other than ‘one’ obligatorily combining with plural-
marked nouns (e.g., English), all numerals obligatorily combining with singular (unmarked)
nouns (e.g., Turkish, Hungarian), and numerals optionally combining with either singular
or plural nouns (e.g., Western Armenian). Building on the presuppositional approach to
morphological number in Sauerland (2003), we see that all of the data considered receive an
account once we assume variation in the selection of the measure relevant to the one-ness
presupposition of the morphological singular form. Diﬀerent classes of words and diﬀerent
languages determine whether or not something measures 1 for the purpose of morphological
singularity on the basis of diverging criteria.
2.1 Number marking and numerals
Speakers of number marking languages decide between singular and plural forms of nouns
as they embed them in larger linguistic contexts: In English, book is felt to mean something
diﬀerent from books, and the choice between these forms is regular and well-defined. If we
are talking about a single book, we must use the singular form of the noun; when we are
talking about more than one book, we use the plural. While intuitively appealing, this
characterization of grammatical number in terms of one vs. more than one faces problems
(see the discussion in Sauerland (2003) and Sauerland et al. (2005), as well as in Section 2.2
below). Still, it gives us a point from which to begin investigating the topic at hand: the
impact numerals have on the determination of grammatical number.
In English, the numeral one requires that the noun it appears with bear singular mor-
phology, thus one book and not one books. For numerals greater than one, plural morphology
is required: two books and not two book. We can describe this pattern using our characteriza-
tion of grammatical number above: With one we are talking about a single thing and so we
require the singular form; with greater numerals, we are talking about more than one thing,
thus the plural form must be used. The problem lies in explaining how these facts arise:
What aspect of the linguistic form is responsible for the choice of grammatical number, and
at what level of grammar does it operate?
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Suppose that the determination of grammatical number is a wholly syntactic process
driven by features of the modificational elements that then agree with features on modified
nouns. Such a system would posit a singular feature on the numeral one and a plural
feature on all other numerals, at least in English. When composing with a noun, the number
feature of the numeral would value the number feature of the noun and determine its mor-
phological form. Note that this feature distribution, one+singular and not-one+plural,
captures the facts of English, but the system being considered admits a great deal of variation
beyond the English pattern. Without ad hoc stipulations concerning the distribution of these
features, a numeral could possess any number feature and so we should expect to find lan-
guages with unintuitive – and unattested – patterns of number marking. For example, how
would we block a language from attributing the plural feature to one and the singular
feature to all other numerals? In other words, how do we rule out languages in which nouns
agree with one in the plural and numerals other than one in the singular?2 The problem
with a syntactic, or featural approach is that grammatical number bears only an indirect
relationship to the meaning of the elements indexed with it, and so we lack a principled way
of constraining the patterns that can be generated.
Here we consider an alternative to the syntactic approach: a semantic account of gram-
matical number in the presence of numerals that attributes the distinction between singular
and plural forms to an interaction between the meaning of numerals and the semantics of
the nominal element with which they compose. In developing this system, we consider data
from two types of nouns: the basic type, as exemplified by book, and measure terms such as
kilo (Lønning, 1987). Measure terms express morphological number, yet their morphology
appears to be insensitive to singular vs. plural reference: In a construction such as one kilo of
apples, kilo surfaces with singular morphology regardless of the number of individuals refer-
enced (i.e., the number of apples). By augmenting the data to be covered to include measure
terms, we highlight the breadth required by the semantic mechanism that modulates gram-
matical number. We then expand the coverage of the system beyond English, seeing what
it takes to account for diverging patterns of number marking such as those found in Turkish
2Note that the language described diﬀers from, e.g., English, in that singular and plural morphology behave
as expected in the absence of numerals, but with numerals we witness the diverging pattern.
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and Western Armenian (Bale et al., 2011a): in Turkish, all numerals require singular (i.e.,
unmarked) morphology on the nouns with which they occur; in Western Armenian, numerals
optionally compose with singular or plural nouns. The data involving English measure terms
and the pattern from Turkish evidence the fact that not every instance of a morphologically
singular noun references a single individual. Our task, then, is to allow singular-marked
nominals to receive a plural interpretation.
What results is a semantic program centered around a designated functional projection,
#P, from which morphological number features originate (cf. Sauerland, 2003, a.o.). The
head of #P, either sg or pl, is an operator that establishes conditions on the denotation
of the resulting nominal: sg checks for singularity of the predicate, and pl applies when
singularity is not satisfied. In other words, the morphological singular form requires that
the nominal indexed with it reference only things that number 1. Variation in the way that
singularity is checked captures the cross-linguistic diversity in patterns of number marking
that we consider. This variation also accounts for number marking within the second domain
of nominals, measure terms. Before we begin to develop this system, however, we must
consider in more detail the assumptions at its foundation, together with the data to be
explained. This is the topic of the next section.
2.2 Theoretical background: #P
What does it mean for a noun to be semantically singular? Let us assume that the noun
must denote a set of atoms. How about semantic plurality? If singularity is tied with atoms,
then a plural noun could denote sums of atoms (Link, 1983). We thus carve up our domain of
individuals as in Fig. 2.1, where ‘atoms’ is tantamount to singulars, and ‘sums’ is tantamount
to plurals.
The singular/plural distinction as realized in Fig. 2.1 makes more precise our intuitions
on the contrast between nouns like book vs. books: the former refers to a set of book atoms
(e.g., {a, b, c}) while the later refers to a set of book sums ({a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}; but
see Sauerland et al., 2005, for a finer grained notion of this contrast; we return to this point
below). When someone uses singular book, he is talking about single individuals; when he
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a+b+c
•
⇐ Sums
a+b a+c b+c
• • •
• • • ⇐ Atoms
a b c
Figure 2.1: The plural domain
uses books, he is talking about pluralities of books.
Nominal morphology is in some way sensitive to t en singularities (atoms) and pluralities
(sums) in Fig. 2.1; our task is to determine what this way is. If a noun’s denotation contains
individuals formed by the sum operation +, then that noun appears with plural morphology.
Thus, when talking about pluralities we use the plural form of the relevant noun. When
referencing atomic individuals, we use the singular form. What follows is a proposal linking
semantic number with morphological number.
Sauerland (2003) develops an extensional account of the semantics of morphological num-
ber: When a DP like the book references a single individual, singular morphology surfaces on
the nominal and eﬀects singular agreement with other elements in the sentence. When a DP
does not reference a single individual, plural morphology and agreement result. The role of
checking the numerosity of nominal referents is given to a syntactic head that projects above
the determiner; Sauerland terms this element the φ-head. The structure in (1) results.
(1) Nominal structure from Sauerland (2003):
φP
φ
[sg/pl]
DP
D
the
NP
books
The φ-heads host number features, which control agreement. The sg head determines the
morphological singular form, and the pl head determines the morphological plural. One
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process establishes agreement within the nominal between nouns, adjectives, determiners,
and the φ-head. Another process establishes agreement between the φP in subject position
and the finite verb.
The crux of Sauerland’s proposal is that only the number features in φ are semantically
interpreted. Moreover, these features are interpreted as presuppositions. He endows the
φ-heads with the semantics in (2). They are identity functions that take an individual and
return that individual if certain conditions are met.
(2) φ-heads from Sauerland (2003):
a. [[sg]] = id{x∈De|¬∃a(atom(w)(a)∧a<x∧a̸=x)}
b. [[pl]] = idDe
(3) φ-heads from Sauerland (2003):
a. [[sg]] = λx: ¬∃a[ATw(a) ∧ a<x ∧ a̸=x]. x
b. [[pl]] = λx. x
(3) translates Sauerland’s notation into one that matches our conventions here. Singular sg
encodes the presupposition that the nominal referent has no atomic proper part, which in
eﬀect limits possible referents to atoms or portions of substance (e.g., the water). Plural pl
makes no demands beyond requiring that its sister denote a (plural) individual.
There are at least two reasons to doubt the hierarchical placement and referent-checking
semantics of Sauerland’s φP. First, nominals express morphological number in the absence of
a determiner, as in NP conjunction or compounds. More importantly for our purposes, if the
role of the morphological singular, sg, is always to check the atomicity of the referent, we
have no hope of allowing singular-marked nominals to refer to a plural individual: singular
morphology would mandate atomic reference, which precludes sums. Next, we consider
minimal yet significant changes to Sauerland’s general proposal.
Following Sauerland (2003) (see also Sauerland et al., 2005), let us assume that the locus
of syntactic number features is a designated functional head. To distinguish the current
approach from Sauerland’s, we term this element the #-head. Morphological number marking
arises as a result of syntactic agreement with #. In this system, morphological number is
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never directly interpreted; the determination of semantic number is a separate but related
process. That is, the #-heads do not contribute directly to the semantics of the nominals
with which they compose. Instead, the #-head that surfaces depends on the semantics of the
nominal with which it composes. The details follow.
We find (minimally) two variants of the #-heads: sg and pl.3 Here we depart from
Sauerland (2003), who assumes that φ composes once a nominal references individuals, i.e.,
at the DP layer. Instead, suppose that # occurs as the sister to a sub-maximal nominal
projection as in (4) and serves as an identity map on the predicate denoted by the nominal
with which it composes.
(4) DP
D #P
# NP
This move allows for the account of measure terms and cross-linguistic patterns developed in
Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. Still, a major contribution of Sauerland’s work is the demonstration
that sg, and not pl, is semantically marked (see Sauerland et al., 2005, for a discussion of the
facts that lead to this conclusion). The #-head sg carries with it a numerical presupposition
for one-ness of the property with which it composes, (5-a). To satisfy the presupposition of sg,
every member of a predicate denotation must measure 1. pl carries no such presupposition,
(5-b). For now, assume that the measure µ relevant to the one-ness presuppotion of sg is
basic cardinality: µ(x) = µcard(x). The choice between sg and pl is mediated by Heim’s
(1991) principle of Maximize Presupposition, which ensures that sg is used whenever its
one-ness presupposition is met.
(5) #-heads:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀x∈P[ µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
Maximize Presupposition requires that when faced with a choice between two forms, for
3Additional #-heads are likely needed to account for dual, trial, paucal, etc., values of grammatical number.
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example sg and pl, one must choose the strongest (i.e., most restrictive) form possible. So
whenever a predicate may compose with sg, it must. Otherwise, pl surfaces.
At this point we must draw a clear distinction between morphological number, expressed
primarily by ø and -s in English and determined by the functional #-heads sg and pl, and
semantic number. Assume three books: a, b, and c. In its basic form, semantically singular
book denotes a set of atoms, (6-a). The star operator * (Link, 1983) closes the semantically
singular property, (6-a), under sum formation, +, and produces the plural property, (6-b).4
(6) a. [[book]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[*book]] = {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}
Suppose that in number marking languages nouns always express grammatical number. In
other words, they always appear in the presence of #. The semantically singular property in
(6-a) may compose with sg: every member of [[book]] is atomic and thus has cardinality 1,
so the presupposition of sg is satisfied. We thus predict that morphologically singular nouns
refer exclusively to atoms. All of the members of the semantically singular predicate in (6-a)
are atomic, and to reference a member of this predicate we use the morphologically singular
book. The semantically plural property in (6-b) does not satisfy the one-ness presupposition
of sg in (5-a) because there are elements of [[*book]] with cardinality greater than 1, namely
all of the sums formed on the basis of + (e.g., a+b, b+c, etc.). By precluding the combination
of semantically plural properties with sg, we correctly predict that morphologically singular
nouns do not refer to pluralities; if one were to reference pluralities, a semantically plural
property would be required, and so the morphologically plural form of the corresponding
noun would be used.
Without any presupposition on its use, pl may compose with either of the properties in
(6). What blocks pl’s combination with semantically singular properties, (6-a), and thus
accounts for why morphologically plural books is not used to refer exclusively to book atoms,
is the principle of Maximize Presupposition (Heim, 1991). Compare the strings in (7).
4 We construe semantic plurality as closure under sum, and not closure under sum less the atoms, in order
to account for the behavior of plurals in downward entailing or non-monotonic environments. There, plurals
may be used to refer to singularities. For example, if someone asks whether John has children, it would be
infelicitous to answer no when he has only one child. For a fuller discussion of these facts, see Sauerland et
al. (2005).
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(7) a. [[sg book]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[pl book]] = {a, b, c}
In choosing between the use of sg or pl with semantically singular properties, we see that
the two options are denotationally equivalent. The one-ness presupposition of sg is met by
the semantically singular property: every member has cardinality 1. Without any constraints
on its use, pl likewise readily composes with a semantically singular property. Therefore the
#-head, either sg or pl, serves as an identity map on the property, returning the same set
of individuals it took as an argument.
But Maximize Presupposition necessitates the use of the lexical item with the strongest
presuppositions (that are met). Because sg carries stronger presuppositions – pl has none
at all – with semantically singular properties we must use sg. It is only when sg’s one-ness
presupposition is not satisfied, i.e., when we have a semantically plural property containing
individuals with cardinality greater than 1, that pl is used. In this way, morphological
number corresponds directly to semantic number: the only licit combinations are sg with
semantically singular properties and pl with semantically plural properties.
Next, consider how numerals fit into this program of number marking. Suppose for now
that cardinal numerals are restrictive modifiers: they compose with predicates and restrict
the predicates’ denotation to those elements with the appropriate cardinality.5
(8) a. [[one]]⟨⟨e,t⟩,⟨e,t⟩⟩ = λPλx. P(x) ∧ µcard(x) = 1
b. [[two]]⟨⟨e,t⟩,⟨e,t⟩⟩ = λPλx. P(x) ∧ µcard(x) = 2
Recall the assumptions regarding morphological and semantic number; the semantics for the
#-heads are repeated in (9), and the semantics of plurality in (10). Assume further that
numerals project between the noun and the # projection: # > numeral > NP. We address
the motivation behind this structural assumption once we extend the account to measure
terms in Section 2.4.
5For discussion of numerals as modifiers, see Link (1987), Verkuyl (1993), Carpenter (1995), Landman
(2003), among others; we explicate these assumptions regarding numeral semantics in Section 2.4.1.
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(9) #’s semantics:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀x∈P[ µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
(10) Semantic number :
a. [[book]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[*book]] = {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}
(11) a. [[one book]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[one *book]] = {a, b, c}
The numeral one may compose with either a semantically singular or a semantically plural
property; in either case, the resulting denotation is a set of atoms, each with cardinality 1,
(11). This set of atoms satisfies the one-ness presupposition of sg, (12-a): every member has
cardinality 1. Because the presupposition of sg is satisfied once one composes, Maximize
Presupposition rules out the choice of pl, (12-c,d), and thus rules out one books. Again,
composing restrictive one with either a semantically singular or a semantically plural property
necessarily returns a set of individuals, each with cardinality 1, a set that allows for the
morphological singular form on the basis of sg. Because sg may be used in the presence of
one, it must be used.
If we want to rule out the composition of a semantically plural property with singular
morphology, as in (12-b), we may appeal to a principle of economy, whereby the strings with
and without * compete: because (12-a) and (12-b) are denotationally equivalent, and because
(12-b) is more complex (it contains the pluralizing *-operator), (12-b) is uneconomical and
therefore aberrant.6
6Note that we have no evidence suggesting that the combination of one with a semantically plural property
should be ruled out by our system: the strings [sg one book ] and [sg one *book ] will both spell out as one
book and denote the same set of individuals.
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(12) One + sg
a. ✓ [[sg one book]] = {a, b, c}
b. ✗ [[sg one *book]] = {a, b, c}, but failure of economy principle7
c. ✗ [[pl one book]] = failure to apply Maximize Presupposition
d. ✗ [[pl one *book]] = failure to apply Maximize Presupposition
The numeral two with its restrictive semantics in (8-b) requires that the property with
which it composes be semantically plural. When two composes with a semantically singular
property, it looks among a set of atoms for individuals with the appropriate cardinality and
finds none; the result is the empty set. We must say, then, that necessarily denoting the
empty set, as in (13-b,d), is deviant and thus ruled out. Such a move should be familiar
from recent work on the ungrammaticality that results from logical triviality (e.g., Gajewski,
2002). With semantically plural properties, two readily composes and restricts the nominal’s
denotation to those individuals with cardinality 2. The one-ness presupposition of sg fails
on such a denotation because it is not the case that all members number 1, (13-c). Because
the presupposition of sg fails, we must use pl instead, thus two books as in (13-a).
(13) Two + pl
a. ✓ [[pl two *book]] = {a+b, a+c, b+c}
b. ✗ [[pl two book]] = Ø
c. ✗ [[sg two *book]] = presupposition failure
d. ✗ [[sg two book]] = Ø
At this point we appear to have an account of number marking in the presence of numerals
for basic count nouns like book in English. Our task now is to extend the coverage of this
account. We first consider two diﬀerent systems of number marking from Turkish andWestern
Armenian. We then return to English and explore the semantics of measure terms like kilo,
which, to all intents and purposes, behave as nouns, yet do not appear to refer in the way
that a noun like book does. Without clear referents to check the atomicity of, we must assess
7From Sauerland (2003): “Do not use the plural if the resulting meaning is identical to the meaning of the
singular in the present context.”
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what it means to be semantically singular for these nouns.
2.3 Shortcomings of the present account
Suppose that number marking finds its value (singular vs. plural) on the basis of one-ness,
as in the system of morphological number sketched above. Whenever a predicate satisfies
the condition of one-ness, singular morphology surfaces. This condition of one-ness remains
purposefully vague. We saw that when it is tied to the cardinality of the members of a nominal
denotation, the condition correctly captures the pattern of number marking in the presence
of numerals on basic nouns like book in English. But that cannot be the end of the story.
In this section, we consider two additional sets of data that demonstrate the limited ability
of cardinality to determine the one-ness of a predicate. We begin with number marking and
numerals in Turkish, then we return to English and look at the behavior of measure terms
like kilo.
2.3.1 Cross-linguistic variation
Languages vary with respect to their patterns of number marking in the presence of numerals.
So far, we have considered one type of language, exemplified by English, in which the nu-
meral one co-occurs with singular-marked nouns and all other numerals require plural-marked
nouns. Here we consider data from two other types of languages. In the first, all numerals
obligatorily combine with singular-marked nouns (‘one book’, ‘two book’; e.g., Turkish or
Hungarian; Bale et al., 2011a; Farkas and de Swart, 2010); in the second, numerals option-
ally combine with either singular- or plural-marked nouns (‘one/two book(s)’; e.g., Western
Armenian; Bale et al., 2011a). Bale et al. (2011a) oﬀer an account of these facts that treats
nominal denotations and numeral semantics as distinct across languages. Farkas and de Swart
(2010) derive the patterns within the framework of Optimality Theory. Here we adopt the
null hypothesis that the denotations of nouns and numerals remain constant across number
marking languages, and assume that a standard compositional semantics determines number
morphology. With this is mind, our system for number marking as it stands cannot account
for either of these patterns.
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Turkish possesses a morphological distinction between singular and plural nouns, as ev-
idenced in (14); the morpheme -lar indexes plurality.8 The choice of this morphology is
regular and well-defined; the singular form is used to reference singular individuals and the
plural form references pluralities. So far, tying the one-ness presupposition of sg to basic
cardinality can capture these facts, as in the case of English.
(14) a. c¸ocuk
boy(sg)
b. c¸ocuk-lar
boy-pl
Unlike with English, however, in Turkish-like languages all numerals, crucially those greater
than ‘one’, require singular morphology. Concretely, in the presence of a numeral, -lar is
prohibited, (15-b). In other words, nouns in Turkish are obligatorily singular, at least mor-
phologically so, when they occur with numerals.
(15) a. iki
two
c¸ocuk
boy(sg)
‘two boys’
b. *iki
two
c¸ocuk-lar
boy-pl
Despite clear reference to more than one individual, i.e., to two boys, the noun c¸ocuk ‘boy’
in (15-a) expresses singular morphology.
We find a more complex pattern of number marking in Western Armenian. Like Turkish
and English, Western Armenian possesses productive plural morphology: the morpheme -ner
indexes plurality.
(16) a. degha
boy(sg)
b. degha-ner
boy-pl
Western Armenian’s pattern of number marking in the presence of numerals represents a
hybrid of the English and Turkish systems: nouns either may appear as morphologically
singular in the presence of a numeral greater than ‘one’, as in Turkish, or they may appear
8All cross-linguistic data in this subsection come from Bale et al. (2011a).
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as morphologically plural, as in English.9
(17) a. yergu
two
degha
boy(sg)
‘two boys’
b. yergu
two
degha-ner
boy-pl
‘two boys’
Assuming the system of number marking developed in the previous section for English, we
predict neither the Turkish facts in (15) nor the Western Armenian facts in (17). The problem
is that we have aligned semantic and morphological number so that the morphologically
singular nouns are semantically singular, and we have assumed a restrictive semantics for
numerals under which numerals greater than ‘one’ require semantic plurality for the predicate
with which they compose. Both of the strings in (18) are aberrant. (18-a) fails because ‘two’
applied to a semantically singular predicate returns the empty set. (18-b) fails because the
one-ness presupposition of sg, at least when it is tied to basic cardinality, cannot be met by
a predicate containing plural individuals.
(18) a. [[sg two book]] = Ø
b. [[sg two *book]] = Presupposition failure
What we need is a way to allow singular-marked nominals to receive a plural interpretation,
that is, to be semantically plural. Our approach will be to reevaluate the numerical presup-
position we have attributed to the #-head sg so that it may also compose with semantically
plural nouns in the presence of a numeral. Before doing so, however, we consider additional
data for which our system of number marking must account.
9This description of morphological number in Western Armenian from Bale et al. (2011a) is likely an
idealization, resulting from the confluence of distinct dialects; see Sigler (1996) for a fuller discussion of
the facts. Keeping in mind that much more work remains to be done to better understand the nuanced
interpretations of these nominals, our goal will be to leave open the option of our approach accounting for the
Western Armenian system as it is presented in Bale et al. (2011a).
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2.3.2 Measure terms
So far we have been considering number marking on basic nouns like book and boy. These
nouns may be viewed as one-place predicates, denoting sets of individuals holding the relevant
property. We defined semantic number for these predicates in terms of the cardinality of the
members of their denotations: if a predicate refers to a set of atoms, it is semantically singular;
if the predicate is closed under sum-formation, it is semantically plural. But what happens
when we have nouns that do not refer to individuals, atomic or otherwise, that still behave
regularly with respect to number marking? Of interest are the italicized words in (19).
(19) a. That meat weighs two kilos.
b. I ate two kilos of meat.
We must first convince ourselves that measure terms like kilo are nouns, or at least nomi-
nal to the extent that they should be handled by the same system of number marking that
determines the morphology of book vs. books. To begin, measure terms display regular singu-
lar/plural morphology: kilo vs. kilos. Furthermore, they are free to combine with numerals
and when they do they behave as expected, reserving the morphological singular form for
the numeral one: one kilo vs. two kilos. Like basic nouns, measure terms constitute an open
class: a nonce word may be substituted for a measure term and still we can conclude that
the intended meaning involves a quantity or extent identified by the nonce word (but see the
discussion in Wellwood, 2014). Finally, measure terms are subject to quantifier restrictions:
many kilos but not much kilos.
Assuming that we take these facts as evidence that measure terms are nouns, what do
we make of the semantics of singular vs. plural for them? The current schema relating
morphological and semantic number is summarized in (20); it is unclear how this schema
could apply to measure terms.
(20) Relationship between nominal referents and morphology :
a. atoms ⇒ sg
b. sums of atoms ⇒ pl
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The problem is that measure terms do not appear to refer in the way that boy does. What
kind of atoms are kilos, meters, degrees, etc.? What would it mean to close sets of these
supposed atoms under sum formation? We thus take as our starting point the idea that
measure terms are nouns which do not refer directly to individuals.
Without a referring semantics for measure terms we immediately face a problem in han-
dling these nouns within our system of number marking. Recall the semantics for the #-heads,
(21), where the one-ness presupposition of singular morphology depends on the cardinality
of the members of the relevant property.
(21) #’s semantics:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀x∈P[ µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
Without atoms to count, the one-ness presupposition of sg is meaningless in the context
of measure terms. Perhaps more damningly, even if we have a simple predicate denotation
for phrases that contain measure terms such that they denote a set of individuals, what
matters to the number morphology of these terms is not cardinality, but rather the measure
specified by the term itself: the choice between one kilo and two kilos does not depend on
how many atomic individuals weigh the relevant amount. In one kilo of apples, we possibly
(and probably) reference more than a single apple, yet singular morphology surfaces on the
measure term. What matters in the determination is not the measure in cardinality, but
rather the measure in kilograms: when the individuals referenced measure 1 with respect to
the kilo measure, singular morphology surfaces on the measure term.
In treating measure terms under our system of number marking, we will need to settle on
a semantics for these terms and ensure that the morphological distinction between singular
and plural attends to cardinality in the case of basic nouns and specific measures in the case
of measure terms.
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2.4 Proposed analysis
In what follows, we revise our system of number marking in the presence of numerals from
Section 2.2 so that it may handle both measure terms and the observed cross-linguistic vari-
ation. We start by adopting a referential semantics for numbers that has cardinal numerals
formed on the basis of the functional element card (Zabbal, 2005). Next, we align the seman-
tics of measure terms with card and make clearer the assumptions concerning the measure
relevant to the one-ness presupposition of sg. Finally, we locate the parameter determining
cross-linguistic variation in the selection of the measure relevant to the one-ness presupposi-
tion of sg. The resulting proposal attributes measurement – and therefore counting – not to
numerals proper, but to a functional projection M(easure)P. In number marking languages,
M0 often goes unpronounced, silently relating a numeral with the predicate denoted by a
noun.
2.4.1 Numeral semantics
We started with minimal assumptions about numerals: they are property modifiers, type
⟨⟨e, t⟩ , ⟨e, t⟩⟩, and they occupy a position intermediate between # and NP. Now, we fill in
the details of these assumptions.
First, concerning their structure, assume that numerals occupy the specifier of a functional
projection NumP (Selkirk 1977; Hurford 1987; Gawron 2002; a.o.), and that NumP occurs
hierarchically between NP and DP (Ritter, 1992).
(22) Structure of NumP :
DP
D NumP
numeral Num′
Num NP
For their semantics, take numerals to be individual-denoting expressions referring to natural
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numbers: numerals are of type n. In other words, we adopt a platonistic approach to numbers.
The choice of Num0 determines the function of the numeral (e.g., cardinal, ordinal, etc.;
Zabbal 2005). Cardinal numerals are those that serve the purpose of counting; they are
formed on the basis of the Num-head card, which takes a predicate and returns a relation
between numbers and individuals (in the spirit of Krifka (1989)). In (24), semantically plural
*boy composes with card and the numeral two. The result restricts the denotation of *boy
to just those (plural) individuals with cardinality 2.
(23) [[card]] = λPλnλx. P(x) ∧ µcard(x) = n
(24) [[two card *boy]] = λx. *boy(x) ∧ µcard(x) = 2
Note that card delivers the restrictive semantics for cardinal numerals that we assumed
above: after composing with a predicate and a number n, card restricts that predicate’s
denotation to just those members with cardinality n. This restrictive semantics ensures that
cardinals greater than ‘one’ must compose with a semantically plural predicate (formed via
*), as in (25-b). Were such cardinals to compose with a semantically singular, i.e., atomic
predicate, (25-a), the result would be the empty set, (25-c): there are no individuals in the
denotation of an atomic predicate with cardinality greater than 1.
(25) Assuming three boys:
a. [[boy]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[*boy]] = {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}
c. [[two card boy]] = Ø
d. [[two card *boy]] = {a+b, a+c, b+c}
Next, let us preserve the semantics we gave to the #-heads, repeated below, and see how
this semantics interact with our revised assumptions concerning cardinal numerals. The full
nominal structure, including both NumP and #P, appears in (27).
(26) #’s semantics:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀x∈P[ µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
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(27) Nominal structure:
DP
D #P
# NumP
numeral Num′
Num
card
NP
The #-head takes the nominal, NumP, as an argument. Continue to assume that the
measure relevant to the one-ness presupposition of sg is cardinality (note that cardinality is
the measure supplied by the closest head to #, card; more on this below). Number marking
in the presence of numerals proceeds as it did above (cf. (12) and (13)):
(28) Number marking with one:
a. ✓ [[sg one card book]] = {a, b, c}
b. ✗ [[sg one card *book]] = {a, b, c}, but failure of economy principle
c. ✗ [[pl one card book]] = failure to apply Maximize Presupposition
d. ✗ [[pl one card *book]] = failure to apply Maximize Presupposition
(29) Number marking with two:
a. ✓ [[pl two card *book]] = {a+b, a+c, b+c}
b. ✗ [[pl two card book]] = Ø
c. ✗ [[sg two card *book]] = presupposition failure
d. ✗ [[sg two card book]] = Ø
Again, with cardinality determining number marking, one may (and therefore must) compose
with sg, which results in singular morphology on the co-occurring nominal, as in (28-a).
Concretely, sg (the determinant of singular morphology) checks whether every member of
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the denotation of a nominal predicate evaluates to 1 with respect to the measure µcard in
its presupposition. With two and other numerals greater than one, the presupposition of
sg fails, so pl must be used instead. The result is plural morphology on the co-occurring
nominal, as in (29-a). In other words, we correctly derive one book and two books.
We thus maintain our coverage of basic nouns with numerals. Why, then, have we gone
to the trouble of revising our assumptions concerning numerals? As we shall see in what
follows, viewing numerals as referring expressions that serve as an argument of the functional
counting element card allows for a straightforward account of number marking on measure
terms.
2.4.2 Accounting for measure terms
Before we can attempt to apply our system of number marking to measure terms, we must
settle on a semantics for these nouns. Although we treat measure term semantics much more
fully in the following chapter, we begin here with a preliminary semantics. To this end, note
that measure terms appear to have two distinct uses. In the first, their ostensibly intran-
sitive use, measure terms compose with a numeral and reference an abstract measurement
or extent. They appear intransitive because we lack an overt substance noun. Intransitive
measure terms typically occur as the objects of measure verbs (e.g., measure, weigh, etc.), as
in (30-a). They also appear in predicative be constructions, (30-b), as well as modifiers of
gradable adjectives, (30-c), and in equative constructions, (30-d).
(30) Intransitive measure terms:
a. John weighs 100 kilos.
b. The temperature is 70 degrees.
c. John is two meters tall.
d. Ten degrees Fahrenheit is colder than ten degrees Celsius.
In (30-a), the measure phrase 100 kilos specifies the extent of John’s weight. Similarly, in
(30-c), two meters specifies the extent of John’s height.
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Intransitive uses of measure terms contrast with their transitive use, where we have
an overt nominal argument that provides the material to be measured.10 Given its role in
the resulting interpretation, here we term this nominal argument the substance noun. The
substance noun can be introduced via partitive, (31), or pseudo-partitive constructions, (32).
In what follows, we will focus on measure terms in pseudo-partitives, where the connection
between the measure term and the substance noun is more direct (Selkirk, 1977).
(31) Partitive:
a. I drank two liters of that wine.
b. I ate two kilos of those apples.
(32) Pseudo-partitive:
a. I drank two liters of wine.
b. I ate two kilos of apples.
In (32), the measure terms serve to quantize the denotations of the substance noun: the
measure phrase uses the specified extent familiar from intransitive uses to restrict the deno-
tation of the nominal complement.11 For example, in (32-b), two kilos of apples denotes a
set of apple individuals: those pluralities of apples that measure two kilos. It remains to be
shown how transitive measure terms, together with the accompanying numeral, measure and
quantize the substance noun. We must also be explicit about how intransitive measure terms
interact with a numeral to specify extents along a dimension. Lastly, we must determine
the relationship between transitive and intransitive measure terms. Let us work backwards,
focusing first on the semantics of measure phrases like two kilos and two kilos of apples. We
can then decide on an appropriate semantics for the measure terms themselves that will yield
the desired semantics for measure phrases.
As noted above, measure phrases denote sets of individuals, or predicates. For example,
the intransitive measure phrase 100 kilos in (30-a) names the property of weighing 100 kilos,
a property we then ascribe to John. In (32-b), two kilos of apples denotes the property of
10Parsons (1970) terms transitive vs. intransitive uses of measure terms ‘applied’ and ‘isolated’, respectively.
11Strictly speaking, the measure term restricts the denotation of the predicate counterpart of the kind
named by the substance noun.
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being a collection of apples that weighs two kilos. Supposing we want our measure phrases to
be predicate-denoting, type ⟨e, t⟩, we can conceive of the measure terms as relations between
numbers and individuals.
Under this relational conception, in the intransitive use a measure term takes a numeral
and returns the set of individuals that satisfy the relevant measure to the extent specified by
the numeral. In this way, a measure phrase like 100 kilos will be true of an individual just
in case it weighs 100 kilos: supply 100 as the numeral argument to the relation in (33) and
the predicate of weighing 100 kilos results, as in (34).
(33) [[kilo]]⟨n,⟨e,t⟩⟩ = λnλx. µkg(x) = n
(34) [[100 kilos]] = λx. µkg(x) = 100
In their transitive uses, measure terms take an additional argument: the substance noun.
Complements of transitive measure terms used in pseudo-partitive constructions may only
be bare plurals or mass nouns, suggesting that they refer at the kind level. We may use
the semantics for intransitive measure terms in (33) as the basis for the transitive measure
term semantics, where the only diﬀerence is that the latter takes an additional kind-denoting
internal argument supplied by the substance noun.12
(35) [[kilo]]⟨k,⟨n,⟨e,t⟩⟩⟩ = λkλnλx.
∪k(x) ∧ µkg(x) = n
(36) [[card]] = λPλnλx. P(x) ∧ µcard(x) = n
It bears noting that the semantic type given here for transitive measure terms resembles that
given to our Num-head card: ⟨k, ⟨n, ⟨e, t⟩⟩⟩ vs. ⟨⟨e, t⟩ , ⟨n, ⟨e, t⟩⟩⟩. The only diﬀerence is
that where card takes a predicate-denoting argument (it may compose with singular count
nous), measure terms require a kind. The parallels in structure are obvious: card takes
a predicate-denoting argument and then a numeral, forming NumP. A measure term (e.g.,
kilo) takes a kind-denoting argument and then a numeral, forming M(easure)P. The relevant
12The following chapter provides a detailed discussion of the relationship between transitive and intransitive
uses of measure terms. There we will see that so-called ‘intransitive’ uses of measure terms feature an implicit
kind argument. In other words, the transitive semantics of measure terms is prior.
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structures appear in (37) and (38).13
(37) Cardinal numeral structure:
DP
D #P
# NumP
numeral Num′
Num
card
NP
(38) Measure term structure:
DP
D #P
# MP
numeral M′
M
kilo
nP
Ostensibly intransitive measure terms lack an overt internal argument. We might therefore
conclude that their structure diﬀers from that of a transitive measure term in the absence of
a nominal complement, as in (39). So far we have noted both structural and semantic simi-
13For now, the substance noun in the measure term structure in (38) is labeled as nP. The label is meant to
indicate only that the substance noun is kind-denoting and expresses morphological number, but likely does
not project a full DP. The following chapter provides a fuller discussion of the structure of measure phrases,
including the role of the particle of.
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larities between card and measure terms; we can pursue the parallel between these elements
further by observing that, like measure terms, card also allows ostensibly intransitive uses.
Transitive uses are far more common, and constitute standard cardinal numerals (i.e., three
boys). Intransitive use of card, where a cardinal appears without an overt NP complement,
include constructions such as the boys are three or those books number ten. As with intran-
sitive measure terms, intransitive cardinal numerals serve as predicates.14 The structure for
an intransitive cardinal appears in (40).
(39) Intransitive measure phrase:
#P
# MP
numeral M
kilo
(40) Intransitive cardinal numeral :
#P
# NumP
numeral Num
card
Given the similarities between card and measure terms like kilo, the following innovation
suggests itself: align card with measure terms, such that both instantiate the category M.
This move requires us to conceive of MP more generally, taking it to be a measure phrase
counting either atoms (card) or something more abstract (kilo). In both cases, the measure
14Chapter 5.1.3 compares card with true classifiers in languages like Mandarin Chinese. There, we observe
the striking similarity in function and behavior between these two elements. Strengthening the connection
between card and classifiers, Greenberg (1972) notes that all of the classifier languages he considers allow
for intransitive uses of classifiers in parallel to intransitive uses of card. He calls these uses ‘anaphoric’,
suggesting that the uses are not in fact intransitive but instead presuppose nominal relata. This is the same
we will give to the so-called intransitive uses observed here.
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is specified by the head of the phrase.
(41) Generalizing MP :
DP
D #P
# MP
numeral M′
M
card/kilo
NP/nP
One advantage of this move is that it allows us to account for number marking on measure
terms. First, consider the problem.
As in the case of card, an MP headed by an measure term denotes a nominal predicate,
which may then be checked against the one-ness presupposition of sg. In (42), we have the
denotation of one kilo of apples.
(42) [[one kilo (of) apples]] = λx. ∪apple(x) ∧ µkg(x) = 1
Like one boy, one kilo of apples denotes a set of individuals. The measure term kilo constrains
the denotation of apples on the basis of the kilo measure, µkg. One kilo of apples thus
denotes the set of apple individuals measuring 1 kilo. However, the average apple weighs
approximately 0.2 kilos, so in most scenarios the individuals denoted by one kilo of apples
will be pluralities, or sums of individuals. In other words, the individuals denoted by one kilo
of apples will not have cardinality 1. Checking such a set against the one-ness presupposition
of sg relativized to µcard therefore fails, and so we incorrectly predict plural morphology on
kilo in (42): one kilos of apples.
Note that Sauerland’s (2003) referent-based system does not fare any better: φ occurs as
the sister to DP, and absolute atomicity of the individual denoted by DP determines number
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morphology. However, in one kilo of apples vs. two+ kilos of apples, the referent is a quantity
of apples and yet the number of apples measuring 1 or 2+ kilos is irrelevant to the number
morphology expressed on kilo. Number marking on measure terms is determined instead by
the value of the numeral present: only with one do we have singular morphology.
For our system of number marking to handle both basic nouns and measure terms, the
one-ness presupposition of English’s sg cannot be invariantly tied to cardinality (and through
cardinality to semantic number). However, recall that cardinality does yield the correct
pattern of number marking in the case of cardinal numerals: in one boy, but not two boys,
every individual referenced has cardinality 1, so we get singular morphology on the noun.
Further note that the cardinality measure, µcard, comes specified by card in the presence
of a cardinal numeral: card occupies M0, the head closest to # (cf. the structure in (41)).
Here is the claim: in English, the measure specified by the head of #’s sister determines the
measure µ relevant to the one-ness presupposition of sg.
(43) #’s semantics:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀x∈P[ µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
With cardinal numerals, card is the closest head to # and so the measure relevant to the one-
ness presupposition of sg is cardinality, µcard. Because sg checks for one-ness on the basis of
cardinality in the presence of cardinal numerals, the singular/plural distinction on basic nouns
like book is sensitive to the semantic number of the predicate in question: when the predicate
is closed under sum-formation and contains pluralities in its denotation, it no longer satisfies
the one-ness presupposition of sg and so pl must be used. The result is plural morphology
with semantically plural predicates (i.e., those that include plural individuals formed via
sum). Only when the predicate is semantically singular, and thus atomic, will the one-ness
presupposition of sg be met on the basis of cardinality. We thus maintain our coverage of
number marking on basic nouns, preserving the intuition that singular morphology indexes
reference to atoms and plural morphology indexes reference to pluralities (at least in most
cases; see Fn. 4). Furthermore, we correctly predict singular morphology on basic nouns only
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with the numeral one.
Assuming that the measure in the one-ness presupposition of sg is supplied by the closest
head, measure terms both specify the relevant measure for which one-ness must be satisfied
(e.g., µkg, µdegree, µlb, etc.) and have number morphology expressed on them (e.g., kilo vs.
kilos). Here is why: Like card, measure terms occupy the head of #’s sister. Also like
card, measure terms supply a measure: µkg in the case of kilo, µdegree in the case of degree,
etc. With the measure term kilo heading MP, M0 comes specified for the kilogram measure,
µkg. In (42), every member of the set denoted by one kilo of apples necessarily evaluates to
1 with respect to the kilo measure. With a diﬀerent numeral, say two, no longer does every
member measure 1 kilo; in fact, no member does.
Here is our pattern of number marking on English measure terms. To repeat: The
measure supplied by the measure term – and not absolute cardinality – determines nominal
number morphology. In the presence of numerals, singular morphology is checked against the
measure specified by the head closest to #. When those numerals are cardinals, the head
is card and µcard determines singular morphology. When those numerals are arguments of
measure terms, the specific measure named by the term itself determines singular morphology.
Crucially, when the numeral is one, everything in the denotation of #’s sister will necessarily
measure 1 with respect to the measure supplied by M0, allowing for singular morphology.
When the numeral is something other than one, nothing in the sister of # will measure 1
with respect to the measure supplied by the term, so pl must be used.
In sum, we have seen that the measure relevant to the one-ness presupposition of sg is
underspecified, and that in English this measure is supplied by the head closest to #. In the
case of cardinal numerals, cardinality determines number morphology: card is the head of
#’s sister and card measures cardinality. In the case of measure terms, the specific measure
supplied by the given term determines number morphology. With kilo, everything in MP
must measure 1 kilo in order for the one-ness presupposition of sg to be satisfied; only when
the numeral one appears with kilo does this state of aﬀairs holds. In this way, we account
for number marking on measure terms in the presence of numerals, which, as we have seen,
is sensitive to the numeral present and not to the number of individuals referenced.
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The system as it stands yields the desired patterns, but it faces the problem of not being
compositional: Some sort of magic looks into the semantics of the measure heads and plugs
the relevant measure into the one-ness presupposition of sg. We can do better. In order to
compositionally attribute the measure internal to M0 to the one-ness presupposition of sg,
we must consider what all of these measures have in common; we can then hang our system
of English number marking on this property of measures.
MP will always denote a property that is quantity-uniform with respect to the measure
internal to the semantics of M0. In other words, every individual in the denotation of MP
will evaluate to the same extent. (44) provides a formal definition of this notion.
(44) Quantity-uniform property :
QUµ(P) = 1 iﬀ ∀x∀y[ P(x) ∧ P(y) → µ(x) = µ(y) ]
Take, for example, the MP one boy. Assuming three boys, we get the denotation in (46).
(45) [[one card boy]] = {a, b, c}
In (45), card heads MP, and internal to card is the cardinality measure µcard. The predicate
one boy denotes a set of singular boys. When measured by µcard, every member returns the
same value, namely 1. With one kilo of apples, kilo heads MP and supplies the kilo measure
µkg; the predicate denotes a set of apple individuals that each return the same value when
measured by µkg: 1. The reader can verify that any measure supplied by M0 behaves similarly.
Given that the aim is to tie the one-ness presupposition to the measures in M0, all we need
do is relativize this presupposition to just those measures that determine quantity-uniform
properties, as defined in (60).
(46) English #-heads:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀µ∀x∈P[ QUµ(P) → µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
What results is a fully compositional account of English number marking: with cardinal
numerals, number marking is sensitive to the quantity-uniform measure µcard, that is, to the
semantic number of nominal predicates. With measure terms, number marking is sensitive
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to the quantity-uniform measure supplied by the measure term itself, which in eﬀect links
number marking to the value of the co-occurring numeral: one takes sg regardless of the
number of intended referents.
In the next section, we see how our assumptions about the measures relevant to the
one-ness presupposition of sg may be extended to provide an account of the cross-linguistic
variation in number marking discussed in Section 2.3.1.
2.4.3 Relevant measures
In addition to deriving the English pattern of number marking for both basic and measure
nouns, we must also introduce suﬃcient flexibility into our system so that it may account for
the patterns in Turkish and Western Armenian. The approach will be to derive the Turkish
facts in addition to the English facts, and then assume variation within Western Armenian
such that it can employ either the English or the Turkish system.
Recall that in Turkish and languages like it all numerals require singular morphology,
which necessitates sg in numeral-noun constructions. With numerals greater than ‘one’, we
thus require sg in the presence of a semantically plural property. Consider once again the
structure of a nominal predicate modified by a cardinal numeral, as in (47-c).
(47) a. [[boy]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[*boy]] = {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}
c. [[two card *boy]] = {a+b, a+c, b+c}
The combination of sg with the numeral-modified predicate in (47-c) is problematic because
of the way we have aligned semantic and morphological number: we must allow singular-
marked nominals to receive a plural interpretation. As was our strategy in accounting for
measure terms in the previous subsection, here we will again take advantage of the flexibility
allowed for in the selection of the measure µ in the one-ness presupposition of sg. In English
we said that µ is supplied by the head closest to #, but this need not be the case in all
languages.
Given our semantics for card, cardinal numerals serve as restrictive modifiers: they
return a subset of a noun’s denotation populated by individuals with the appropriate cardi-
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nality. By ensuring that every element has the same cardinality, cardinal numerals quantize
the members of the resulting denotation. Crucially, every member of a quantized predicate
has no parts that are also members of that predicate; in other words, every member of a
quantized predicate is a smallest member (Krifka, 1989).
Take two boys in (47-c). This predicate is true of three (plural) individuals: a+b, a+c,
and b+c. Each of these individuals has no parts which are also in the denotation of two boys.
In this way, every member of the predicate two boys is a smallest member of the predicate
two boys: every member is an atom relative to the predicate in question. (We leave it to
the reader to check that this situation holds for any cardinal numeral.) In Turkish, then,
number marking appears to be sensitive not to absolute atomicity (evaluated by, for example,
the cardinality measure µcard) but rather to relative atomicity: quantized predicates bear
singular morphology. Here we need a notion of relative atomicity: counting as atomic not
with respect to the entire domain, but rather with respect to a specific predicate (Krifka,
1989; Chierchia, 1998b). We term these relative atoms ‘P-atoms’, the smallest elements of
P: those elements of P that have no other elements of P as parts.15
In Turkish, the measure relevant to the one-ness presupposition of sg should count the
smallest elements, or relative atoms of nominal predicates. This measure, µP-atom, is defined
in (48).
(48) µP-atom(y) is defined only if y∈P; when defined
µP-atom(y) = |{x∈P: x≤y & ¬∃z∈P[z<x]}|
(49) Turkish #-heads:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀x∈P[ µP-atom(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
(50) [[two card *boy]] = {a+b, a+c, b+c}
In the presence of cardinal numerals, # composes with a predicate as in (50). Every member
of this predicate has no parts which are themselves members of the predicate, therefore
15This notion of relative atomicity diﬀers from that found in Rothstein (2010a), where atoms are defined
relative to a context and not to a predicate.
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every member of this predicate measures 1 P-atom. Supposing µP -atom to be the measure
relevant to the #-heads, sg may – and, by Maximize Presupposition, must – be used with
(50). In fact, all numeral-noun combinations will have a quantized denotation wherein the
elements share a common cardinality, so it will necessarily be the case that every member
measures 1 P-atom. In other words, with µP-atom as the measure relevant to sg’s one-ness
presupposition, we predict singular morphology with all numerals. This is the pattern in
Turkish-like languages.16
One way to view the distinction between the Turkish and English patterns of number
marking in the presence of numerals is as a diﬀerence in whether the one-ness presupposition
of sg is relativized to the complement of # (i.e., MP; µP-atom) or to the head of its complement
(i.e., M0). In Turkish, we find the former strategy: because numerals, crucially those greater
than ‘one’, quantize the predicates that they modify into sets of relative atoms, the one-
ness presupposition of sg relativized to µP -atom will always be satisfied in the presence of
a numeral. In English, we saw that the head of #’s sister supplies the relevant measure:
either cardinality in the case of cardinal numerals (supplied by card) or the specific measure
supplied by measure terms.
The present account makes a prediction about number morphology on measure terms in
Turkish. Every member of a predicate like two kilos of apples will measure 1 P-atom. In
order to measure more than 1 P-atom, an individual would have to measure two kilos and
be a proper part of a diﬀerent member of the predicate that also measure two kilos. But this
is impossible: the monotonicity of the kilogram measure ensures that anything weighing two
kilos has no proper parts that weigh two kilos. We therefore expect singular morphology on
measure terms like kilo with all numerals in Turkish, which is precisely what we find in (51).
16Note that the approach correctly predicts singular agreement with all numerals in Turkish even if semantic
plurality in such languages is not mere sum-formation, *, but something stronger such as closure under sum
less the atoms, ⋆ (cf. Link, 1983; for arguments in favor of this stricter approach to plurality in Turkish, see
Bale et al., 2011a,b).
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(51) Turkish measure phrases:
a. elma-dan
apple-abl
bir
one
kilo(*-lar)
kilo-pl
‘one kilo of apples’
b. elma-dan
apple-abl
iki
two
kilo(*-lar)
kilo-pl
‘two kilos of apples’
Recall that in Western Armenian we find optionality between the English and Turkish sys-
tems: numerals greater than ‘one’ optionally combine with either singular- or plural-marked
nouns. To account for this optionality, simply assume that each of the two strategies above
(phrasal vs. head) is available when selecting the measure relevant to sg’s presupposition.
When the phrasal strategy is pursued, one-ness is relativized to P-atoms and so singular-
marked nominals appear with numerals greater than ‘one’; when the English-type, head-
based strategy is pursued, one-ness is sensitive to cardinality, and so we find plural-marked
nominals with these numerals.
We appear to have not only an account of number marking on basic nouns and measure
terms in English, but also an account of the cross-linguistic variation observed in patterns
of number marking. Crucially, both sets of phenomena receive an account once we assume
variation in the measure relevant to the determination of singularity.
2.5 Discussion
In our account of number marking in the presence of numerals, we have considered data from
three domains. First, we looked at basic nouns like book in English whose morphological
number depends solely on the semantic number of the property denoted by the nominal.
We also considered measure terms like kilo, assuming that these measure terms are nouns, at
least to the extent that they should be handled by the same system that treats morphological
number on basic nouns. Finally, we examined cross-linguistic variation in patterns of number
marking, drawing data from Turkish and Western Armenian.
Our account relied on three assumptions: 1) cardinal numerals are formed on the basis of
the functional element card⟨⟨e,t⟩,⟨n,⟨e,t⟩⟩⟩, 2) measure terms, like card, are relations between
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numbers and individuals, and 3) morphological number is determined by the head of the
functional projection #P, which serves as an identity map on the predicate denoted by the
nominal.
(52) a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀x∈P[ µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
sg carries with it a one-ness presupposition which ensures that every member of the nomi-
nal’s denotation measure 1 with respect to some relevant measure µ. In English, we saw that
µ is supplied by the head of the complement of #; in the case of cardinal numerals, cardi-
nality determines morphological number. With measure terms, µ is supplied by the measure
term itself; this accounts for why morphological number on these nouns is sensitive solely to
the numeral present. These measures cohere on the basis of determining quantity-uniform
predicates, as in (53).
(53) Quantity-uniform:
QUµ(P) = 1 iﬀ ∀x∀y[ P(x) ∧ P(y) → µ(x) = µ(y) ]
The full semantics for the English #-heads thus checks the one-ness presupposition of sg
against quantity-uniform measures:
(54) English #-heads:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀µ∀x∈P[ QUµ(P) → µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
Cross-linguistic variation in patterns of number marking falls out once we allow variation
in the selection of µ: In English, µ is relativized to the head of #’s sister; in Turkish, where
all numerals occur with singular-marked nouns, µ is relativized to the phrasal complement
of # on the basis of relative P-atoms. In other words, Turkish sg evaluates its one-ness
presupposition on the basis of relative atomicity via the measure in P-atoms, defined in (55).
(55) µP-atom(y) is defined only if y∈P; when defined:
µP-atom(y) = |{x∈P: x≤y & ¬∃z∈P[z<x]}|
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(56) Turkish #-heads:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀x∈P[ µP-atom(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
Numeral-modified nominals are quantized such that every member of the predicate is a small-
est member, so we correctly predict sg with all numerals when one-ness is tied to µP-atom.
In Western Armenian, where the pattern of number marking is intermediate between
the English and the Turkish systems, there is optionality in the selection of µ: either the
head or the phrasal approach may apply. Our account of this variation makes do with
a uniform syntax and semantics for numerals across these languages (cf. the variation in
numeral semantics proposed in Bale et al., 2011a) within a standard semantics framework
(cf. the OT account of Farkas and de Swart, 2010).
While the focus of this chapter has been the semantics of morphological number and its
interaction with numerals, the claims put forth carry consequences for theories of measure-
ment more broadly. We implicitly took kilo to stand in for all measure terms, but distinct
subclasses of quantizing nouns have been identified, including container nouns (e.g., glass;
Partee and Borschev, 2012) and English-style classifiers (e.g., grain; Chierchia, 1998a). The
next step is to see how these subclasses of measure terms behave within the proposed frame-
work, and whether they in fact possess distinct semantics. This is the topic of the next
chapter, which locates measure terms like kilo within a typology of quantizing nouns.
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Chapter 3
A Typology of Quantizing Nouns
The previous chapter proposed a mechanism by which the number marking on measure terms
is determined. The account focused on the word kilo, which was meant to stand in for any
measure term. However, we have yet to establish what it means to count as a measure term.
Furthermore, we lack a comprehensive description of their distribution, as well as of the
interpretations they yield. More importantly, measure terms like kilo inhabit the broader
class of quantizing nouns: those nouns that facilitate the counting or measuring of stuﬀ. We
therefore begin this chapter by investigating proposed examples of quantizing nouns from
the literature. We consider measure terms (e.g., kilo; Lønning, 1987), container nouns (e.g.
glass; Partee and Borschev, 2012), and atomizers (e.g., grain; Chierchia, 1998a), examining
whether these proposed subclasses in fact possess distinct semantics. We find support for
attributing diﬀerent semantics to each subclass after investigating the diﬀerent readings that
result from their respective uses (e.g., Greenberg, 1972; Selkirk, 1977; Doetjes, 1997; Chier-
chia, 1998a; Landman, 2004; Rothstein, 2009, 2010b). Three interpretations are considered:
the container reading yielded by a container noun, the measure reading resulting from a
measure term, and the atomizing reading of atomizers.1
The proposed account of these diﬀerences is based on a functional distinction between
container nouns, measure terms, and atomizers: with a measure reading, measure terms
project M(easure)P and feature the semantics of a measure, as proposed in the preceding
1To prefigure the case study of the degree noun amount in Chapter 4, each of these three readings is
definite in the sense that they reference salient, real-world objects.
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chapter, Section 2.4.2; with an container reading, container nouns project NP and have
the semantics of basic noun, modified by a prepositional phrase specifying the substance mea-
sured. Atomizers serve yet a diﬀerent function, behaving as transitive nouns and atomizing,
or partitioning their nominal relata.
With a better understanding of the readings admitted, together with the conditions that
govern their distribution, we revisit the transitive/intransitive distinction from Section 2.4.2,
wherein measure terms optionally appear with a complement noun. We then consider the op-
tional co-occurence of a numeral. The three subclasses of quantizing nouns proposed pattern
diﬀerently with respect to both phenomena: container nouns optionally appear without a
substance noun or numeral, measure terms must appear with a numeral, and atomizers must
appear with a substance noun. The restriction on these uses is shown to follow straightfor-
wardly from the semantics given to the diﬀerent subclasses of measure terms.
3.1 Identifying the object of study
In our examination of number marking on measure terms in the previous chapter, we identified
measure terms as words that specify a measure, that is, a relation between individuals and
natural numbers: µkg in the case of kilo or µlb in the case of pound. Another way to conceive
of measure terms is as a means by which a substance in quantized – that is, packaged – for
the purpose of measuring or counting.2 In this sense, kilo allows for the measurement of
a substance using the standard kilogram unit. A pseudo-partitive like three kilos of apples
identifies quantities of apples that, when measured by the kilogram measure, evaluate to
3. With this conception of measure terms as quantizers, what do we make of words like
grain, slice, quantity, etc., that, perhaps more directly, enable the counting of a substance
(Chierchia, 1998a)? Should these words form a class with measure terms like kilo (Lønning,
1987)? How about nouns like cup or bowl, which appear to implicate measurement in their
semantics (Partee and Borschev, 2012)?
As we shall see, delimiting the class of quantizing nouns is not a straightforward endeavor.
2Counting is a special case of measuring: individuals are related to natural numbers (which happen to be
restricted to the integers). With counting, these numbers correspond to a cardinality.
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We begin with uses of the descriptors ‘measure term’, ‘atomizer’, and ‘container noun’. In our
attempt to oﬀer concrete ways of understanding these terms, we will find that the proposed
classifications are at times ephemeral, allowing for a great deal of overlap. This observed
transience of definitions suggests a similar haziness in the distinctions that underlie them.
However, an examination of the behavior of these terms supports treating each descriptor as
identifying a unique and well-defined class of words, inhabiting the broader class of quantizing
nouns. Let us begin with the most unique of these subclasses: atomizers.
Chierchia (1998a) distinguishes between measure terms like kilo and what he calls ‘classi-
fiers’ like grain or drop. Before proceeding, it bears noting that traditional characterizations
of classifier languages would have English lack classifiers altogether (e.g., Greenberg, 1972;
Allan, 1977a,b; Denny, 1976, 1979; Adams and Conklin, 1973, among many others). Classi-
fiers are taken to be an epiphenomenon of classifier languages: a closed, small, contrasting set
of morphemes that designate countable units; classifier languages are those that require these
morphemes in the presence of numerals for the purpose of counting the referents of nouns.
The surfeit of words in English that (optionally) serve the purpose of enabling counting (i.e.,
what we are considering as quantizing nouns), together with the language’s ability to directly
count with a numeral, suggests a substantial divide between English and classifier languages.
However, as we shall see and as the discussion in Greenberg (1972) (see also Lehrer, 1986)
identifies, within the candidate set for quantizing nouns that we consider, English does pos-
sess a class of expressions that align with the definition of ‘classifier’, at least to the extent
that any term in a non-classifier language can. In an attempt to recognize the theoreti-
cal distinction between classifier languages and number marking languages like English, we
therefore adopt the term ‘atomizer’ for what others have called English classifiers. Once we
consider the semantics for atomizers, the motivation for this naming convention will become
more clear.
While both measure terms and atomizers inherently relate individuals or quantities with
numbers, as evidenced by their free use in the pseudo-partitive frame, Chierchia points out
that atomizers impose complex selectional restrictions on the nouns with which they com-
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pose.3 For example, the atomizer grain requires a substance structured with specific dimen-
sional properties (e.g., small, cylindrical, inanimate bodies), hence its inability to compose
with amorphous water or animate and inappropriately large men:
(1) *Four grains of that water/those men (Chierchia, 1998a)
Whereas atomizers necessitate certain properties of the nouns and corresponding sub-
stances with which they compose, measure terms enjoy a much freer distribution. Still,
the use of measure terms is not completely unconstrained. For example, kilo requires the
substance referenced by its nominal relata to possess the capacity for mass, just as degree
requires a capacity for temperature. These ontological requirements, however, operate at a
fundamentally diﬀerent level from constraints imposed by classifiers: intuitively, the former
constrain the domain of these relations, while the latter constrain their range.
In an attempt to characterize and thus predict the diﬀerences between atomizers and
measure terms, Chierchia (1998a) attributes diﬀerent functions to these two classes of words.
Atomizers are construed as (partial) functions from pluralities into sets of atoms constituted
by members of the pluralities. Thus, grain qua function applied to some substance, say rice,
returns the set of rice atoms with the appropriate spatial properties. Instead of mapping
to or constructing atoms, measure terms receive a semantics under which they are (partial)
functions from individuals (plural or atomic) into the set of (non-negative) real numbers. Here
it is important to note that Chierchia treats measure terms as measures proper. Applying
kilo to an apple individual, the result is the kilo measure applied to that individual. As
functions into sets of atoms, nominal phrases featuring atomizers, e.g., two grains of rice,
reference individuals, whereas measure phrases, e.g., two kilos of apples, reference something
more abstract like number or extent along some scale.
This diﬀerentiation of function between atomizers and measure terms stands to explain
the diﬀerences in selectional restrictions observed above. Because atomizers necessarily ac-
cess atoms, they may constrain those atoms along certain dimensions. Viewed as a relation
between individuals (atomic or otherwise) and abstract numbers, measure terms have no op-
3The label ‘pseudo-partitive’ is used here merely to indicate the string [numeral ] [quantizing noun] [of ]
[substance noun]. The discussion that follows describes how this string results from many diﬀerent structures,
only one of which serves as a candidate for the theory-laden label ‘pseudo-partitive’.
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portunity to make demands of the individuals at play beyond requiring that they inhabit the
relevant function’s domain. On the basis of this functional distinction, two other diﬀerences
in behavior between atomizers and measure terms fall out.
First, measure terms combine with a restricted set of quantificational determiners. Con-
cretely, quantifiers that operate over individuals like every, most, or no cannot co-occur with
measure terms, (2).4 Such quantifiers readily compose with atomizers, (3). Once we settle on
a semantics of these terms, we will see that the quantifier restriction for measure terms falls
out from their number-seeking semantics, a feature absent from the denotation of atomizers.
(2) a. ??I bought every/most/no pound of rice from that store.
b. ??Most liters of wine in this tank are polluted. (Chierchia, 1998a)
(3) I bought every grain of rice in that store.
Second, atomizers allow for adjectival modification as in (4-a), where the property of being
beautiful may be attributed to the slices of pizza themselves. Unlike atomizers, measure
terms resist such modification; in (4-b), the most plausible interpretation ascribes beauty to
the pizza and not to the pounds thereof.
(4) a. I bought two beautiful slices of pizza.
b. ?I bought two beautiful pounds of pizza. (Chierchia, 1998a)
As mappings into numbers and not sets of individuals, measure terms expectedly resist quan-
tification and modification on the basis of individuals. The term pound does not reference
objects in the world like pile or grain does; we do not require the existence of a real-world
entity corresponding to a pound, so attempting to characterize or manipulate pounds as one
would objects is inappropriate and therefore disallowed. In fact, one might be led by the ref-
erencing of individuals in their semantics to align atomizing phrases with basic count nouns
like boy or book, to the exclusion of measure terms. As we shall see, however, true atomizers
stand apart from both measure terms and count nouns, which instead are aligned with con-
4The judgments for object-level quantifiers/modifiers and measure terms are more nuanced than Chierchia
(1998a) would lead one to believe. At issue is the ability of measure terms to serve as container nouns, a topic
we consider in some detail in the following section.
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tainer nouns. Furthermore, this contrast between container nouns and measure terms quickly
fades once we recognize that each may be used as an instance of the other: container nouns
admit uses as measure terms, and measure terms admit uses as container nouns.
Consider the measure term liter. As a number-seeking relation formed on the basis of
a measure, liter resists quantification on the basis of individuals, (2-b), as well as direct
modification. In (5), if we are talking about the quantity of wine that was bought, then it
is most natural to view beautiful as modifying wine and not the liters thereof. But already
by hedging our language and focusing only on a reading under which a quantity of wine is
referenced, we have tipped our hand.
(5) I bought two beautiful liters of wine.
One may readily imagine a situation in which objects directly correspond to the amount
specified by liter, namely wine bottles, and with this in mind it is possible in (5) to view
beautiful as modifying these bottles and thus liters directly.5 Here is our first encounter
with the container interpretation of a measure term, under which the term functions as a
container noun in its reference to individuals. This reading of the measure term contrasts
with its measure interpretation, where the term references a quantity of some substance
instead of its container. In fact, measure and container readings of measure terms may
be distinguished overtly in some languages. Doetjes (1997) provides the following examples
from Dutch, in which the measure term kilo optionally takes plural morphology.
(6) a. Jan
Jan
heeft
has
twee
two
kilo
kilo(sg)
pruimen
plums
gekocht.
bought
‘Jan has bought two kilos of plums.’
b. Jan
Jan
heeft
has
meer
more
kilo-s
kilo-pl
pruimen
plums
gekocht
bought
dan
than
Marie
Marie
‘Jan bought more kilos of plums than Marie did.’ (Doetjes, 1997)
When singular, the measure term favors a measure interpretation: in (6-a), the speaker
references the amount of plums Jan has bought. When plural, the term favors a container
interpretation; the preferred reading of (6-b) is one under which the number of individual
5For present purposes, imagine we inhabit a world in which typical wine bottles have a one liter capacity.
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units measuring one kilo (say, packages of plums) is being compared. We return to this issue of
morphologically distinguishing measure vs. container interpretations cross-linguistically
in Section 3.2.4.
Atomizers like grain and measure terms like kilo are not the only sorts of words that
may be used to quantize a substance for the purpose of counting or measuring. Consider the
word glass or bowl or box, or any other name for a container. These words lead fruitful lives
as basic count nouns, as evidenced by their non-relational, referential uses in the following
example.
(7) Mary put the three glasses and a bowl into the box on her table.
It is no coincidence, however, that these words all reference objects whose role is to contain
stuﬀ. It is in this role that these so-called ‘container nouns’ quantize a substance for the
purpose of counting and therefore constitute yet another candidate class to be included under
the title ‘quantizing noun’.
In (8), we witness that just like atomizers and measure terms, container nouns admit a
relational use, combining with a noun and a numeral in the pseudo-partitive frame.
(8) Mary put three glasses of water into her soup.
Container nouns also admit both container and measure interpretations: while the mea-
sure interpretation under which Mary puts three glasses-worth of water into the soup is
much more plausible in (8), one may also read the sentence as stating that Mary put the
glasses themselves into the soup, that is, one may get a container interpretation for this
use of glass. For another example of the truth-conditional distinction between measure and
container readings and thus the flexibility required in the semantics of container nouns,
consider the following sentence.
(9) John carried three boxes of books into the store.
Imagine a scenario in which a store sells books by the (standard, moderately-sized) box. John
delivers the store’s stock, and in doing so he carries the merchandise to fill three of these
salable boxes in a single, very large box. In this scenario the sentence in (9) is true under a
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reading example thing named referent
measure three kilos of apples apples ⊆ substance noun
container three glasses of wine glasses ⊆ quantizing noun
atomizing three grains of rice grains of rice ⊆ substance noun + quantizing noun
Table 3.1: Interpretations available to quantizing nouns summarized in terms of the sort of
object that is referenced
measure reading and false under a container reading: John carried only one box into the
store, the contents of which measure 3 with respect to the salient box measure.
Here it bears noting a fundamental diﬀerence between the container and measure
reading of quantizing nouns. Consider the container reading of three glasses of wine. The
referent is three glasses, which happen to contain wine. In other words, the referent belongs
to the class of things named by the quantizing noun glass. Contrast this interpretation with
the measure interpretation of three liters of wine. The referent in this case is wine, which
happens to measure 3 liters in volume. Under the measure reading, the referent belongs to
the class of things named by the substance noun wine. Note further that atomizers stand
apart in the reading they admit: three grains of rice references something that is at once
both grains and rice; the referent of an atomizer belongs in some sense both to the class of
things named by the substance noun and to the class of things named by the quantizing noun.
Moreover, the function of the atomizer is to partition the denotation of the substance noun
into designated, minimal countable units; this reading we term the atomizing interpretation
of a quantizing noun. We will return to the semantics that delivers these interpretations,
which are summarized in Table 3.1.
Focusing on the ambiguity between measure and container interpretations for con-
tainer nouns, Rothstein (2009) oﬀers four diagnostics which distinguish between the two
readings. We consider each diagnostic in turn, seeing also how measure terms and atomizers
fare and noting the diﬀerences among the three proposed subclasses of words.
Diagnostic 1. Measure suﬃxes are appropriate only under the measure reading
To the extent that one can force a measure reading for a container noun, Rothstein (2009)
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claims that under this reading the noun allows suﬃxation with -ful, which she calls a ‘measure
suﬃx’. In (10) and the examples that follow for these diagnostics, the (a) examples are meant
to be evaluated under a container interpretation and the (b) examples are meant to be
evaluated under a measure interpretation. Note that under a container interpretation,
container nouns refuse measure suﬃxes.
(10) Container nouns
a. Three bucket(#ful)s of mud were standing in a row against the wall.
b. We needed three bucket(ful)s of cement to build that wall. (Rothstein, 2009)
Unlike container nouns, which permit measure suﬃxes with a measure reading, measure
terms appear entirely incompatible with these suﬃxes under either reading. In fact, the
combination of measure terms with measure suﬃxes is ruled out altogether (e.g., literful,
gallonful, tonful ; Lehrer, 1986).
(11) Measure terms
a. Three liter(*ful)s of mud were standing in a row against the wall.
b. We needed three liter(*ful)s of cement to build that wall.
Like measure terms, atomizers are incompatible with measure suﬃxes. To keep the exam-
ples as similar to Rothstein’s originals as possible, imagine a context in which we are building
miniature rice walls:
(12) Atomizers
a. Three grain(*ful)s of rice were standing in a row against the wall.
b. We needed three grain(*ful)s of rice to build that wall.
Intuitively, the problem in (12) feels less like one of the morphological composition of an
atomizer with a measure suﬃx, and more like an inability to force the measure reading
that would license the measure suﬃx in the first place. Whereas (11-b) admits a measure
interpretation for liter, in (12-b) a parallel reading is inaccessible, with or without the suﬃx
-ful. We return to this issue in our discussion of atomizers in relation to the next diagnostic.
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Diagnostic 2. Plural pronouns may not be anteceded under a measure reading
Under a container reading, container nouns may serve as antecedents to plural pronouns,
(13-a). This situation cannot attain when container nouns receive a measure interpretation,
(13-b).
(13) Container nouns
a. There are two cups of wine on this tray. They are blue.
b. There are two cups of wine in this soup. #They are blue. (Rothstein, 2009)
Measure terms behave similarly: only under a container interpretation may they serve
as antecedents to plural pronouns. Crucially, (14-a) succeeds to the extent that we attribute
blueness to the liters (i.e., to bottles), and not to the wine itself.
(14) Measure terms
a. There are two liters of wine on this tray. They are blue.
b. There are two liters of wine in this soup. #They are blue.
Performing a similar manipulation on atomizers, we find again that they do not permit
a measure interpretation. Despite the eﬀort to force a measure interpretation in (15-b),
the atomizer provides a suitable antecedent for they ; we remain with an atomizing interpre-
tation for the atomizer, a use which, like the container interpretation, provides a suitable
antecedent for the plural pronoun.
(15) Atomizers
a. There are two grains of rice on this tray. They are blue.
b. There are two grains of rice in this soup. They are blue.
It appears, then, that atomizers resist measure readings altogether.
Diagnostic 3. Singular agreement is impossible under a container reading
Under a measure interpretation, plural container nouns allow optional singular agreement,
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(16-b); container interpretations force plural agreement when the container noun appears in
the plural, (16-a) (but see Lehrer, 1986, for a discussion of the limitations of this diagnostic).6
(16) Container nounsacceptability persists with postposed
a. There *is/are two cups of wine on this tray.
b. There is/are two cups of wine in this soup. (Rothstein, 2009)
Measure terms behave like container nouns with respect to agreement: in (17-a), if we
imagine a container interpretation under which we are referencing two bottles of wine,
singular agreement is disallowed. Under the measure reading in (17-b), we allow for singular
agreement.
(17) Measure terms
a. There *is/are two liters of wine on this tray.
b. There is/are two liters of wine in this soup.
Again, atomizers resist the measure reading altogether, so it is unsurprising that they
fail to pattern like container nouns or measure terms in allowing singular agreement with this
interpretation. In other words, the issue is again not that atomizers pattern diﬀerently with
respect to the agreement diagnostic, but rather that they lack the range of interpretations
presupposed by the diagnostic.
(18) Atomizers
a. There *is/are two grains of rice on this tray.
b. There *is/are two grains of rice in this soup.
Attempting to force the container interpretation in (18-a), we find as we would expect that
singular agreement is unavailable. However, where we attempt to force the measure inter-
pretation in (18-b), we find that singular agreement remains unavailable. Again, it appears
6Given the permissive nature of agreement in there-existentials, it is important to note that the pattern of
acceptability persists with postposed verbs. Consider the following:
(i) Two cups of wine *is/are needed for this tray.
(ii) Two cups of wine is/are needed in this soup.
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that the complication with the atomizer grain in (18-b) is not that it performs diﬀerently
with respect to the diagnostic, but rather that it fails to provide the measure interpreta-
tion that the diagnostic evaluates. Instead, (18-b) allows only an atomizing interpretation,
which, like the container interpretation, precludes agreement in the singular.
Diagnostic 4. Distributive operators are incompatible with a measure reading
The last diagnostic concerns the behavior of the distributive operator each: under the con-
tainer reading, such distributive operators may quantify over the individuals in the denota-
tion of a container noun phrase. Under a measure reading, this quantification is disallowed,
presumably because use of the quantizing noun references a single entity: a quantity of wine
in (19-b).
(19) Container nouns
a. The two cups of wine cost 2 euros each.
b. #The two cups of wine in this soup cost 2 euros each. (Rothstein, 2009)
Like container nouns, measure terms are compatible with distributive operators only
under a container interpretation. For each to be acceptable in (20-a), we must understand
the sentence as discussing the cost of individual vessels of wine, e.g., wine bottles. Once
we understand the measure term as referencing a single quantity, as in (20-b), distributive
quantification becomes unacceptable.
(20) Measure terms
a. The two liters of wine cost 2 euros each.
b. #The two liters of wine in this soup cost 2 euros each.
As with the previous diagnostics, with distributive operators atomizers diverge from the
patterns of container nouns and measure terms. Accepting that atomizers do not allow
measure interpretations, this divergence is expected: in our failed attempt to coerce a
measure reading from grain in (21-b), we are left with an atomizing interpretation and so
61
the use of each is appropriate.
(21) Atomizers
a. The two grains of rice cost 2 euros each.
b. The two grains of rice in this soup cost 2 euros each.
It bears repeating that the acceptable use of each with an atomizer in (21-b) signals not an
inconsistent result for the diagnostic, but rather a divergence between atomizers on the one
hand and container nouns and measure terms on the other with respect to their capacity for
a measure interpretation. The diagnostics we have considered are formulated with respect
to readings and not the terms that yield those readings. Table 3.2 summarizes the results of
the diagnostics as applied to measure and container interpretations.
reading -ful they SG each
measure YES NO YES NO
container NO YES NO YES
Table 3.2: Interpretation diagnostics from Rothstein (2009)
As the results demonstrate, these diagnostics are capable of uniquely identifying, if not
forcing either the measure or the container interpretation.7 But we must remind our-
selves of our original focus: identifying readings is useful only inasmuch as it serves our
understanding of what a quantizing noun is.
Among the candidate class of words falling under the blanket label ‘quantizing noun’,
certain clusterings suggest themselves and have been assumed in the literature: measure
terms like kilo, container nouns like glass, and atomizers like grain. Our task has been to
evaluate how meaningful these diﬀerent classifications are, and how deeply they are reflected
in the semantics of these terms. To that end, we have repurposed the diagnostics from
Rothstein (2009); Table 3.3 presents their results not as applied to specific readings, but as
applied to each of the three proposed subclasses of quantizing nouns. A value of ‘Y/N’ signals
that the property called for in the diagnostic optionally holds of the subclass depending on
7The picture becomes more complicated once we include the results of these diagnostics as applied to the
atomizing interpretation.
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term -ful they sg each
measure term NO Y/N Y/N Y/N
container noun Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N
atomizer NO YES NO YES
Table 3.3: Diagnostics adapted from Rothstein (2009) and applied to subclasses of quantizing
nouns
whether it receives a measure or a container reading; to interpret Y/N values, refer to
Table 3.2.
The most striking feature of the value distribution in Table 3.3 is the clear split between
atomizers like grain on the one hand and measure terms and container nouns on the other.
As we saw, atomizers resist a measure reading, setting them apart from the measure terms
and container nouns. For this reason alone we ought to treat atomizers as a distinct subclass.
We return to the properties of this subclass when we adopt a semantics for atomizers in
Section 3.3.
Comparing the properties of measure terms and container nouns in Table 3.3, we find
considerable overlap. Because both classes allow either measure or container interpreta-
tions, their behavior as antecedents of plural pronouns, with optional singular agreement, and
in allowing quantification by distributive operators is determined solely by the reading they
receive. According to Table 3.3, there is only one diﬀerence between these two subclasses of
words, but it is an important one: measure suﬃxes are impossible on measure terms.
Consider the role of measure suﬃxes: -ful aﬃxes to a noun to form a measure term,
identifying the quantity that can be held by members of the denotation of that noun. From
the Oxford English Dictionary:
(22) -ful : a suﬃx forming derivatives with the general sense ‘quantity that fills or would
fill’ (something); it may be attached at pleasure to any noun denoting an object that
can be regarded as holding or containing a more or less definite quantity of anything
(OED Online)
Thus, glassful references the amount a relevant glass can hold, bucketful references the amount
a relevant bucket can hold, and so on. By referencing containers, container nouns provide a
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ready source for this derivation of a quantity. But what about measure terms?
We have characterized the function of a measure suﬃx as transforming a property of
individuals (e.g., the property of being a glass) into a quantity of substance derived from
the volume those individuals may contain (e.g., the amount that would fill a glass). For a
measure suﬃx to be felicitously applied to a measure term, the measure term would have to
reference objects with a capacity for containing, but we saw that measures terms reference
individuals only indirectly on the basis of world knowledge about associations between the
standard unit size relevant from its measure use and the objects that instantiate that unit
(e.g., wine bottles in the case of liter). It appears, then, that the measure use of a measure
term is somehow prior, and as such measure suﬃxes cannot apply to these terms. Conversely,
the container interpretation of container nouns precedes their measure uses, which are
derived via a process similar to that of -ful suﬃxation (e.g., glass qua quantity corresponds
to the capacity of the relevant glass).
Here is the claim: measure terms and container nouns are functionally distinct. One is
a measure (i.e., a relation) and the other is a simple predicate; they yield measure and
container readings, respectively. When we have a container noun with a measure reading,
it is functioning as a measure term. When we have a measure term with a container reading,
it is functioning as a container noun. Measure terms shift to simple predicates and yield
container interpretations to the extent that there exists a natural correspondence between
the measure they specify and the objects that normally instantiate its units. Container nouns
shift to relational measures and yield measure interpretations to the extent that there exists
a natural correspondence between the objects they reference and the units of a measure.
We have thus identified three subclasses of quantizing nouns: container nouns, measure
terms, and atomizers. We have also identified three distinct interpretations: measure,
container, and atomizing. Now we must provide a semantics for these quantizing nouns
to yield the correct interpretations. We begin with container nouns and measure terms in
the next section.
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3.2 The semantics of vs. readings
We start with the proposed correspondence between word class and interpretation diagramed
in Fig. 3.1. Solid lines indicate a direct relationship between term and interpretation; dashed
lines indicate the possibility of deriving one use from the other.
Container Noun- -Container Interpretation
Measure Term- -Measure Interpretation
Figure 3.1: Relationship between quantizing nouns and the interpretations they yield
Recall that by ‘container noun’ we indicate words that freely admit non-relational, refer-
ential uses and denote naturally-occurring containers, or objects with the capacity for holding
something inside of them. Examples of container nouns include glass, bowl, and box. Measure
terms are words that express a standard unit of measure such as kilo or pound or liter (they
are at times also called ‘amount terms’).
A container interpretation is that under which a quantizing noun is used as a relation
between a plurality or substance and objects containing it; the interpretation is therefore
referential in the sense that the resulting denotation references concrete objects (that happen
to be containers). Under a container reading, (23) states that Mary carried two objects,
each of which was a glass containing water.
(23) Mary carried two glasses of water.
container interpretations contrast with measure interpretations in that the latter reference
real-world objects only insomuch as they measure some abstract amount. The quantizing
nouns functions as a relation between the specified extent of some measure (i.e., a number)
and individuals that evaluate to that extent with respect to the measure. Under a measure
reading, (24) states that Mary carried a quantity of water whose mass measures two kilos.
(24) Mary carried two kilos of water.
As the diagram in Fig. 3.1 specifies, container interpretations result from uses of container
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nouns and measure interpretations from measure terms. Our first task is to settle on a
semantics for container nouns and for measure terms so that the appropriate readings result.
However, the story does not end with a semantics yielding container interpretations for
container nouns and measure interpretations for measure terms. In addition to identifying
default interpretations, Fig. 3.1 illustrates the second component of the proposal, namely the
flexibility of these terms’ uses.
Recall that container nouns and measure terms each admit uses as the other, as evidenced
by the examples in (5) and (8), repeated in (25).
(25) a. Mary put three glasses of water into her soup.
b. I bought two beautiful liters of wine.
The most natural interpretation of (25-a) has Mary putting a quantity of water that measures
three glasses into the soup, and not the glasses themselves. (25-a) thus evidences a measure
reading for the container noun glass. Similarly, (25-b) evidences a container reading for
the measure term liter : under its most natural interpretation, the sentence states that the
speaker bought two things, each of which is a liter of wine (i.e., an object independent of the
wine it contains) that is beautiful. We therefore must specify the means by which container
nouns function as measure terms to yield a measure reading and measure terms function as
container nouns to yield a container interpretation. We begin with the semantics for the
basic terms, then we turn to the process by which each use is derived from the other.
3.2.1 semantics
container readings result from uses of container nouns; this section provides a semantics
for container nouns that yields the container reading. As we consider the choice points
that determine our approach, we must recognize that container nouns are in fact nouns,
such that container interpretations result from a nominal semantics. But nouns may be
characterized by whether or not they are relational, or complement-taking (cf. the distinction
between ‘sortal’ and ‘relational’ nouns in Lo¨bner, 1985). In what follows, we consider two
approaches that diﬀer in whether or not they treat the semantics of container nouns as
relational.
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Let us begin by identifying the ingredients of the container reading that results from
use of a container noun. The phrase glass of water includes three elements: the container
noun glass, the particle of, and the substance noun water.8 Notice that we remain agnostic
regarding the categorial status of of by referring to it as a particle and not a preposition
(see Chomsky, 1981, as well as the discussion in Rothstein, 2009); the role that of plays will
depend on the analysis we give to the first element, the container noun. The last element,
water, is a noun identifying the substance held within the relevant container.
In analyzing container nouns, the first tack is to treat their semantics as non-relational
and derive the container use, by which we specify both a container and its contents, via
modification by the of -phrase (see Rothstein, 2009, for a similar proposal concerning con-
tainer interpretations of the Hebrew free genitive construction). Note that the modification
implicated in such an approach cannot (straightforwardly) be intersective: a glass of water is
not at once both a glass and water. We therefore require modification of a sort that capital-
izes on the fact that these nouns in their basic use denote containers, and therefore attributes
to these containers the property of being filled by the relevant substance.
This non-relational semantics ascribes an invariant predicative type to container nouns;
they denote a set of containers, as in the case of glass in (26).
(26) [[glass]] = λx. glass(x)
To derive the container interpretation from this predicate semantics for container nouns,
we may either call upon a novel process of modification between the container noun and the
substance noun, or we may build this novelty into the particle of. In order to keep our set of
composition rules constrained, we pursue the latter option, attributing to of the semantics
of containing in (27).9 As such, we treat of as a preposition that takes the substance noun
as a complement. No special semantics need be assumed for the substance noun; given
the restriction against singular count nouns occurring in this position, substance nouns are
8Use of the label ‘substance noun’ is not intended to convey that this element must be a mass term;
container interpretations also result with plural count nouns serving as the substance noun, as in glass of
rocks. The label simply conveys that the substance noun provides the contents of the container.
9For discussion of the motivation behind keeping our set of composition rules constrained, see Scontras and
Nicolae (to appear).
67
treated semantically as kinds, (28). This restriction to kind-denoting substance nouns is built
into the semantics for of.
(27) [[of]] = λkλx. ∃y[∪k(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
(28) [[water]] = water = ∩λx. water(x)
Composing of with the substance noun, we create a property of individuals that are filled
with the relevant substance. Here is where we may appeal to intersective modification: the
of -phrase and the container noun, each a predicate of individuals, compose to yield a new
predicate of individuals: those members of the denotation of the container noun that are
filled with instances of the substance noun.
(29) [[glass of water]] = λx. glass(x) ∧ ∃y[∪water(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
In this way, glass of water is true of an individual just in case it is a glass that is filled
with water, and we derive the interpretation without a relational semantics for a container
noun.10 In favor of this approach is its ability to handle both container readings of container
nouns, as in (29), as well as basic uses where no substance noun is projected. In each case
the semantics of the container noun itself remains unchanged.
Having developed a non-relational approach to container noun semantics, we now consider
a diﬀerent tack, treating the semantics of container nouns as relational and deriving their
container use via argument saturation by the of -phrase. The process is straightforward:
rather than attributing the semantics of containing to of, this relation must be built into the
semantics of the container noun itself. Thus, we lift the predicative type of the basic noun
so that it takes the substance noun as an argument. In other words, the container noun is
treated as semantically transitive. Under this relational approach, of contributes nothing to
the resulting semantics.
(30) [[glass]] = λkλx. glass(x) ∧ ∃y[∪k(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
10Partee and Borschev (2012), in response to a similar semantics for container nouns proposed by Rothstein
(2009), question whether the semantics in (29) actually captures the individual interpretation (what they call
the the ‘Container + Contents’ interpretation). At issue is whether we want our semantics to refer to both
the container and its contents, or merely to the container, which is in turn characterized by its contents. We
refer the reader to Partee and Borschev (2012) for the relevant discussion.
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(31) [[glass (of) water]] = λx. glass(x) ∧ ∃y[∪water(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
Note that both the relational and non-relational approaches yield the same denotation for
the container use of a container noun (compare (29) and (31)).
The relationship between container uses of container nouns (where they denote con-
tainers filled with the substance noun) and basic uses (where they simply denote containers)
requires spelling out. History tells us that the former derives from the latter, such that basic
uses precede container uses (cf. the etymological discussion of cup and gallon in Partee and
Borschev, 2012). As we will see, the complexity necessitated by this relationship suggests
the first, non-relational approach to container noun semantics over the relational one we now
consider.
In her account of the Hebrew Construct State, Rothstein (2009) derives what we are call-
ing container interpretations for container nouns via a type-shifting operation that trans-
forms predicate-denoting container nouns into relations of type ⟨⟨e, t⟩ , ⟨e, t⟩⟩, as in (30). The
operation Rothstein proposes is CS-SHIFT (‘Construct State Shift’), reproduced in (32).11
(32) CS-SHIFT([λx. N(x)]) = λPλx. ∃y[N(x) ∧ P(y) ∧ R(x,y)]
CS-SHIFT applies to a simple noun, type ⟨e, t⟩, and transforms the predicate into a relation
between predicates and individuals. In (32), P is the predicate that the container noun takes
as an argument, and R is a contextually specified relation. For container uses of container
nouns, Rothstein takes R to be the contain relation (cf. our filled-with relation). The
process of deriving a container interpretation proceeds as in (33).
(33) a. [[glass]] = λx. glass(x)
b. [[CS-SHIFT(glass)]] = λPλx. ∃y[glass(x) ∧ P(y) ∧ contain(y)(x)]
c. [[CS-SHIFT(glass)(water)]] = λx. ∃y[glass(x) ∧ water(y) ∧ contain(y)(x)]
The result of applying CS-SHIFT to a container noun with contain as the relevant rela-
tion, (33-b), is equivalent to the output of our relational semantics (cf. (30); but see Par-
tee and Borschev, 2012, for discussion of the nuanced diﬀerence between the contain and
11Note that Rothstein treats the substance noun as a predicate, rather than as a kind as we have done.
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filled-with relations). We end up with a subset of the individuals in the denotation of the
basic use of the container noun, namely those that contain some quantity within the deno-
tation of the substance noun. With an operation like CS-SHIFT, we thus specify the way
that container nouns relate to their non-relational uses: the latter are prior, related to the
container interpretation via a type-shifting operation that transforms a predicate-denoting
noun into a relation.
In Hebrew, the language Rothstein uses to motivate CS-SHIFT, the Construct State’s
container interpretation does not feature any particle on a par with the of in English
container uses. Instead, the Construct State directly joins the container and substance
nouns as in (34).
(34) sˇalosˇ
three
kosot
cup(f.pl.)
mayim
water
‘three cups of water’ (Rothstein, 2009)
Without any prepositional element to tie the semantics of the contain relation to, a non-
relational semantics for container nouns appears ill-fated. Thus, Rothstein derives the re-
lational semantics on the basis of CS-SHIFT. But in English we do have evidence for an
overt source of the containing relation: of. By attributing this relation to of and keeping
the semantics of container nouns unambiguously predicate-denoting, we save ourselves the
trouble of stipulating an operation like CS-SHIFT that would yield the desired ambiguity
between non-relational, basic uses and relational, container uses of container nouns. For
this reason, we might want to settle on the non-relational approach to container nouns that
we first pursued.
Another consideration in deciding between a PP-modification approach to container
interpretations and Rothstein’s type-shifting approach concerns the special status of the
syntactic frame that yields these interpretations, which at least superficially appears to be
the pseudo-partitive. Selkirk (1977) provides a bevy of facts to support her conclusion that
pseudo-partitives possess a syntax distinct from true partitives, where the latter involves
modification of a noun by a full-fledged PP. Crucially, in pseudo-partitives there is a tighter
relationship between the quantizing noun and the substance noun than PP-modification
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would allow. To see this distinction, we quickly review Selkirk’s facts.
First, partitives and pseudo-partitives are distinguished on the basis of the ‘Partitive
Constraint’, which states that the embedded NP in a true partitive must be specific. Simply
put, the substance noun in a partitive must be definite. We thus superficially distinguish
the partitive in (35-a) from the pseudo-partitive in (35-b), where the former has a definite
substance noun and the latter has instead a mass or plural count noun.
(35) a. Mary carried three bowls of that soup into the dining room. (partitive)
b. Mary carried three bowls of soup/beans into the dining room. (pseudo-partitive)
According to Selkirk, true partitives allow extraposition of the of phrase (i.e., of the sub-
stance noun); pseudo-partitives do not. She provides the examples in (36) to illustrate this
contrast. Note that the following sentences feature a container noun used with a measure
interpretation: the sentences are about eating fudge, not boxes.
(36) a. They devoured seven boxes of
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
your
Ø
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
delicious fudge last night.
b. They devoured seven boxes last night of
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
your
*Ø
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
delicious fudge.
When we modify Selkirk’s examples so that they yield a container interpretation, as in
(37), suddenly extraposition of the substance noun succeeds.
(37) a. They bought seven boxes of
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
your
Ø
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
delicious fudge last night.
b. They bought seven boxes last night of
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
your
Ø
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
delicious fudge.
In fact, Selkirk herself recognizes the diﬀerence between container and measure uses of
quantizing nouns. Only the latter, she claims, project pseudo-partitive syntax. For this rea-
son, the remainder of Selkirk’s diagnostics for distinguishing pseudo-partitive from partitive
constructions do not apply to container interpretations. In light of the current discussion,
we may interpret Selkirk’s claim as stating that container interpretations do not feature a
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direct relationship between container and substance nouns, consistent with the extraposition
facts in (36) and (37). In other words, a PP-modification structure for container interpre-
tations appears to be justified; these interpretations do not result from true pseudo-partitive
structure, but rather from simple adjunction.
To summarize, container readings result from the composition of three elements: a
container noun, the lexical preposition of, and a substance noun. Example semantics for
these elements are repeated in (38).
(38) a. [[glass]] = λx. glass(x)
b. [[of]] = λkλx. ∃y[∪k(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
c. [[water]] = water
d. [[glass of water]] = λx. glass(x) ∧ ∃y[∪water(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
Our semantics, where the container noun, an N head, is modified by the PP headed by of,
suggests a structure in which the container noun projects NP, to which a PP adjoins. The
syntax for the container interpretation of a container noun appears in (39).
(39) container structure:
NP
NP
glass
PP
P
of
nP
water
Here a note is in order on the categorial status of the substance noun. In all of the uses of
quantizing nouns that we have an will consider, the substance noun is either bare plural or
mass, but never a singular count noun. We encode this restriction by taking the substance
noun to be kind-denoting. In English, we cannot tell whether this kind-denoting substance
noun projects DP or some functional layer below DP. We do know that the substance noun
hosts morphological number, determined by #P, so minimally it must contain more structure
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than just NP would allow.12 We therefore face a choice: either the substance noun projects
DP with a null D responsible for kind-formation, or it projects a sub-maximal functional
layer. The assignment of case (or lack thereof) to this sub-maximal projection would then be
tied to kind-formation. Given the stable absence of determiners on substance nouns both in
English and cross-linguistically (even French, notorious for the obligatory use of determiners,
has no D on a substance noun), we label the substance noun nP to signal the sub-maximal
nominal the substance noun projects (but keeping in mind the caveats discussed).
Returning to container noun phrases, as an NP the system of number morphology devel-
oped in the previous chapter handles a container noun as it would any basic noun (cf. Section
2.4.1). Container noun phrases denote sets of individuals, and their elements are counted
by cardinal numerals formed on the basis of the M0 head card, which takes the container
noun phrase as its complement. Number morphology is determined by the # head, which
projects above MP; pl must be used because MP will contain in its denotation elements with
cardinality greater than 1 (i.e., elements with cardinality 3). The full nominal structure is
given in (40).
(40) Counting container nouns:
#P
#
pl
MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
card
NP
NP
glass
PP
P
of
nP
water
12Note further that the substance noun can be modified, as in three glasses of water from the tap.
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We thus have an account of the first aspect of our proposal, namely the correspondence
between container nouns and container interpretations. Additionally, we specify the re-
lationship between basic and container uses of container nouns: the nouns’ semantics is
invariantly predicative, and whether or not we modify the noun with a prepositional phrase
determines the use we observe.
Next, we turn to the correspondence between measure terms and the measure interpre-
tation.
3.2.2 semantics
As in the previous subsection, here we begin by identifying the ingredients of the measure
reading. We saw that these readings result from uses of measure terms, as in three liters of
water. We thus have the measure term liter, the particle of, and the substance noun water.
On the surface, all that diﬀers between container and measure readings is whether we
have a container noun or a measure term – in other words, whether the quantizing noun
names a container or a measure. In what follows, we develop a semantics for measure terms
that yields the measure reading. We are guided by the observation that measure terms
specify measures (e.g., µkg in the case of kilo, µlb in the case of pound, etc.), so measure
interpretations ought to result from measure semantics. In fact, we encountered a semantics
for measure terms in the previous chapter (Section 2.4.2), as part of the proposed account
of number marking on measure terms. The semantics are restated below, and reevaluated in
light of the current discussion.
Throughout our comparison of the container and measure interpretations, we have
contrasted them on the basis of whether they are referential: container uses refer to ob-
jects (i.e., containers), while measure uses refer to amounts. This contrast is misleading:
both glass of water under a container interpretation and liter of water under a measure
interpretation refer to objects. What diﬀers is that in the former we refer to an object in
the denotation of the quantizing noun (i.e., to a glass) and in the latter we refer to an object
in the denotation of the substance noun (i.e., to a quantity of water). In this sense, both
container and measure uses are referential, referring to real-world objects; when we say
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that measure uses specify amounts, take this as shorthand for specifying the amount that
delimits the denotation of the resulting phrase, which contains individuals. This distinction
will become crucial in the next chapter when we encounter the degree noun amount.
As we develop a semantics for measure terms that yields their measure interpretation,
we must first take into account the distribution of these terms. Of particular importance is
the close tie between measure terms and numerals. In every use we have so far encountered,
measure terms either explicitly or implicitly call on a numeral to provide a value for the
measure that will then constrain the denotation of the substance noun. As we saw in Section
2.4.2, in the phrase three liters of water, we restrict the denotation of the substance noun
water to just those quantities of water than measure 3 liters. In a liter of water, no numeral is
expressed, but still we understand the phrase as identifying quantities of water that measure
a specific value, namely 1, in liters. These facts demonstrate that measure terms operate
on numbers in their semantics. In fact, we saw in the previous chapter how this assumption
allows us to integrate measure terms into the syntax and semantics of measuring more broadly.
The proposed semantics for measure terms has them take two arguments, the substance
noun and the numeral, and yield a set of instances of the substance noun, namely those
individuals that return the value of the numeral when measured (cf. the ‘unit of measure’
semantics given in Partee and Borschev, 2012). Consider the semantics of liter in (41).
(41) [[liter]] = λkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µli(x) = n
When it composes with a substance noun and a numeral, the measure term yields the mea-
sure reading: a set containing elements that measure the appropriate amount and instantiate
the substance noun. The predicate in (42) denotes a set of water quantities, each measuring
three liters in volume.
(42) [[three liters (of) water]] = λx. ∪water(x) ∧ µli(x) = 3
This semantics for measure terms diﬀers from the semantics given to container nouns in
two important respects. First, measure terms receive a relational semantics, whereas con-
tainer nouns are treated as simple predicates. This relational semantics for measure terms
precipitates the second diﬀerence: of in a measure use is introduced syncategorematically,
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contributing no semantic content (see Schwarzschild, 2006, for a discussion of this treatment
of of in constructions with measure terms). Recall that for container interpretations we
treat of as a lexical preposition contributing the semantic filled-with relation.
Additionally, we attribute to measure terms a categorial diﬀerence: whereas container
nouns are in fact nouns, projecting NP, measure terms are at base measures, projecting
MP. The trees in (43) illustrate the structural divergence that results from this categorial
diﬀerence.13
(43) a. Container noun structure:
#P
#
pl
MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
card
NP
NP
glass
PP
P
of
nP
water
b. Measure term structure:
#P
#
pl
MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
kilo
(of ) nP
water
Again, numerals under a container interpretation function as cardinals, just as they do with
13Keep in mind that we label the substance noun as nP to signal that it projects a sub-maximal nominal
layer.
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basic nouns (cf. Section 2.4.1). The cardinal is formed on the basis of card, which heads
MP and takes the container noun NP as a complement. Number morphology is determined
via the process described in the previous chapter: sg checks for singularity of the elements
of the nominal denotation on the basis of cardinality, the measure specified by the M-head
card.
By projecting MP rather than serving as its complement (as in the case of container
nouns), measure terms preclude the use of card and thus the use of cardinal numerals. But
this is as it should be: under a measure reading the numeral is not a cardinal. In three
liters of water, the numeral three does not count individuals. Instead, the numeral specifies
the requisite value of the relevant measure, µli (see Rothstein, 2009; Landman, 2004, for
discussion of the same observation).
Recall how number marking works on measure terms (cf. Section 2.4.2). As an instance
of M0, measure terms serve as the head closest to # and so sg checks for singularity of the
elements of the nominal denotation on the basis of the measure specified by the measure
term. In three liters of water, µli serves as the measure for which the elements of MP must
evaluate to 1; with three as the numeral argument of liter, the one-ness presupposition of
sg fails and so pl must be used, resulting in plural morphology on liter. The failure results
from the fact that three ensures that everything in the denotation of MP evaluates to 3 with
respect to the measure in M0, so there is no hope of these elements satisfying the one-ness
presupposition of sg.
We have thus accounted for the second component of the proposal in Fig. 3.1: Measure
terms are endowed with a relational semantics that essentially restricts the denotation of the
complement substance noun on the basis of the value provided by their second argument,
the numeral. The resulting denotation is a set of instances of the substance noun, namely
those individuals that evaluate on the basis of the relevant measure to the necessary extent.
Here is our measure reading, which derives from the semantics of measure terms. By using
the measure term to restrict the denotation of the substance noun, we successfully derive
the crucial component of the measure reading: three liters of water refers to a quantity of
water.
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At this point we have a semantics for container nouns and measure terms that delivers
container and measure readings, respectively. Next, we need an explanation for the
observed variability in the uses of these terms such that each may serve as the other. In
other words, we need the means to transform a container noun into a measure term, and vice
versa.
3.2.3 Deriving one use from the other
Recall the proposed correspondence between word class and interpretation, repeated in Fig.
3.2. Solid lines indicate an implicational relationship; the dashed line indicates functional
versatility such that container nouns enjoy uses as measure terms and measure terms may
serve as container nouns. We have developed accounts for the implicational relationships in
Fig. 3.2 on the basis of the semantics of these terms, which attributes a categorial distinction
to the two classes of words. Now, we must account for their categorial versatility.
Container Noun- -Individual Interpretation
Amount Term- -Quantity Interpretation
Figure 3.2: Relationship between measure terms and interpretations
So far, our account of container and measure interpretations proceeds via direct map-
pings from the semantics for the terms involved to the corresponding interpretation. Con-
tainer nouns, together with the filled-with relation supplied by the preposition of, result
in a container interpretation such that objects filled with the appropriate contents are
referenced. Measure terms, on the basis of the measure they specify and their relational
semantics, deliver a measure interpretation such that objects measuring the appropriate
extent are referenced. But this account fails to predict the preferred interpretations of the
sentences in (44).
(44) a. Mary poured three glasses of water into her soup.
b. I dropped two beautiful liters of wine.
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In (44-a), we have what appears to be a container noun implicated in a measure reading:
Mary is not said to have added three containers filled with water into the soup, but rather
to have added a single quantity of water. In (44-b), a measure term yields a container
reading: beauty is attributed to two objects, whereas a measure reading would have just a
single object accessible, namely a quantity of wine measuring two liters.
Given the semantics we have attributed to container nouns and measure terms, it is
incoherent to claim that the unexpected readings result from canonical uses of these terms; we
must hold fast to the implications in Fig. 3.2 such that a container noun yields a container
interpretation and a measure term yields a measure interpretation. Partee and Borschev
(2012, p.447) describe this variation as follows: “the distinction [between container nouns
and measure terms] is formally sharp, but the classification of nouns is not.” In (44), what
we have are unorthodox uses of the words glass and liter. Instead of serving as a container
noun, in (44-a) glass functions as a measure term, resulting in a measure interpretation.
In (44-b), liter serves as a container noun and yields and container interpretation. At
base, these terms are still container nouns and measure terms, that is, they are born within
their prescribed class. We therefore must specify how container nouns acquire measure term
semantics and how measure terms acquire container noun semantics. We consider each case
in turn.
In order to derive a measure term, and thus a measure interpretation from a container
noun, we need to shift the basic predicate semantics of container nouns into the relational
type attributed to measure terms. The resulting semantics should hang on the measure
derived from the standard volume of the container referenced. In the case of glass, we need
to shift a set of glasses into a function that measures individuals with respect to the derived
glass measure, µglass.
That measure terms may derive from container nouns finds support in the diachronic
development of measure terms. Consider the case of gallon, which finds its roots in Gaulish
galla ‘vessel’ (Partee and Borschev, 2012, who themselves cite an entry in the Online Etymol-
ogy Dictionary).14 A perhaps more obvious example is the measure term foot, which derives
14http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=gallon
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from the length of men’s feet. Thus, we have evidence that the synchronic transformation
we are considering operates elsewhere in the grammar: from a concrete, real-world object we
derive a standard measure. What we lack is a description of the meaning shift that results
in this transformation.
In considering the function of the measure suﬃx -ful in Section 3.1, we already witnessed
the transformation of container nouns into measure terms. We described the role of -ful
as operating on the denotation of a noun and identifying the quantity that can be held by
individual members of that noun’s denotation. In (45), we see a first attempt at the formal
description of the derivation of a measure term via -ful suﬃxation.
(45) [[-ful]] = λPλkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µP (x) = n
The suﬃx -ful takes a predicate as an argument and returns a measure term, type ⟨k, ⟨n, ⟨e, t⟩⟩⟩.
This shift is category-changing: a noun is transformed into an M0-head. Note that the mea-
sure operating in the derived measure term semantics bases itself on the predicate argument
of -ful, P. Thus, we expect success in the application of -ful to the extent that deriving the P
measure is possible. In other words, we expect the derivation of a measure term from a noun
to the extent that there is a salient correspondence between the objects the noun references
and a measure using the potential contents of those objects as units. By referencing contain-
ers, container nouns provide natural units of measure for -ful, namely their volume (however
abstract; cf. a bookful of problems).
In their uses as measure terms, we might say that container nouns undergo a process
analogous to -ful suﬃxation (for a similar proposal, see Rothstein, 2009). Concretely, the
(preferred) measure reading of (46) results from a meaning transformation as described in
(45) applied silently to glass.
(46) Mary poured three glasses of water into her soup.
In other words, one should read (46) as stating that Mary poured three glassfuls of water into
her soup. Because glass provides natural units of measure, namely the volume of a standard
glass, the interpretation is transparent: Mary poured a quantity of water equal to the volume
of three glasses into her soup. Thus, measure terms derive from container nouns via a lexical
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process functionally equivalent to (silent) -ful suﬃxation, and the measure exploited in the
resulting semantics uses the elements of the container noun’s denotation as units. However,
this transformation cannot be as simple as the semantics of -ful suﬃxation in (45) would
have one believe.
The problem lies in the creation of a continuous measure from the semantics of a pred-
icate, a measure which crucially maps individuals to non-negative real numbers (and not
just integers). In (45), the measure is written as µP – but writing the measure and deriving
it compositionally are diﬀerent tasks. The measure could use instances of P as its standard
unit, as in the Concrete Portion reading of container nouns from Partee and Borschev (2012).
A schematic indication of the semantics of this meaning shift, again assuming something like
-ful suﬃxation, appears in (47).
(47) Container noun to measure term shift (step 1 ):
[[SHIFTC-M]] = λPλkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ ∃y[P(y) ∧ filled-with(x)(y) ∧ µcard(y) = n]
Take glass. Three glassfuls of water would denote a quantity of water that would fill three
glasses. In (47), the variable y ranges over pluralities, so the individual that contains the
relevant quantity of water would consist of three glasses. But shifting from counting units
that correspond to the volume of an instance of P, say the amount a salient glass can hold,
to measuring quantities of stuﬀ along a continuous scale cannot be a process that proceeds
compositionally. There is no operator that we could posit that would create a continuous
measure for us. Presumably, the shift happens once a standard unit is agreed upon, so that
this unit may form the basis of a continuous measure, which itself forms the basis of a measure
term (cf. the case of gallon or foot).
Now, consider variation in the opposite direction: container nouns, and thus container
interpretations, derived from measure terms. Our task is to shift the relational meaning of
a measure term to a non-relational, predicate semantics using the measure named by the
measure term as its basis. Recall the behavior of measure terms qua container nouns, as
evidenced by the container interpretation of (48).
(48) I dropped two beautiful liters of soda.
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Under the (preferred) container reading, (48) ascribes beauty not to soda, but to the two
containers of it that were dropped. The contents of each container is taken to measure one
liter. We therefore witness the measure term liter functioning as a container noun, referencing
containers filled with soda.
Attempting to derive a predicate semantics from an amount term denotation, one might
try to delimit a set of objects that evaluate to 1 with respect to the measure called for in the
semantics of the amount term. The corresponding meaning shift is defined in (49).
(49) Measure term to container noun shift (first attempt):
[[SHIFTM-C]] = λMλx. ∃k[M(k)(1)(x)]
(50) [[liter]] = λkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µli(x) = n
(51) [[SHIFTM-C(liter)]] = λx. ∃k[liter(k)(1)(x)]
In (51), the shift applies to liter and returns a set of individuals that each measure one
liter, but not the containers thereof. However, the elements in the denotation of a container
noun are something above and beyond their contents. Under a container reading, the two
beautiful things that the speaker bought in (48) are not merely 1-liter quantities of soda, but
the vessels that contain those quantities.
We have not erred in requiring that a derived container noun reference quantities that
evaluate to 1 with respect to the relevant measure; in (48), 1-liter quantities of soda are
relevant. But we have failed to produce the container aspect of a derived container noun.
The result of the meaning shift must denote a class of containers. A revised attempt to do
so appears in (52).
(52) Measure term to container noun shift (second attempt):
[[SHIFTM-C]] = λMλx. ∃k∃y[M(k)(1)(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
(53) [[SHIFTM-C(liter)]] = λx. ∃k∃y[liter(k)(1)(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
(53) includes in its denotation any object that would be filled by a liter of some substance.
We have at least succeeded in deriving a set of containers from a measure term. With this
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candidate semantics for derived container nouns, consider how the proposal for container
readings from Section 3.2.1 fares.
Recall that the ingredients to a container reading are the container noun, here derived
from a measure term as in (53), the substance noun, and the lexical preposition of, which
contributes the filled-with relation.
Composing with the substance noun, of produces the property of being filled with in-
stances of that substance. With soda as the substance noun, of soda denotes a set of objects
filled with soda. The derived container noun, (53), itself a predicate, composes with the of
phrase via intersective modification. When modified by of soda, SHIFTM-C(liter) identifies
any individual that is filled with a liter of soda.
(54) [[SHIFTM-C(liter) of soda]] = λx. ∃k∃y[liter(k)(1)(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)] ∧
[[SHIFTM-C(liter) of soda]] = λx. ∃y[∪soda(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
[[SHIFTM-C(liter) of soda]] = λx. ∃k∃y[liter(k)(1)(y) ∧ ∪soda(y) ∧ filled-with(y)(x)]
We have captured the container aspect of our derived container noun semantics. Still, the
semantics for the derived container noun is too liberal. Under the preferred container
reading of (48), one imagines a class of objects more specific than any container of one
liter of soda, for example those containers that take the form of a plastic bottle found on
convenience store shelves. Given the constraints on the resulting denotation that world
knowledge imposes, a formal derivation of container noun semantics from a measure term
is impossible in the general case. In other words, we cannot pin this transformation to an
operator projected in the syntax.
It would appear that we have instead an active lexicon: container nouns are derived from
measure terms via categorial reinterpretation of the term as a nominal head (cf. Rothstein,
2009). Because this process takes into account knowledge about the state of the world in the
context of the use of the measure term qua container noun, naming it explicitly as in (49) or
(52) fails. Instead, the reinterpretation depends on a salient correspondence between specific
quantities that evaluate to 1 with respect to the measure term’s measure and a well-defined
class of objects with the capacity to contain this quantity.
In summary, we have described the processes by which container nouns function as mea-
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sure terms and measure terms function as container nouns. The first transformation occurs
when objects referenced by a container noun (i.e., containers) are first used to form units of
measure. From these units we extrapolate a continuous measure, and use it as the basis of
a measure term. The second transformation, from measure term to container noun, involves
reinterpreting a measure term as a nominal head that references a salient class of objects
whose potential contents evaluate to 1 with respect to the measure in the semantics of the
measure term; this shift occurs in the lexicon. By describing these transformations, we have
accounted for the last piece of our proposal relating container nouns and measure terms with
container and measure interpretations, namely the variable uses of these terms.
3.2.4 Cross-linguistic support for the categorial distinction
Before concluding the discussion of the semantics of container nouns and measure terms,
a note on the consistency of the account with cross-linguistic data is in order. Given the
proposed categorial distinction between container nouns and measure terms, such that only
the former inhabit the syntactic category Noun, we might expect to find syntactic reflexes of
this distinction. In what follows, we consider data from Danish and German on two diverging
properties of container and measure readings. As we shall see, these diﬀerences support
the proposed categorial distinction between the terms that generate these readings.
By characterizing container nouns as simple predicates in their semantics, we identified
the of in container readings as a lexical preposition heading an adjoined PP, which contains
the substance noun. The proposed structure for the container interpretation of a container
noun is repeated in (55).
(55) NP
NP
glass
PP
P
of
nP
water
In contrast to container nouns, measure terms were taken to be relational functions that
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compose with the substance noun directly via argument saturation. Thus, the substance
noun serves as the complement of the measure term, and the of in a measure reading is not
a preposition, but merely a marker of (a lack of) case on the measure term’s complement.
The proposed structure for the measure interpretation of a measure term is repeated in
(56).
(56) MP
numeral M′
M
kilo
(of ) nP
water
Given its lexical status, we should expect a certain robustness for the preposition in a con-
tainer reading that we do not for the particle in a measure reading. If a language fails
to express an intervening particle between a quantizing noun and its substance noun under
one of the two possible readings, we therefore expect the particle to be absent under the
measure reading. In their discussion of Danish pseudo-partitives, Hankamer and Mikkelsen
(2008) identify precisely this pattern. In (57-a), the prepositionmed ‘with’ intervenes between
the container noun pose ‘bag’ and the substance noun mel ‘flour’. In (57-b), a preposition
is precluded from intervening between the measure term liter and the substance noun vand
‘water’.
(57) a. pose-r
bag-PL
med
with
mel
flour
‘bags of flour’ (individual)
b. liter
liter
(*af)
of
vand
water
‘liter of water’ (quantity) (Hankamer and Mikkelsen, 2008)
Supposing as we have that only container readings project PP, we have an explanation for
the unavailability of a preposition in (57-b): the measure term composes directly with the
substance noun. Hankamer and Mikkelsen come to a similar conclusion, namely that only
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the container noun in (57-a) is a true noun.
Next, consider how the proposed categorial distinction plays out in the domain of number
marking. In English, both container nouns and measure terms express morphological number.
With one, the relevant quantizing noun appears in the singular form; with greater numerals,
plural morphology must be used. We thus observe the following contrasts.
(58) a. Mary carried one cup(*s) of water.
b. Mary carried two cup*(s) of water.
(59) a. Mary drank one liter(*s) of water.
b. Mary drank two liter*(s) of water.
Chapter 2 developed a semantic account of nominal number marking; that measure terms
express number morphology led us to conclude that they are nominal to the extent that they
fall within the purview of our system of grammatical number. In (58), the morphology on
the noun cup is determined by the cardinality measure. In (59), number morphology on the
measure head liter is determined by the liter measure, i.e., the measure specified by M0. In
both cases, if all members of the nominal denotation do not evaluate to 1 with respect to the
relevant measure, plural morphology must be used.
But here we pause: Given the proposed categorial distinction between measure terms and
container nouns, we might expect a language with a more conservative system of grammatical
number to reflect this categorial distinction such that measure terms, as things that are not
nouns proper, are not subject to this nominal system of number marking. We would there-
fore expect measure terms and container nouns to diﬀer on whether they host morphological
number. Furthermore, within such a language, derived container nouns would host gram-
matical number whereas derived measure terms would not. German appears to employ this
conservative system of grammatical number and therefore provides cross-linguistic support
for the categorial distinction between measure terms and container nouns.15
Grestenberger (2013) notes that plural marking on quantizing nouns in (Viennese) Ger-
15Similar patterns surface in Danish (Hankamer and Mikkelsen, 2008), Swedish (Delsing, 1993, p.204), and
Norwegian (Kinn, 2001).
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man determines the reading that results from their use. Consider the minimal pair in (60).
In (60-a), the plural-marked container noun Gla¨ser ‘glasses’ expectedly yields a container
interpretation. In the minimally diﬀering (60-b), Glas appears without plural marking and
yields a measure interpretation.
(60) a. Zwei
two
Gla¨s-er
glass-PL
Wasser
water
‘two glasses of water’ (container)
b. Zwei
two
Glas
glass
Wasser
water
‘two glasses of water’ (measure) Grestenberger (2013)
Recall the proposal relating container nouns and measure terms to their container and
measure readings: container readings result from the semantics of container nouns, mea-
sure readings result from the semantics of measure terms, and both sets of terms enjoy
derived uses as the other. Thus, in (60-a), we see the container noun qua noun hosting
number morphology, whereas in (60-b) that same word, now used as a derived measure term,
appears unmarked for number. That usage as a container noun should explain the absence of
number morphology on Glas in (60-b) finds support in the fact that measure terms generally
resist plural marking in German. As (61) shows, the measure term kilo cannot appear in the
plural.
(61) Zwei
two
Kilo/*Kilos
kilo/kilos
A¨pfel
apples
‘two kilos of apples’ (measure) Grestenberger (2013)
We therefore see in German that container nouns but not measure terms express morpholog-
ical number, and that container nouns qua measure terms appear in the unmarked form.16
These facts therefore serve as evidence for the categorial distinction proposed between con-
tainer nouns and measure terms, such that only the former inhabit the syntactic category
Noun. In German, then, M0 heads are not subject to the system of grammatical number
that determines the morphology on nouns. Note that here we make a prediction: container
16This description is a simplification of the German facts. For a much fuller discussion see Grestenberger
(2013), who arrives at a conclusion similar to the one arrived at here, namely that measure terms are catego-
rially distinct from container nouns.
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nouns derived from measure terms should gain a morphological plural form. The example in
in (6-b) above appears to bear this prediction out, at least for Dutch: a derived container
noun expresses morphological number.
3.3 The diverging status of atomizers
We began this chapter by examining candidate subclasses of quantizing nouns in English.
With the aid of four diagnostics adapted from Rothstein (2009), we distinguished three classes
of words: container nouns like glass, measure terms like liter, and atomizers like grain. Recall
that the diagnostics we employed were originally meant to discriminate between container
and measure readings, and not the terms themselves; the results of these tests are repro-
duced in Table 3.4.
reading -ful they SG each
measure YES NO YES NO
container NO YES NO YES
Table 3.4: Interpretation diagnostics from Rothstein (2009)
To summarize: container interpretations are impossible with -ful suﬃxed to the quan-
tizing noun, or with singular agreement between the plural quantizing noun and the matrix
verb. Quantity interpretations prevent the quantizing phrase from serving as the antecedent
to a plural pronoun like they, as well as quantification by distributive operators such as each.
In addition to applying the diagnostics to readings as originally intended, we further
applied them directly to the three subclasses of quantizing nouns. Recall the results of these
diagnostics, repeated in Table 3.5.
Measure terms and container nouns were shown to vary in their behavior depending on the
reading that resulted from their use. The exception was -ful suﬃxation, which necessitates a
measure interpretation and is impossible for measure terms. This distinction contributed to
the motivation for treating measure terms and container nouns as distinct subclasses, in fact
as instantiating distinct syntactic categories. We concluded that measure terms are endowed
with a semantics that yields a measure interpretation, that the semantics of container nouns
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term -ful they sg each
measure term NO Y/N Y/N Y/N
container noun Y/N Y/N Y/N Y/N
atomizer NO YES NO YES
Table 3.5: Diagnostics adapted from Rothstein (2009) and applied to subclasses of quantizing
nouns
results in a container interpretation, and that the members of each class enjoy uses as the
other to the extent that salient correspondences exist between measures and the objects that
may serve as their units.
Contrasting with measure terms and container nouns, in each of our diagnostics it was
found that atomizers resist a measure reading. Given that we have taken measure readings
to result from the semantics of a measure term, we therefore see that atomizers cannot be
used as measure terms. But what is it about the semantics of measure readings, and
more fundamentally the semantics of measure terms, that conflicts with the semantics of
atomizers? As we saw, measure readings find their basis in the measure specified in the
semantics of measure terms. To the extent that the elements of the denotation of a container
noun correspond to the units of a measure, these nouns may also serve as measure terms.
Atomizers, however, preclude correspondence to a measure. The claim is that this prohibition
of measure term usage stems from the fact that atomizers are at once neither referential,
identifying objects with the capacity for containing, nor do they appeal directly to measures
in their semantics.
With the characteristics discussed above serving as constraints, we now develop a seman-
tics for atomizers in English that appeals not to measurement, but instead to atomization of
an amorphous substance, or kind. In developing this semantics, it bears noting that atomizers
resist intransitive uses in which a substance noun fails to appear. Chierchia (1998a) observes
the aberrance of the following example, in which the atomizer grain is used intransitively,
without a substance noun. To the extent that an intransitive use is possible, a substance
noun is implicitly assumed.
(62) ?There were three grains on the floor. (Chierchia, 1998a)
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In (62), we see that a simple predicate semantics for atomizers is impossible; were these
terms predicates, they should unhesitatingly appear without a corresponding substance noun
(cf. the behavior of container nouns). From this incompatibility with intransitive uses (i.e.,
uses without an of phrase), Chierchia concludes that the semantics of atomizers is inherently
relational. We should conclude the same. It will not do, then, to propose a predicate semantics
for atomizers like that given for container nouns, and stipulate that unlike container nouns
the elements of a atomizer’s denotation may never form the basis of a measure (so that
atomizers cannot yield a measure interpretation). Again, container nouns are at base non-
relational nouns, freely admitting intransitive uses. Therefore, let us submit a semantics
for atomizers that is both partitioning (i.e., atomizing) and relational, and that does not
appeal to measures. As we do so, keep in mind that the given semantics is meant to cover
merely English atomizers; we return to the connection between English atomizers and their
counterparts in classifier languages like Mandarin in Chapter 5.
Recall the uses of atomizers we have so far considered, for example grain in (63).
(63) There are two grains of rice in this soup.
(64) *three rice(s)
In (63), the atomizer’s substance noun rice is a mass noun, which when used independently
resists counting by cardinal numerals, (64), intuitively because mass nouns are not specified
for what counts as a minimal part, or atom (Link, 1983; see also the discussion of mass
noun properties in Gillon, 1999). In order to count elements of a mass noun’s denotation,
we require information about just what these countable units are. Put plainly, atomizers
provide this information: In (63), grain specifies the rice units for counting, namely those
small, cylindrical members of rice’s denotation. Thus, atomizers catalyze the counting of
the denotation of a noun that otherwise would resist composition with a cardinal numeral.
Concretely, atomizer phrases map mass noun denotations into sets of atoms, the units by
which cardinality is calculated.
But atomizers do more than simply specify atoms. They also specify physical and spatial
properties of these atoms. A grain of sand has a specific shape or physical makeup, just
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as a pile of dishes or a stack of laundry or a drop of water. The atoms that atomizers
ultimately reference are aggregates of a kind that are assembled in a certain way. The
atomizing function of atomizers must therefore track the physical properties of the substance
noun and its instances.
To formalize the function of atomizing, that is, mapping into a set of atoms, let us draw
on the notion of a partition. Doing so will take us on a considerable detour through the
theory of connectedness within the framework of mereotopology (Grimm, 2012; Lima, 2014),
but what results is a powerful notion of relative atomicity and, more generally, what it means
to be a whole quantity of some stuﬀ. These tools will further prove useful in the discussion
of degree semantics in the next chapter.
3.3.1 Partitions
Atomizers compose with a substance noun and designate countable units assembled in a cer-
tain way. In (65), grain composes with the mass noun rice, specifying, or rather constructing
atoms in the denotation of rice. The rice atoms are minimal instances of rice that are ar-
ranged in discrete, small, cylindrical forms. These atoms then get counted by the cardinal
numeral three.
(65) John picked up three grains of rice from the floor.
This atomizing interpretation for atomizers stands apart from container and measure
readings on the basis of the referents that result. Recall that under a container interpre-
tation, three glasses of wine refers to an element in the denotation of the quantizing noun;
it refers to three glasses. Under a measure interpretation, three liters of wine refers to an
element in the denotation of the substance noun; it refers to a quantity of wine. With the
atomizing interpretation, the referent of three grains of rice seems to be at once both rice
and grains. In other words, the entity referred to under an atomizing interpretation belongs
in some sense both to the denotation of the quantizing noun grain and the substance noun
rice.
Crucial to the understanding of the semantics of atomizers is the facilitation of counting
that results from their use. In (65), the atomizer grain permits the counting of the mass
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noun rice. Although the assumptions we make here will ultimately determine the shape of
our analysis for the semantics of atomizers, for now we remain agnostic about the structure
of a mass noun’s denotation, namely what it is about these nouns that precludes direct
counting.17 Proposed accounts of mass noun semantics include the double domain approach
of Link (1983), who claims that mass nouns find their denotation in a quantificational domain
distinct from that of count nouns. Rejecting the double domain approach, Chierchia (1998a)
proposes instead that mass nouns diﬀer from count nouns only in that the denotations of mass
nouns are inherently plural, that is, closed under sum-formation. In later work, Chierchia
(2010) proposes a diﬀerent account of mass nouns under which their atoms are unstable, or
inconstant across worlds. For the present purpose, we need rely only on the fact that mass
nouns preclude counting on the basis of atoms, and that atomizers transform mass noun
denotations into countable, atomic sets.
Sets are countable when their members are stable units that do not overlap. To create
non-overlapping sets, atomizers carve up an otherwise amorphous collection of entities into
discrete individuals. In other words, atomizers establish a partition. A formal definition of a
partitioning function is adapted from Chierchia (2013, p.9) in (66).
(66) Partitioning function π:
π is a function of type ⟨⟨e, t⟩ , ⟨e, t⟩⟩
such that for any P⟨e,t⟩ and any x and y in π(P),
¬∃z[z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y]
The partitioning function π in (66) take a set of individuals (a predicate P) and returns a new
set of individuals. Imposed on the new set is the condition that none of its members overlap.
Modeled by standard mereology, this no-overlap condition ensures that no two entities share
a part. To see the partitioning function at work in the abstract, consider the set in (67-a)
and the possible partitioning of this set in (67-b). Note that (67-b) represents just one of
many possible partitions. Some of these possible partitions will be natural in that they
are suggested or provided by context. For example, a candy bar with pre-formed blocks of
chocolate will suggest naturally partitioning the bar into those designated chunks, as opposed
17We return to the issue of mass nouns in Chapter 5.1.2.
92
to some other arrangement that meets the no-overlap condition of a partition.
(67) a. P = {a+b, a+c, a+d, b+c, b+d, c+d, a+b+c, a+b+d, a+c+d, b+c+d, a+b+c+d}
b. π(P) = {a+b, c+d}
Now, recall the notion of relative atoms from the previous chapter: evaluating atomicity not
with respect to the entire domain, but with respect to a specific predicate. The relative
atoms of a predicate P, its P-atoms, are those elements of P that have no other elements of
P as parts. On the basis of this notion of relative atomicity, we defined the P-atom measure,
µP -atom, as in (68).
(68) µP -atom(y) is defined only if y∈P; when defined:
µP -atom(y) = |{x∈P: x≤y & ¬∃z∈P[z<x]}|
Once we suppose that counting takes place not over absolute atoms, but over relative atoms
via µP -atom, a partitioned predicate becomes amenable to counting: In (67-b), each member
of the partitioned predicate measures 1 P-atom. But here we face a problem: with only the
no-overlap condition on partitioning, we allow for some extremely odd counting, at least in
the general case.
Imagine the predicate modeled in (67) corresponds to the predicate denotation of the
mass noun water. When partitioned, we have a set of non-overlapping water atoms relative
to a mereological model. Because overlap concerns only the material part-of relation, ≤,
these two water atoms may in fact belong to the same portion of water, for example the
water contained in a single glass. As long as the atoms do not share any instance of water
as parts, we ought to be able to say that the water in the glass when partitioned as in (67)
numbers 2. But intuitively the glass contains just a single quantity of water. Something has
gone wrong: imposing only no overlap will not suﬃce to designate countable units. At issue
here is the notion of spatial connectedness, the domain of formal topology.
In his investigation of countability in natural language, Grimm (2012) follows recent
philosophical work on ontological modeling (Casati and Varzi, 1999; Varzi, 2007) and enriches
standard mereological models with the topological notion of connectedness. Lima (2014)
extends this mereotopological approach in her study of counting in the Yudja language.
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What follows is a brief summary of the relevant aspects of these authors’ works.
First, consider what goes wrong in the water counting scenario above: a single quantity
of water divides into two, non-overlapping atoms, yet we would be hard pressed to say that
this water numbers 2 in any meaningful sense. Now, imagine that these non-overlapping
water atoms were separated spatially, say in two diﬀerent glasses. Suddenly, counting two
quantities of water feels completely natural. Given intuitions like this one, Grimm (2012)
and Lima (2014) propose that counting proceeds over maximally self-connected portions of
stuﬀ. These maximally self-connected portions are our relative atoms. Now for the formal
details.
Mereology is a theory of parthood, described by Leonard and Goodman (1940) as “the
calculus of individuals.” Central to mereology is the parthood relation ≤ and the axioms
that constrain it. The relation is reflexive, such that every individual is part of itself, (69-a);
it is transitive, such that a part of a part of an individual is also a part of that individual,
(69-b); and it is antisymmetric, such that if two individuals are part of each other then they
are identical, (69-c). Note that variables in these formula and the formula that follow are
quantified over universally unless otherwise specified.
(69) The axioms of parthood :
a. x ≤ x (reflexivity)
b. x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z → x ≤ z (transitivity)
c. x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x → x = y (antisymmetry)
The proper parthood relation < is defined on the basis of ≤ in (70): a proper part of some
individual must be a part of that individual, which must have some other individual as a
part.
(70) Proper parthood :
x < y := x ≤ y ∧ ∃z[z ≤ y ∧ ¬(z ≤ x)]
The overlap relation O, defined in (71), also derives from ≤: two individuals overlap if they
share a part.
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(71) Overlap:
O(x)(y) := ∃z[z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y]
With these relations and their axioms, mereological theory has been used to model the
domain of individuals (e.g., Link, 1983). By enriching these models with the formal notion of
connectedness, we stand to derive a robust notion minimal wholes and thus relative atoms,
the output of atomizers that serve as the basis for counting.
Topology is a theory of shapes in space. As such, topology is concerned with the connect-
edness relation C, with its axioms in (72). We will encounter many varieties of connectedness;
for now suppose that two entities are connected if they touch each other. The relation is re-
flexive, such that an individual is necessarily connected to itself, (72-a); and it is symmetric,
such that if an individual is connected to another individual, then that individual is also
connected to it, (72-b). To illustrate: I am connected to myself. I am also connected to my
chair, which is furthermore connected to me.
(72) The axioms of connectedness:
a. C(x)(x) (reflexivity)
b. C(x)(y) → C(y)(x) (symmetry)
Adopting the axioms in (73) incorporates connectedness into mereological theory. These
axioms describe how connectedness interacts with parthood: a part of something is necessarily
connected to that individual, (73-a); two individuals that overlap are connected, (73-b); and
anything connected to part of an individual is also connected to that individual, (73-c). Here
is our mereotopological framework.
(73) The axioms bridging topology and mereology :
a. x ≤ y → C(x)(y) (integrity)
b. O(x)(y) → C(x)(y) (unity)
c. x ≤ y → ∀z[C(x)(z) → C(z)(y)] (monotonicity)
Returning once again to the water counting scenario above, our problem was that we iden-
tified two parts of what intuitively counted as a single quantity of water. The parts did not
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overlap, yet they were connected. In other words, they formed a whole individual. The frame-
work of mereotypology allows us to model this fact formally by incorporating the topological
relationship of connectedness within a theory of parthood.
To capture the role of connectedness in countability, Lima (2014) proposes that the in-
dividuals we can count are maximally self-connected. In (74), we have the property of self-
connectedness:
(74) Self-connectedness:
SC(x) := ∀y∀z[∀v[O(v)(x) ↔ (O(v)(y) ∨ O(v)(z))] → C(y)(z)]
To count as self-connected, an individual’s parts must be connected to each other. The water
in our counting scenario holds this property: partitioning the water into two non-overlapping
parts, these parts are connected to each other (they sit in the same glass). However, each
of these water-parts is itself self-connected: splitting an arbitrary part into yet more non-
overlapping parts, those parts will still be connected to each other. Self-connectedness will
not suﬃce, then, to satisfy our intuitions about countability; we need a stronger definition of
wholes.
Relying only on self-connectedness to determine countability, we confront the problem
that an individual can be self-connected and a material part of another individual: the parts
of water in a glass are themselves self-connected, and they will have parts that are self-
connected, etc. For counting, we must ensure that an individual is not only self-connected
(so that it is spatially whole), but also maximal (so that it is not a proper part of any other
individual). This property, of being maximally self-connected, appears in (75). Note that
the property is relativized to a single kind.18
(75) Maximally self-connected :
MSC(x)(k) := SC(x) ∧ ∪k(x) ∧ ¬∃y[x < y ∧ SC(y) ∧ ∪k(y)]
An instance of a kind satisfies the property of maximal self-connectedness when its parts are
connected to each other and it is not a proper part of any other self-connected instance of the
kind. For the glass of water, only the total quantity of water will meet this requirement: the
18Alternatively, we could relativize maximal self-connectedness to a predicate (cf. Grimm, 2012).
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water is self connected and not part of any other self-connected quantity of water. Finally,
we have a definition of relative atomicity that matches our intuitions about what it means
to number 1. In other words, we have the means to model the semantics of atomizers, which
partition substances in service of counting. But now back to the connectedness relation itself.
The axioms of topology aﬀord many ways for two individuals to be connected; Grimm
(2012) discusses the following five varieties of connectedness. As we shall see, diﬀerent sorts
of connectedness describe diﬀerent sorts of relative atoms. We begin with the strongest form
of connectedness: strongly connected. Two individuals are strongly connected just in
case their interiors overlap.19 Next is externally connected, which attains when two
individuals are connected but their interiors do not overlap. Then we have by-connection,
a three-place notion of connectedness: two individuals are by-connected when they are both
connected to the same individual. Relatedly, two individuals are mediately connected
when there is some individual through which they are by connected. Finally, we have the
weakest notion of connectedness: proximately connected. Two individuals are proxi-
mately connected when they are suﬃciently near each other (not necessarily contiguous).
Suppose that a partition results in a set of countable, maximally self-connected individ-
uals. The revised semantics for a partitioning function appears in (76).
(76) Partitioning function π:
π is a function of type ⟨k, ⟨e, t⟩⟩
such that for any k and any y in π(k),
∪k(y) & MSC(y)(k).
The partitioning function π applies to a kind and returns a set of maximally self-connected
instances of that kind. In other words, π specifies how the kind instantiates by objects
in the world. These individuals are atomic relative to π(k) – for the purpose of counting,
each member of π(k) counts as a single P-atom. With the varieties of connectedness just
discussed, what it means to be a maximally self-connected individual may vary widely. Now,
let us consider how partitioning serve the semantics of an atomizer.
19See Grimm (2012) or any of the philosophical work that informs his mereotypological framework for a
formal definition of interior. For our purposes, an intuitive notion of interior should suﬃce.
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3.3.2 Atomizer semantics
The atomizer grain takes a mass noun like rice and returns the set of rice atoms, namely the
minimal elements of rice’s denotation with the appropriate physical properties. We can start
by attributing to grain only a partitioning function as in (77).
(77) [[grain]] = λkλx. x ∈ π(k)
The output of grain applied to a kind-denoting substance noun will be a set of maximally
self-connected portions of the relevant substance. Here we make use of the strongest notion
of connectedness, which implicates material overlap. Using this strong notion will allow two
rice atoms to touch, yet remain discrete (their interiors do not touch). Applied to rice, we get
the portions of rice that are self-connected and not a proper part of any other portion of rice.
Simply put, we get grains of rice. However, the semantics in (77) is incomplete. In addition to
identifying atoms, grain imposes constraints on those atoms, namely that they hold specific
physical or ontological properties. Without identifying these requisite properties, grain could
be applied to any kind, but as we see in (78), an atomizer is not always indiscriminate in its
usage.
(78) *Four grains of water/men
The problem with the illicit atomizer phrases in (78) relates to the fact that water units
(e.g., drops) and man units (e.g., individual men) are inappropriately configured; they do
not count as grains. We therefore must build into the semantics of an atomizer constraints
on the set of atoms that results, based on properties of the intended atoms. For grain, this
means limiting the derived set of atoms to objects that are bounded, small, cylindrical, and
inanimate.20 A revised semantics for grain, incorporating these constraints, appears in (79).
(79) [[grain]] = λkλx: x is bounded and small and cylindrical and inanimate. x ∈ π(k)
20This listing of properties of grain atoms is not intended to be exhaustive; there are likely many nuanced
facets to counting as a grain of something. The list of properties given serves merely to highlight how these
properties, whatever they might be, constrain the semantics of an atomizer. Furthermore, we must be careful
to not constrain these atomizers too severely, to allow for uses like grain of truth.
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For a given classifier the essential properties will necessarily vary, but the formula for
English atomizer semantics is clear: these terms are functions from a kind into the set of
minimal instances of that kind, constrained by relevant physical or ontological properties.
The crucial ingredient is the partitioning function π, which may be calibrated on the basis of
connectedness type. To repeat, π specifies how a kind instantiates. Here it bears noting that
English possesses an atomizer whose semantics appears to impose (almost) no restrictions
on the atoms that result – it serves merely to partition instances of a kind.21 The word is
quantity, as in the examples in (80).
(80) a. Alan found three quantities of rice on the floor.
b. Bill carried three quantities of water into the other room.
c. Charlie bought three quantities of apples from the farm stand.
In addition to imposing no restriction on the kind with which it composes, quantity admits
a great deal of flexibility it the arrangement of atoms that result from its use. Quantity thus
evidences the strong context sensitivity of partitioning functions. Take quantity of apples;
the apples need only be proximately connected, that is, suﬃciently close to each other. They
could also be mediately connected, say sitting together on a table. If there are many apples
on the table and context supports specific groupings, say certain apples are touching each
other, quantity could require that the resulting atoms are externally connected.
In the most general case, then, an English atomizer possesses the semantics in (81), where
the partitioning function is sensitive to the variety of connectedness suggested by context.
(81) [[quantity]] = λkλx. x ∈ π(k)
With (81) serving as the template for atomizer semantics, we have achieved what we set out
to: the semantics of atomizers is both relational, taking a nominal argument, and atomizing,
returning an atomic set of individuals arranged in a certain way. Our definition of a partition
delivers these results.
A final note: The structure called for by there proposed semantics has atomizers taking
the substance noun as a complement. In parallel the case of measure terms, the particle
21Some speakers might consider quantity illicit with animate substance nouns, as in three quantities of men.
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of contributes no semantic content. Atomizers themselves are neither container nouns nor
measure terms, yet they are nominal (e.g., they express grammatical number, as in one grain
of rice vs. two grains of rice). It seems appropriate, then, to treat atomizers as transitive
nouns. They create (relatively) atomic predicates, whose members may be counted and
quantified over like any basic noun. As nouns, atomizers are counted by cardinal numerals
formed by card and handled by # in the familiar manner: on the basis of cardinality
relative to the nominal predicate, we determine whether the atomizer appears morphologically
singular or plural.
(82) Structure of an atomizing nominal :
#P
#
pl
MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
card
NP
N
grain
(of ) nP
rice
Throughout our discussion of atomizer semantics we have limited the scope of the account
to English; in Chapter 5, we revisit the atomizer semantics proposed here as we compare
English atomizers with their counterparts in true classifier languages like Mandarin.
Next, we examine one last aspect of the behavior of quantizing nouns: the distinction
between their transitive and intransitive uses. This is the topic of the next section.
3.4 Transitive vs. intransitive uses
In developing a candidate semantics for container nouns, measure terms, and atomizers, we
have focused primarily on a single construction, at least superficially so. The relevant string
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of words appears in (83).
(83) [numeral ] [quantizing noun] [of] [substance noun]
Calling the string in (83) a single construction is not only misleading but wrong. Depending
on our choice of quantizing noun, diﬀerent structures deliver the arrangement of words in
(83), not to mention the diﬀerent readings that result from these diﬀerent structures. Our
choices for the quantizing noun include container nouns, measure terms, and atomizers. On
the basis of the measure term used, (83) derives from one of the three structures in (84).22
(84) a. Container noun:
MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
card
NP
NP
glass
PP
P
of
nP
water
b. Measure term:
MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
kilo
(of ) nP
water
22Number morphology on the quantizing nouns in these structures (i.e., #P) is omitted for simplicity. For
a reminder of how number marking works, refer back to Chapter 2.
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c. Atomizer :
MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
card
NP
Cl
grain
(of ) nP
rice
Measure terms and atomizers share the property of taking the substance noun as a syntactic
complement and a semantic argument; the of in uses of both is not a lexical preposition.
In contrast, container nouns compose with the substance noun indirectly via a PP headed
by the preposition of and adjoined to NP, modifying the container noun. With syntactic
adjunction and semantic modification only in the presence of container nouns, the optional
presence of the substance noun in the frame in (83) is predicted only with container nouns
serving as the quantizing noun.
Container nouns and atomizers share the property of being counted by cardinal numerals
formed on the basis of card, a M0-head that takes the maximal projection of the quantizing
noun as its complement. However, numerals in the presence of a measure term are not
cardinals: card does not project. Instead, the measure term heads its own MP and takes
the numeral as a semantic argument. In the string in (83), we should find that only container
nouns or atomizers permit the absence of the numeral – the numeral must appear with
measure terms.
This section investigates the two predictions just sketched. While we ultimately hold to
the basic semantics we have given to each subclass of quantizing noun, we shall see that the
facts are more complicated than the proposed semantics would have us believe. Consider-
ing a broader range of data necessitates a deeper understanding of how our semantics for
measurement fits within broader theories of grammar.
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3.4.1 The ontological distinction between kilos and cups and grains
We have the opportunity here for an excursion into metaphysics: What sorts of things are kilos
and cups and grains? Answering this question calls attention to the fundamental diﬀerences
we have attributed to the semantics of quantizing nouns.
Cups have an existence independent of their contents. One may talk of cups and not
be constantly interrupted by the question “of what?” Cups live in kitchen cabinets or on
desks; they come in various shapes and sizes and colors; they are made out of an assortment
of materials. Despite their diﬀerences, the set of cups coheres on the basis of their common
form and purpose, namely that of a bowl-shaped container used for drinking.23 Substitute
for cup any other container noun and a similar state of aﬀairs will hold.
That cups persist independently of their contents is reflected in the predicate semantics
we have given to the container noun cup in (85).
(85) [[cup]] = λx. cup(x)
This semantics is not relational; solely on the basis of the word cup one may identify the set
of objects that are cups. They are those objects that hold the property of being a cup.
Unlike cups, kilos do not enjoy an existence independent of the things they measure (or
that measure them), at least not in terms of real-world objects. To talk of kilos, one must
talk of kilos of what. A kilo of apples is a thing that measures one kilo. A kilo of rocks is
likewise a thing that measures one kilo. But the first thing is apples, the second rocks. We
may therefore delimit the set of things that measure one kilo (or two kilos, or three kilos,
etc.), but nowhere in that set will we find a thing that is a kilo. Being a kilo is not a property
an object can hold. However, measuring n kilos of something is.
(86) [[kilo]] = λkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µkg(x) = n
We therefore see the need for the relational semantics we have attributed to the measure
term kilo in (86): only with information about how many kilos of what may one reference
real-world objects. Substitute for kilo any other measure term and we find ourselves in a
23Ignore for present purposes the discussion of vagueness: Does a broken cup count as a cup?
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similar predicament.
Whereas cups are concrete objects and kilos simpliciter are not, for grains their ontological
status is less clear. Grains certainly are objects existing in the world: a grain of rice is
something that a person can point to. But a grain of rice is unlike a grain of sand, and each
is distinct from a grain of calcium carbonate (the basis of a water hardness measure). One
would be hard-pressed to delimit the set of objects that are grains. In fact, even as we use
the term ‘grains’, a relatum is assumed. Grains exist only inasmuch as the substance that
they are grains of does: the property of being a grain is defined with respect to a substance
(i.e., a kind).
However, in contrast to kilos of some stuﬀ, grains of a substance are inherently quantized.
Grains of something physically realize in a standardized way that kilos of something do not;
with kilos, we need to know how many kilos we are talking about in order to reference
a real-world object. With grains, all we need to know is the substance. Consequently,
unlike kilos, grains need not reference a specific extent along a scale in order to instantiate.
We see, then, that in order to serve as a property of real-world objects, grains require a
concomitant substance, but not a specified amount of that substance, as reflected in the
relational semantics in (87).
(87) [[grain]] = λkλx: x is bounded and small and cylindrical and inanimate. x ∈ π(k)
Note that one distinction between an atomizer like grain and a measure term like kilo lies
in whether we need a numeral to specify what a given instance of grain or kilo is. Another
diﬀerence concerns the partition inherent to atomizer semantics, which enables counting
(rather than measuring).24 Still, both are relational in that they require a substance to form
a property, contrasting with container nouns that readily refer independently of a substance
or quantity thereof.
We therefore find conceptual justification for the semantics we have attributed to measure
terms. But these considerations serve only to delimit the range of possible analyses, not to
determine them. Where our aim is to provide an explanation of natural language phenomena,
24One option, which for now must remain merely a consideration, is that partitions enter the semantics
whenever kinds instantiate. Thus, measure terms would feature a partition internal to their semantics, too.
We return to this point in the discussion of Chinese classifiers in Chapter 5.1.3.
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in the remainder of this section we consider the grammatical underpinnings and implications
of the semantics that has been proposed.
3.4.2 Suppressing the substance noun
Although we have focused on uses of measure terms in the string in (83), repeated below in
(88-a), we have also encountered apparently intransitive uses of these terms, (88-b), where
the measure term appeared without the substance noun (or the word of ).
(88) a. [numeral ] [measure term] [of] [substance noun]
b. [numeral ] [measure term]
Container nouns like cups readily admit intransitive uses: there are three cups on the counter,
Mary held three cups in her hand. That container nouns should allow usage without specifying
their contents makes sense given the ontological status of their referents: it is possible to talk
about cups independently of their contents. Grammatically, these constructions are formed
just like any other numeral-noun combination:
(89) MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
card
NP
glass
The structure in (89) is licensed by the non-relational (i.e., intransitive), predicate semantics
given to container nouns. They are nominal expressions of type ⟨e, t⟩, and they behave as
such.
Measure terms like kilo resist intransitive uses: neither there are three kilos on the counter
nor Mary held three kilos in her hand sounds acceptable, and to the extent that either of
them does they feel strongly elliptical. As we saw, instantiating a kilo is not a property an
object may hold, but being a kilo of something is. We therefore require a substance noun
in the usage of container nouns, both conceptually and in their semantics. Were we to try
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to form a structure like (89) with a measure term, composition would fail at the level of M′.
Without its kind-denoting argument, the measure term cannot compose with the rest of the
phrase.
(90) MP
Numeral
3
M′
M
kilo
The prohibition against intransitive uses for measure terms follows from their relational
semantics: a measure term, type ⟨⟨e, t⟩ , ⟨n, ⟨e, t⟩⟩⟩, requires a nominal internal argument.
Without this argument, use of the measure term fails, accounting for its lack of intransitive
uses.
While we correctly predict the oddness of intransitive uses of measure terms in expressions
such as there are three kilos on the floor, as we saw in Section 2.4.2 there are a range of
constructions in which measure terms may be used without a substance noun. Recall that
superficially intransitive uses of measure terms typically appear as the internal argument of
measure verbs (e.g., measure, weigh, etc.), as in (91-a). They also appear in predicative be
constructions, (91-b), as well as modifiers of gradable adjectives, (91-c).
(91) a. John weighs 100 kilos.
b. The temperature is 70 degrees.
c. John is two meters tall.
In (91-a), the speaker attributes to John the property of measuring 100 with respect to the
kilo measure, not the kilo measure of a specific substance. No substance noun appears, nor
is one assumed; the construction does not feel elliptical in the way that there are three kilos
on the floor does (to the extent that this latter sentence is acceptable at all). Thus, our
starting point ought to be the observation that measure terms do in fact admit uses without
a substance noun.
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In the account of number marking on measure terms developed in the previous chapter,
we took intransitive measure terms to be relations between numbers and individuals: the
intransitive measure term takes a numeral and returns the set of individuals that satisfy the
relevant measure to the extent specified by the numeral. The proposed semantics is repeated
in (92).
(92) a. [[kilo]]⟨n,⟨e,t⟩⟩ = λnλx. µkg(x) = n
b. [[100 kilos]] = λx. µkg(x) = 100
An intransitive measure phrase like 100 kilos will be true of an individual just in case it weighs
100 kilos. But what is the relationship between the transitive semantics we have entertained
for measure terms and the intransitive semantics in (92-a)? One possibility assumes that
there is in fact no relationship between the transitive and intransitive semantics; intransitive
kilo in (92-a) and transitive kilo in (93) are two diﬀerent words.
(93) [[kilo]] = λkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µkg(x) = n
In addition to the rampant ambiguity and subsequent explosion of the lexicon such an account
necessitates – not to mention the problems posed to a learner – positing no relationship
between transitive and intransitive measure terms appears to miss an obvious generalization.
The semantics at the core of (92-a) and (93), namely the kilo measure, are the same; all
that diﬀers between the two is the presence or absence of a nominal argument. We should
therefore consider the relationship between transitive and intransitive semantics of measure
terms as one of derivation. It remains to be seen which use is prior, which is derived, and
how this derivation proceeds semantically.
Suppose that the intransitive semantics of measure terms is basic. How would we derive
a transitive use? We might try increasing the adicity of the measure term via a process of
lambda abstraction over the nominal argument, but there is no predicate variable internal
to the intransitive semantics to which we could apply such a process (Heim and Kratzer,
1998). Rather than attempting a feat in semantic acrobatics that derives transitive measure
terms from intransitive semantics, consider two points. First, we convinced ourselves in
Section 3.2.2 that the substance noun plays an essential role in the semantics of measure
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terms. Second, by virtue of being able to spell out the closed class of constructions that
admit intransitive measure terms in (91), we see that transitive measure terms enjoy a much
broader distribution. If one use is derived from the other, it ought to be intransitive measure
terms that derive from a transitive semantics.
We may view the process of detransitivization of measure term semantics as existential
closure (cf. Heim, 1982), here operating on the substance noun’s argument position. The
process would have intransitive measure phrases denote the set of objects that evaluate to
the appropriate value with respect to the measure supplied by the measure term, just as in
our candidate intransitive semantics in (92). What diﬀers, however, is now we say of those
objects denoted that they instantiate some kind. The composition is illustrated in (94).
(94) a. MP
Numeral
3
∃ M′
M
kilo
k
b. [[three kilos]] = λx. ∃k[∪k(x) ∧ µkg(x) = 3]
While ∃-closure of the substance noun argument position yields the desired semantics for an
intransitive measure term, this process of detransitivization must be constrained. Only in a
few specified constructions may intransitive measure terms appear. Recall the representative
intransitive examples we considered:
(95) a. John weighs 100 kilos.
b. The temperature is 70 degrees.
c. John is two meters tall.
What do the measure terms in (95) have in common? At least in (95-b) and (95-c), the
measure phrase serves as the predicate of the sentence: (95-b) ascribes to the subject the
temperature the property of evaluating to 70 with respect to the degree measure; in (95-c),
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we say of John that his height is equal to 2 meters.25 Perhaps it is not so odd to consider
the measure phrase in (95-a) also as a predicate. Doing so would aﬀord us an incisive
characterization of intransitive measure terms: they are licensed only when the measure
phrases they project are used as predicates.
The trouble with labeling intransitive measure terms as predicates centers around ex-
amples like (95-a), where the verb weigh, together with the measure phrase, serves as the
predicate of the sentence. But consider how this sentence composes. We have given super-
ficially intransitive measure phrases a predicate semantics, type ⟨e, t⟩; this phrase appears
bare, without a determiner, so it likely continues to be predicate-denoting at the point at
which it composes with weigh. The subject, John, is individual-denoting, type e. One way
to view the contribution of weigh, then, is as a function that feeds a predicate its argument,
as in (96).
(96) [[weigh]] = λPλx. P(x)
The semantics for measure verbs cannot be so bleached because the verb imposes selectional
restrictions on its complement: John cannot weigh two meters or measure blue. Moreover,
the measure phrase complement does not behave as a genuine internal argument because it
cannot be passivized (cf. 100 kilos are weighed by John). Assuming the measure verb serves
the role of argument-feeder, it does so judiciously, on the basis of presuppositions targeting
the dimension of measure called for by the measure term. That we find so few measure verbs
(e.g., weigh, measure) speaks to the specialized status of this argument-feeding operation.
Before turning to intransitive uses of atomizers, consider one last aspect of the proposed
relationship between transitive and intransitive measure terms, where the latter are taken to
derive from the semantics of the former. In (95-b), repeated in (97), we see an intransitive
use of the measure term degree.
(97) The temperature is 70 degrees.
(98) [[degree]] = λkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µ◦(x) = n
25The gradable adjective in this construction would act as a simple predicate, specifying the dimension of
the measure as one of height. We return to the semantics of gradable adjectives in Chapter 5.1.1.
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Supposing as we have that intransitive degree derives from a transitive semantics, the basic
entry for degree would be as in (98). We would therefore predict that degree should enjoy
transitive uses just like the other measure terms we have encountered. But as Schwarzschild
(2006) observes, degree resists transitive uses: substance nouns are precluded from composing
with degree. According to Schwarzschild, at issue in (99) is the property of monotonictiy, as
defined in (100).26
(99) *two degrees of water (Schwarzschild, 2006)
(100) A measure µ is monotonic with respect to a kind k iﬀ
∀x,y ∈ ∪k [x ≤ y → µ(x) ≤ µ(y)]
How does monotonicity account for the ungrammaticality of transitive degree? In (99),
the relevant measure is µ◦, and the kind with respect to which one assesses the measure’s
monotonicity is water. If µ◦ were monotonic with respect to water, any quantity of water
measuring two degrees would have no proper parts which also measure two degrees. Our
world knowledge tells us this is not the case: any part of a quantity of water that is at two
degrees will also be at two degrees, by virtue of the nature of degrees of temperature. It
seems, then, that its non–monotonic status as a measure precludes degree from transitive
uses. This observation leads to the implicational universal in (101).27
(101) Schwarzschild’s generalization:
Transitive use of measure term ⇒ monotonic measure
Schwarzschild’s generalization provides a description of the data from transitive measure
terms. As expected, another non-monotonic measure, introduced by the measure term carat,
likewise precludes transitive uses: one cannot reference two carats of gold. Now, consider the
explanation for this phenomenon.
According to Schwarzschild, ensuring monotonicity in transitive uses is the job of a des-
ignated Mon head. Mon0 composes with the substance noun and the resulting constituent
26Schwarzschild (2006) defines monotonicity relative to a property, which translates to the corresponding
kind for our purposes.
27What we have called a ‘transitive use’ Schwarzschild refers to as the ‘pseudo-partitive’ construction
(Selkirk, 1977).
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is modified by the measure term, together with the numeral.28 The result is Schwarzschild’s
structure in (102).
(102) MonP
MP
three pounds
Mon′
Mon0
(of )
NP
meat
Mon carries with it a presupposition that the measure phrase (MP) is monotonic on the
part-whole relation given by the property contributed by the substance noun (NP). This
presupposition projects and becomes a condition on the denotation of the maximal projection
of Mon, MonP.
(103) [[MonP]] = λx. NP(x) ∧ MP(x); condition: MP is monotonic on NP
This account of the lack of transitive uses of non-monotonic measure terms is brute–force
engineering; we still lack a principled reason for why Mon should enforce monotonicity and
not prohibit it. Worse, we lack evidence of Mon altogether. We therefore consider an account
of the ill-formedness of two degrees of water without appeal to a designated functional head
that rules it out.
Schwarzschild assumes that non-monotonic degree is precluded from occurring in a specific
construction, the pseudo-partitive. But making the restriction against degree construction-
specific obscures the fact that only predicative uses of the term are allowed. In other words,
it is not the construction, but rather the transitive usage that is incompatible with non-
monotonic measures.
The claim is that non-monotonic measure terms resist transitive uses because they are
at no point endowed with transitive semantics.29 Concretely, a non-monotonic measure term
28Schwarzschild imagines a diﬀerent constituency for measure phrases than that which we have assumed.
For him, a measure phrase is just the combination of a measure term with a numeral. This measure phrase
then modifies the substance noun, rather than taking the noun as a syntactic complement.
29There is another way to look at this restriction: non-monotonic measure terms resist uses as arguments.
Here is some speculation as to why: A measure term composes with its arguments to form a predicate, modeled
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like degree is born with the intransitive semantics in (104). With an intransitive semantics, a
semantics that allows only predicate uses, we correctly predict that non-monotonic measure
terms like degree will never find uses in argument position.
(104) [[degree]] = λnλx. µ◦(x) = n
Returning once more to the ontological considerations that informed our transitive semantics,
it in fact never makes sense when talking of degrees to ask for a clarification of the substance
being measured: of what? Substitute a diﬀerent non-monotonic measure term like carat and
a similar situation holds. Thus, degree does not take a substance noun as a complement
because it lacks the transitive semantics that would allow it to do so.
Having considered the role of the substance noun in measure term semantics, we turn
now to atomizers. The semantics we gave to the atomizer grain has it compose with a kind
to yield an atomic predicate.
(105) [[grain]] = λkλx: x is bounded and small and cylindrical and inanimate. x ∈ π(k)
Our relational semantics for atomizers, together with our rumination on what sort of thing
a grain is (i.e., a grain of something), predict that atomizers should resist intransitive uses
where no substance noun appears. As Chierchia (1998a) observes, atomizers do in fact resist
intransitive uses. To the extent that (106) is permitted, a substance noun is assumed.
(106) ?There were three grains on the floor. (Chierchia, 1998a)
Unlike measure terms, atomizers lack a well-defined class of sanctioned intransitive uses.
With atomizers, then, the original prediction, namely that they would disallow optional
appearance of the substance noun in the frame in (107), holds.
(107) [numeral ] [measure term] [of] [substance noun]
as a set of individuals. Within the set created by a non-monotonic measure term, there will be rampant overlap
among the individuals (every proper part of something measuring two degrees will also measure two degrees).
However, the set created by a monotonic measure term will be structured, or non-overlapping (no proper
part of something measuring three meters will also measure three meters). When serving an argument, an
individual must be extracted from this set. Serving a predicate, we must assess whether some individual is in
this set. Conceptually, searching through an overlapping set for an individual is more diﬃcult than verifying
whether an individual is in such a set. Hence the ban on monotonic measure terms as arguments: the process
of extracting an individual from an overlapping set is too taxing.
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Next, we investigate the second prediction of our quantizing noun semantics: that container
nouns and atomizers, but not measure terms, allow the absence of the numeral.
3.4.3 Suppressing the numeral
The quantizing noun semantics proposed in this chapter has measure terms, but not atomizers
or container nouns, obligatorily occurring with the numeral in the string in (108); only the
measure term takes this numeral as an argument. The representative lexical entries for
quantizing nouns are repeated in (109).
(108) [numeral ] [measure term] [of] [substance noun]
(109) a. Container noun:
[[cup]] = λx. cup(x)
b. Measure term:
[[kilo]] = λkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µkg(x) = n
c. Atomizer :
[[grain]] = λkλx: x is bounded and small and cylindrical and inanimate. x ∈ π(k)
As a noun, a term that denotes a set of individuals, we predict uses of cup without a numeral
in parallel to uses of book or tree or table. This prediction holds: in subject position (the cup
of water fell onto the floor), in object position (Mary held the cup of water), as an oblique
(John hit Bill with the cup of water), in copular constructions (that thing is the cup of water),
etc., container nouns freely appear without a numeral.
As a relation between its kind-denoting complement and (appropriately constrained)
atomic instances of that kind, atomizers do not take the numeral as an argument. Instead,
they are counted via card just like nouns. We therefore predict the optional presence of the
numeral in (108) when an atomizer serves as the quantizing noun. The prediction holds: the
grain of rice fell onto the floor, Mary held the grain of rice, John hit Bill with the grain of rice,
that thing is the grain of rice; whatever unease speakers may associate with the preceding
examples likely stems from the implausible relevance of a single grain of rice. Crucially, the
acceptability of these numeral-less instances of atomizers contrasts with numeral-less uses of
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measure terms, which follow.
Unlike container nouns and atomizers, measure terms take the numeral in (108) as their
(second) argument. We therefore predict that the occurrence of this numeral is obligatory
to saturate the denotation of the measure phrase. Consider what happens when the numeral
fails to appear with a measure term, as in the examples in (110).
(110) a. The liter of water fell onto the floor.
b. Mary held the liter of water.
c. John hit Bill with the liter of water.
d. That thing is the liter of water.
In (110), the measure term appears without a numeral and the result is perfectly inter-
pretable. One interpretation, the container reading, immediately suggests itself for these
examples: In (110-a), the container and its contents fell. But as we saw, this container
interpretation results from uses of derived container nouns. Having already observed the be-
havior of container nouns with numerals, we focus instead on the second interpretation of the
sentences in (110), namely the measure interpretation resulting from the use of a measure
term.
Under a measure interpretation, (110-a) states that some quantity of water measuring
one liter fell onto the floor. But the numeral one appears nowhere in the sentence. The
rest of the examples in (110) behave similarly.30 This interpretation supports the conclusion
that measure terms may be used without the overt expression of a numeral via a process
of one-omission (Jiang, 2012; Li, 1997, see also Perlmutter, 1970). To see that there is an
implicit one in numeral-less uses of measure terms, consider what happens when the measure
term appears morphologically plural as in (111).
(111) a. The liters of water fell onto the floor.
b. Mary held the liters of water.
30This measure interpretation is perhaps easier to get when the numeral-less measure phrase is an indefinite:
a kilo of water fell onto the floor.
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Appearing in the plural without a numeral, measure terms no longer admit a measure
reading. In (111-a), we have an individual reading: many things, each of which contains
a liter of water, fell to the floor. Thus, in (111-a), we have a derived container noun. So,
measure terms may appear without a numeral by suppressing the numeral one, but one is
incompatible with the plural marking on the measure terms in (111): one kilos is impossible.
Therefore, one-omission, and as a result numeral-less measure terms, is ruled out in (111).
Consequently, the prediction that measure terms disallow occurrences without a numeral
holds. In the special case where the measure term does appear without a numeral, one is
assumed.
3.5 Discussion
We began this chapter intent on identifying what it meant to inhabit the class of words that
are quantizing nouns. Building on the description of measure terms from the previous chapter,
we characterized quantizing nouns as words whose function is to quantize a substance for the
purpose of counting or measuring. We considered three candidate subclasses of measure
terms: container nouns like cup, measure terms like kilo, and atomizers like grain. Based
on distributional diﬀerences, as well as salient distinctions in the meanings that result from
uses of members of each candidate subclass, we concluded that container nouns are in fact
semantically distinct from measure terms, and that both are distinct from atomizers.
Container nouns were shown to possess a basic predicate semantics, denoting sets of ob-
jects with the capacity to contain things. Through modification by a PP headed by the
lexical preposition of, which itself composes with a substance noun, container nouns yield
a container interpretation, denoting objects and their contents. Measure terms compose
directly with the substance noun, followed by a numeral, resulting in a measure interpre-
tation, denoting amounts or quantities of the stuﬀ specified by the substance noun. Like
measure terms, atomizers compose directly with the substance noun. However, the role they
play diﬀers: instead of measuring, atomizers partition, creating a set of atomic instances of
the substance noun. The proposed semantics for each subclass of measure terms is given in
(112).
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(112) a. Container noun:
[[cup]] = λx. cup(x)
b. Measure term:
[[kilo]] = λkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µkg(x) = n
c. Atomizer :
[[grain]] = λkλx: x is bounded and small and cylindrical and inanimate. x ∈ π(k)
In addition to direct mappings from container nouns to container readings and from mea-
sure terms to measure readings, we also accounted for the processes by which each term
enjoys uses as the other. A measure term is derived from a container noun via a process
akin to (silent) -ful suﬃxation, which transforms the noun into an M0-head using the ele-
ments of the noun’s denotation as the standard units of the derived measure term’s measure.
Container nouns derive from measure terms by reinterpreting a measure term as a nominal
head denoting a salient class of objects whose (potential) contents evaluate to 1 with respect
to the measure at play in the measure term’s semantics. With a proposal in hand, we then
considered cross-linguistic support for the categorial distinction, as well as the variability of
uses between container nouns and measure terms. What results is the proposed mapping be-
tween quantizing noun and reading specified in Fig. 3.3; solid lines indicate an implicational
relationship between term and reading, while the dashed line indicates functional variability
between terms.
Given the mapping in Fig. 3.3, we then took a closer look at the behavior and distribution
of quantizing nouns. Originally focusing on their uses in the frame in (113), we considered
Quantizing Noun Reading
Container Noun- -Container Interpretation
Measure Term- -Measure Interpretation
Atomizer- -Atomizing Interpretation
Figure 3.3: Relationship between quantizing nouns and the readings that result from their
uses
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what the proposed semantics predicted about the relationship between a given quantizing
noun and the occurrence of the numeral or the substance noun.
(113) [numeral ] [measure term] [of] [substance noun]
The simple predicate semantics for container nouns predicts optional realization of both the
numeral and the substance noun in (113). The relational semantics for atomizers, wherein
the atomizers takes the substance noun as an argument, predicts only optional realization of
the numeral. Both predictions hold: container nouns and atomizers optionally appear with
a numeral, but only container nouns allow the suppression of the substance noun.
The semantics given for measure terms, wherein both the substance noun and the numeral
are arguments of the term, predicts that both the numeral and the substance noun must
appear with a measure term. But as we saw, when a measure phrase is used as a predicate
the measure term does not require a substance noun: John weighs 70 kilos. We therefore
considered how intransitive uses of measure terms (i.e., where the substance noun does not
appear) derive from their transitive uses via a process of existential closure targeting the
kind-denoting argument position. When not detransitivized by ∃-closure, measure terms
conform to our prediction: the substance noun must appear.
As for the numeral, we saw that it optionally appears with measure terms only when it
is assumed to be one. An operation one-omission (e.g., Jiang, 2012), such that the numeral
one may go unpronounced in the presence of a measure term, was therefore proposed. Thus,
measure terms conform to our prediction: the numeral must appear, although when the
numeral is one it is optionally pronounced.
In our investigation of quantizing noun behavior, we noted that intransitive uses of non-
monotonic measure terms like degree cannot plausibly derive from a transitive semantics;
these terms with non-monotonic measures do not admit transitive uses: two degrees of water
is nonsensical. “Non-monotonic” pinpoints the property whereby a quantity of water evaluat-
ing to, say, 30 with respect to µ◦ has proper parts that also measure 30 degrees. In contrast,
monotonic measures lack this property: a quantity of water measuring 1 kilo will have no
proper parts that also measure 1 kilo. We rejected the proposal that non-monotonic measure
terms are banned from occurring in a specific construction (the pseudo-partitive, which ne-
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cessitates a substance noun) on the basis of functional structure specific to that construction
that checks monotonicity (Mon0; Schwarzschild, 2006). Instead, it was proposed that they
simply lack a transitive semantics. Thus, degree and its non-monotonic associates are always
functions from numbers to individuals, type ⟨n, ⟨e, t⟩⟩.
We have now in hand an understanding of the means by which measuring and counting
proceed in the nominal domain. The following chapter expands the typology proposed here
with a case study of the word amount.
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Chapter 4
Amount Semantics
The previous chapter provides a typology of quantizing nouns. Here we probe and extend that
typology with an analysis of the word amount. Despite its superficial similarities with the
atomizer quantity, we will see that the peculiar behavior of amount necessitates an expansion
of our inventory of quantizing nouns with yet another distinct class: degree nouns. Unlike
atomizers, which partition the overlapping denotations of substances and refer directly to
real-world objects, degree nouns like amount appeal to measurement in their semantics and
through a measure reference abstract entities; namely, amounts of stuﬀ.
This case study of amount accomplishes three things: First, we expand and refine the
semantics of measurement, endowing it with the ability to reference abstract representations
of measurement (i.e., degrees). Second, we develop a new semantics for degrees under which
they are semantically complex (i.e., not semantic primitives or simple points on a scale;
cf. Kennedy, 1999): degrees are aligned with kinds and treated as nominalized quantity-
uniform properties. While the idea that degrees should align with kinds has existed in one
form or another for some time (see Anderson and Morzycki, 2012, for discussion and further
motivation), we find here the first systematic implementation of this idea within the broader
framework of compositional semantics, an implementation that situates degrees within a
comprehensive theory of measurement. Third, we show how this new notion of degrees sheds
light on the analysis of so-called “amount” relatives (Carlson, 1977a; Heim, 1987; Grosu
and Landman, 1998). The approach developed here eschews the ad-hoc nature of previous
attempts and more readily accounts for the intuition that amount relatives reference objects,
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not degrees. We begin with a look at the behavior of amount.
4.1 A new kind of degree
Throughout our investigation of measurement in natural language, our strategy has been to
identify cases where measures enter into the semantic calculation. A particularly perspicuous
and interesting case is the word amount, as in (1). The sentence is ambiguous; not all of the
readings implicate measurement.
(1) John brought that amount of apples with him to the party last week.
To see measurement at work in the semantics of amount, we must first identify the readings
this word admits. Under the first reading, amount behaves analogously to the atomizer
quantity. As we saw in the previous chapter, quantity makes no use of measures in its
semantics. Rather, it establishes a partition over the overlapping denotation of the substance
noun with which it composes. Under this quantity-like reading of (1), amount partitions the
denotation of apples and, crucially, references specific apples. In fact, under this quantity-like
reading, (1) may be directly paraphrased as in (2), where quantity stands in for amount.
(2) John brought that quantity of apples with him to the party last week.
Imagine that two bowls of apples sit on a table. The speaker points to one of them and utters
(1) (or (2)), intending the quantity-like reading. He thus conveys that those specific apples
there, in the bowl on the table, were brought by John last week. We already have the means
to deliver this reading: amount receives the same denotation as quantity. It composes with
the substance noun apples, establishing a partition on apples; that picks out the contextually
relevant quantity of apples. Of these apples we assert that John brought them to the party
last week. The sentences in (3) provide more examples to highlight this reading: in each case,
that amount most likely refers to a contextually salient quantity (i.e., set) of apples. So far,
no measurement.
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(3) a. That amount of apples is rotten.
b. That amount of apples fell out of the bag and onto the floor, where it is now.
c. I put away every amount of apples that you brought in.
Under its second reading, amount does not reference concrete objects. In the same two-bowl
scenario just described, suppose that the bowl the speaker points at was just filled by the
speaker’s housemate, who recently returned from the supermarket. Here the speaker does
not intend to communicate with (1) that his housemate bought the same apples that John
brought to the party the previous week. Instead, he conveys that the apples filling the bowl
measure the same (say, in weight or volume or number) as the apples John brought to the
party – the apples are diﬀerent, but the abstract amount is the same. In other words, he
bought an amount of apples equal to the amount that John brought.
The sentences in (4) more transparently demonstrate this second reading of amount. In
(4-a), it is highly unlikely that the speaker eats the same apples every day. Similarly, in
(4-b), one hazards to assume that the speaker and the addressee are eating the same apples.
Instead, both sentences appeal to abstract amounts determined on the basis of a measure;
these abstract amounts are instantiated at various points in time by diﬀerent objects, which
are acted on accordingly.1 For example, suppose a dietary regimen mandates the eating of
two kilos of apples each day; that amount of apples in (4-a) could then refer to that abstract
amount, two kilos, which was diﬀerently instantiated by apples each day (i.e., the speaker ate
diﬀerent apples each day, but each day the apples that the speaker ate measured two kilos).
(4) a. I ate that amount of apples every day for a year.
b. I ate the amount of apples that you ate.
c. I want the amount of apples that Bill received.
Amount is not alone in its status as a degree noun; other nouns that behave like amount
and thus fall within the class of degree nouns include size and length and weight (a subset
of what Partee 1987 calls “attribute” nouns). Compare (4) with the sentences in (5). These
sentences share the ability to reference objects indirectly via an abstract measurement.
1See Cartwright (1970) for a similar observation, which she attributes to Russell (1938).
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(5) a. I sold that length of rope every day for a year.
b. I cut the length of rope that you cut.
c. I bought that size (of) shirt for my entire life.2
d. I wore the size (of) shirt that you wore.
Here we see measurement at work in the semantics of amount and other degree nouns, but
this semantics appears highly context-sensitive. To evaluate amount, first we need to fix the
measure by which we determine amounts; in the verifying scenario given for (4-a), context
fixed that measure to weight. Additionally, the amounts referenced appear to be substance-
bound, applying only to individuals named by the substance noun (apples in (4) and rope or
shirt in (5)). Overtly specifying a diﬀerent substance to which amount applies results in a
cumbersome utterance, interpretable only under a metalinguistic guise. Consider (6).
(6) I ate that amount of apples every day for a year – in bananas.
It would appear that the substance noun is an argument of amount ; in this way, amount
functions as a transitive quantizing noun. The amounts to which we refer are restricted such
that they apply only to objects named by the substance noun. We return to this issue in our
discussion of the status of the substance noun for other quantizing nouns below, as well as
in Section 4.1.1.
Let us settle on some terminology that diﬀerentiates these two readings of amount. Under
the first, object-level interpretation, amount behaves like quantity and the resulting expres-
sion receives a simple definite interpretation: that amount of apples references the maximal
relevant apple individual. Under the second, abstract amount interpretation, that amount of
apples variously instantiates with diﬀerent apple individuals; this we term the existential
definite interpretation (cf. the existential reading for kinds from Carlson 1977b, which we
discuss in detail below).
2Size may compose directly with the substance noun, without an intervening of, supporting the claim that
degree nouns take the substance noun as an argument. Why the other degree nouns preserve the particle of
remains an open question. See Zamparelli (1998) for further discussion of this particle.
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(7) I want that amount of apples.
a. definite interpretation: I want those apples there
b. existential interpretation: I want some apples that measure the relevant amount
In addition to definite and existential interpretations, amount admits another, more ab-
stract reading: the direct interpretation, which directly references an abstract amount and
stands out from the existential interpretation by its lack of instantiation as real-world ob-
jects. This reading is particularly apparent when amount appears bare, without a substance
noun. Imagine ordering wine from a menu, which lists prices for three diﬀerent amounts
(i.e., measurements) of wine. One may utter either of the sentences in (8), implicating only
abstract measurements, not the wine that could instantiate them.
(8) a. I want the largest amount.
b. That amount is too much.
We also see the direct interpretation in specificational sentences like in (9).
(9) That amount is five kilos.
Finally, bare amount receives a direct interpretation when it is indirectly modified by a
substance noun, as in (10). Imagine cashing out at a (disreputable) casino, where winnings
may be instantiated by various commodities. Uttering the sentence in (10), the speaker uses
that amount to reference an abstract measurement (say, a sum of money).
(10) I want that amount in diamonds.
Recall the behavior of the existential interpretation: an abstract amount is instantiated by
the objects holding the appropriate property. It would appear that the direct interpretation
is somehow prior to this reading: first we settle on the abstract amount (the direct inter-
pretation), then we instantiate it (the existential interpretation). We have thus identified
three distinct, though related interpretations for amount. They appear in (11) (keep in mind
that not all readings are always equally salient, hence the use of various tricks to highlight
these interpretations in the sentences considered above).
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(11) I want that amount of apples.
✓ definite interpretation: I want those apples there
✓ direct interpretation: I want that abstract amount/measurement
✓ existential interpretation: I want some apples that measure the relevant
amount
Given our focus on the semantics of measurement, the direct and existential readings of
amount in (11) will be our primary concern; measurement is not implicated in the definite
interpretation. As was our strategy in the previous chapter, we will here endow amount with
a semantics that delivers these readings, while taking note of the flexibility necessary to allow
amount to function as an atomizer like quantity and yield a definite interpretation. In fact,
we must also allow quantity to function like amount.
We saw in examples (1) and (2) that amount and quantity are interchangeable under a
definite interpretation: both words may be used to specify discrete quantities of a substance.
In (12), we see that quantity also admits an existential interpretation (compare (4-a)).
(12) I ate that quantity of apples every day for a year.
It is unlikely that the speaker means to convey that he ate the same apples every day when
uttering (12). Instead, as was the case with amount, here quantity is used to specify an
abstract amount that variously instantiates as apples. Under this reading, quantity receives
an existential interpretation. Here we make a prediction: we hypothesized above that
underlying the existential reading is the direct interpretation, whereby abstract amounts
are referenced but not instantiated by objects. Put diﬀerently, we have hypothesized that the
existential interpretation derives from a direct use of the noun: first a measurement is
referenced, and then it is instantiated. Given that we observe existential uses of quantity
(cf. (12)), we predict direct uses for the noun as well. This prediction appears to hold:
compare (13) with the examples featuring amount in (8).
(13) a. I want the largest quantity.
b. That quantity is too much.
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While the most salient reading for (13) might be a definite one (where a substance is assumed
and a salient subset of it is referenced), it also admits the direct interpretation like amount in
(8), as we would expect if the direct interpretation precedes the existential interpretation.
Under the direct reading, quantity is used to make claims about abstract amounts.
What about the other sub-classes of quantizing nouns? In (14), we test the availability of
the definite interpretation for the container noun glass. Both sentences allow this definite
interpretation: specific quantities of water are referenced by glass of water (likely through a
reinterpretation of glass as a measure term).
(14) a. That glass of water smells like chlorine.
b. I drank every glass of water that you brought.
In (15), we test the availability of the direct interpretation for glass. Neither sentence
delivers this interpretation. (15-a) fails completely. In (15-b), glass functions as a basic noun
and the speaker makes claims about glasses, not about measurements.
(15) a. #I want that glass, but of milk.
b. I want the largest glass.
Finally, in (16), we test the availability of the existential interpretation. Here we see that
no such reading arises. Both sentences express a definite interpretation of glass, resulting
in the unlikely assertion that the same water was consumed at various points in time.
(16) a. I drank that glass of water every day for a year.
b. I drank the glass of water that you drank.
The resulting pattern is summarized in (17). Unlike the atomizer quantity, here we see that
glass may not function like amount and reference abstract measurements (the reader can
verify that no container nouns may).
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(17) I want that glass of water.
✓ definite interpretation: I want that water there
✗ direct interpretation: I want that abstract amount/measurement
✗ existential interpretation: I want some water that measures the relevant
amount
This finding should come as no surprise: in the previous chapter we saw that container nouns
are simple predicates with no measurement in their semantics.3 But if measurement is a
suﬃcient quality to behave as amount, we might expect measure terms like liter to admit
direct and existential interpretations. We begin with the definite interpretation in
(18), which liter admits via its measure term semantics.
(18) a. That liter of water smells like chlorine.
b. I drank every liter of water that you brought.
We next test the direct interpretation for liter. Assuming it is available, the direct inter-
pretation would reference an abstract measurement. However, to the extent that they succeed
at all, the sentences in (19) receive only a definite interpretation whereby a container is
referenced.
(19) a. I want that liter, but of milk.
b. That liter is too much.
Turning to the existential interpretation, in (20) we see that no such reading arises for
liter. The sentences simply cannot convey that diﬀerent quantities of water, each measuring
one liter, were consumed at various times. We summarize the results for the measure term
liter in (21).
(20) a. I drank that liter of water every day for a year.
b. I drank the liter of water that you drank.
3We did, however, see that container nouns may function as measure terms when a natural correspondence
exists between the container referenced and a measure that uses the container as units. In fact, in (14), glass
likely serves as a measure term.
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(21) I want that (one) liter of water.
✓ definite interpretation: I want that water there
✗ direct interpretation: I want that abstract amount/measurement
✗ existential interpretation: I want some water that measures the relevant
amount
The measure term liter, in spite of naming a measure, may not be used to reference ab-
stract amounts determined by that measure, or variable instantiations of such amounts. We
see, then, that amount and the other degree nouns truly stand out among the quantizing
nouns. Only they and quantity, when used under a similar guise, make reference to abstract
measurements.
Despite its unique status among the quantizing nouns, once we broaden our investigation
to include words without any hint of measurement in their semantics, we find a noun that
behaves similarly to amount : kind. In fact, any name for a kind admits analogues to the
direct and existential interpretations we have identified. Consider the behavior of kind
in (22).
(22) a. I ate that kind of apple every day for a year.
b. I ate the kind of apple that you ate.
The sentence in (22-a) does not assert that the same apple was eaten each day for a year;
instead, diﬀerent instantiations of the same kind of apple (say, McIntosh) were eaten each
day. A similar situation obtains in (22-b), which crucially does not assert that the speaker
and the addressee ate the same apple. In parallel to the behavior of amount in (4-a), here we
have an existential reading of kind : the noun is used to name an abstract property, being
a specific kind of apple, and this property is diﬀerently instantiated by real-world objects,
which are acted on accordingly.
If this existential reading for kind is the same beast as the reading we identified for
amount, and if we are right in supposing that the existential reading derives from a more
abstract, direct reading, then we should observe this direct reading for kind. In fact, we
do. First, recall what is meant by the label “direct” for amount : the abstract measurement
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referenced by amount is named and predicated of directly (e.g., by asserting that an amount
of wine is too much, as in (8-b); or by specifying how the measurement instantiates, as in
(10)). With kind, we are not referencing measurements, but rather kinds. Thus, with kind,
a direct interpretation has the kind named entering into a direct predication relationship.
Consider the sentences in (23), where properties are ascribed directly to kinds.
(23) a. That kind of apple is widespread.
b. That kind of whale is extinct.
The direct interpretation for kind also arises when the noun enters into generic construc-
tions; here, the named kind serves as the restrictor to a modal and behaves like an indefinite.
For example, a paraphrase for (24-b) could be, “it is generally the case that apples of that
kind have worms” (Chierchia, 1995).
(24) a. That kind of apple goes down easy.
b. That kind of apple has worms.
We see, then, that kind behaves like amount in its ability to yield both direct (i.e., kind-
referncing) and existential (i.e., kind-instantiating) interpretations. Recall that in addition
to these two interpretations, amount also allows a definite interpretation whereby real-word
objects are referenced, as in (25).
(25) I want that amount of apples.
↪→ I want those specific apples there that I am pointing at
We have supposed that this definite interpretation of amount arises when amount receives
a partitioning quantity semantics (by a process to be made clear below in Section 4.1.2).
Returning to kind, no such definite interpretation is possible. Simply put, that kind of
apple can never refer to a specific, salient apple. It may only reference an apple kind, and
through this apple kind instantiations thereof. It would seem, then, that unlike amount, kind
cannot receive a partitioning semantics. In fact, the definite interpretation for amount
will arise through a reinterpretation of the word as an atomizer like quantity, a strategy
not available to kind. However, kind does allow abstract reference to kinds (the direct
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interpretation), and through such reference diﬀerential instantiation of the relevant kind (the
existential interpretation). The interpretations available to kind are summarized in (26).
(26) I want that kind of apple.
✗ definite interpretation: I want that apple there
✓ direct interpretation: I want that abstract kind4
✓ existential interpretation: I want some apple of the appropriate kind
We finally have a noun with behavior similar to amount. To see more clearly the similarity
in behavior between amount and kind (and kinds), we next consider a broader range of ex-
amples. As will become apparent, the parallels between kind and amount are not accidental.
As such, our semantics for amount will be modeled on the semantics of kinds.
In his discussion of bare plurals and their role as names of kinds, Carlson (1977b) examines
the behavior of the noun kind. We use his observations as a point of comparison with the
behavior of amount. First, Carlson identifies the peculiar relationship between kind and its
substance noun. In (27) and (28) (Carlson’s examples (11) and (12), p.341), Carlson notes
the contrast between the behavior of kind ’s substance noun and run-of-the-mill DPs in their
ability to relativize, be questioned, and pronominalize (cf. the restrictions on pseudo-partitive
syntax observed in Selkirk, 1977, and the anti-anaphora property reported in Zamparelli,
1998).
(27) a. ??Those are the beans that Bob ate three kinds of .
b. ??What did Bob see two kinds of?
c. ??Bob saw three kinds of
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
them
it
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
yesterday.
(28) a. Those are the beans that Bob ate three pounds of .
b. What did Bob eat two pounds of?
c. Bob ate three pounds of
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
them
it
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
yesterday.
4With kind, the direct interpretation whereby kinds are referenced is perhaps more apparent with the
verb like, as in I like that kind of apple. Kind-level predicates illustrate this reading even more clearly, as in
that kind of animal is extinct and the sentences in (23).
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Whereas the substance nouns in (28) freely relativize, get questioned, and pronominalize,
in (27), kind ’s substance noun resists participation in all three phenomena. Crucially, each
of the targeted nominals in (28) is a full DP. In (27), it is more natural to assume a kind-
denoting substance noun, rather than a definite one – an assumption that reduces perceived
acceptability. Compare this behavior with amount in (29); with all three phenomena, amount
aligns with kind – the sentences are possible, but they contrast with (28) in acceptability.
Like with kind in (27), the discomfort associated with the sentences in (29) likely stems from
a clash between assuming a kind-denoting substance noun and manipulating a full DP.
(29) a. ??Those are the beans that Bob ate three amounts of .
b. ??What did Bob
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
see
eat
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
two amounts of?
c. ??Bob saw three amounts of
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
them
it
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
yesterday.
Next, Carlson notes that there are uses of kind that attribute properties to kinds of
things, and crucially not to denumerable objects; here we have the direct interpretation of
kind. For example, (30-a) (Carlson’s example (16a), p.343) and (30-b) make claims about
specific kinds of animal, not specific instantiations of those kinds. Any kind-level predicate
will deliver this direct interpretation for kind.
(30) a. Some kind of animal is common.
b. That kind of dog is widespread.
But like amount, kind may also be used to make claims about instantiations of the kinds that
are named; here we have the existential interpretation. In (31) (Carlson’s example (20),
p.344), the speaker conveys that two kinds of dogs (say, pit bulls and collies) are instantiated
by dogs in the next room (say, by Bruiser and Rex).
(31) Two kinds of dogs are in the next room.
Carlson furthermore shows that the dimension by which we evaluate kind must be fixed,
so that their realizations are disjoint. He gives the example of Fido, the watch-dog collie.
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Watch-dogs are a kind of dog; collies are, too. However, if Fido and no other dog is in the
next room, (31) cannot (easily) describe this situation. The problem is that kind here would
have been used to reference kinds that share realizations. To further illustrate this point,
Carlson considers possible responses to a request to enumerate all the kinds of cars. “Fords,
convertibles, road-racers, sedans, Chevrolets, . . . ” would be out as a response, but a list of
brand names would be fine. Only in the latter case are the sets of objects that realize the
kinds disjoint.
Amount exhibits the same behavior. (32) may not be used to assert that two diﬀerent
amounts of apples (say, apples weighing three kilos and apples numbering five) are instanti-
ated by the same apples in the next room.
(32) Two amounts of apples are in the next room.
Even when the amounts are diﬀerently instantiated, (32) must assume a single, fixed measure
by which we evaluate amount. As with kind, amount requires a fixed dimension by which it is
evaluated; with amount, this dimension is determined by the contextually-specified measure.
So, two quantities of apples, one weighing three kilos and another weighing four, could verify
(32). Likewise, a pit bull and a collie, or a watch dog and a lap dog, verify (31).
In fact, any name for a kind aligns with amount in its ability to yield both direct (i.e.,
kind-naming) and existential (i.e., kind-instantiating) interpretations. Crucially, the ex-
istential interpretation that evaded container nouns and measure terms freely arises from
uses of kind names. We illustrate the availability of these readings with common nouns (e.g.,
apples; see Carlson 1977b for a description of the common noun class, and motivation for
treating common nouns as names for kinds). Again, when we make the definite interpreta-
tion highly unlikely, the existential interpretation becomes particularly salient. In (33), the
same apples were probably not eaten each day, but instantiations of the same kind of apple
likely were (cf. (4-a)). Given the current hypothesis that existential interpretations derive
from direct ones, we expect those apples to exhibit this direct interpretation. In (34), we
privilege this interpretation by combining common nouns with a kind-level predicates.
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(33) I ate those apples every day for a year.
↪→ every day for a year I ate some apples of that kind
(34) a. Those apples are common.
b. That animal is extinct.
Building on Carlson’s investigation of kind and kinds, Wilkinson (1995) discusses the facts
about kind mentioned above (i.e., its ability to yield both direct and existential inter-
pretations), and to them adds three more observations that are relevant to our discussion of
amount. First, Wilkinson notes that kind optionally appears without a common/substance
noun. Compare the sentences in (35) (Wilkinson’s examples (17) and (26), pp.386–7).
(35) a. That kind of animal is sitting on my lawn.
b. An animal of that kind is sitting on my lawn.
Both sentences receive an existential interpretation: an instantiation of the appropriate
animal kind is sitting on the speaker’s lawn. In (35-a), kind appears superficially transi-
tive; Carlson treats it as a modifier of the common noun animal. In (35-b), kind appears
superficially intransitive. For now we leave aside the specifics of the transitive/intransitive
semantics for kind (but see below in Section 4.1.1 for discussion); what is relevant is the
parallel in behavior with amount. In (36), we replicate the transitive/intransitive ambiguity
with amount.
(36) a. That amount of water is too much.
b. Water in that amount is too much.
Next, Wilkinson observes that definite kind may serve as the pivot of a be-existential,
ostensibly flouting the Definiteness Restriction, which precludes definite NPs from occurring
in this position (Milsark, 1974; Heim, 1987). Compare (37-a), featuring kind, with (37-b),
featuring the basic definite those books (Wilkinson’s examples (12) and (13), p.384); whereas
those books may not serve as the pivot of an existential, those kinds does so freely (see also
Zamparelli 1998).
132
definite direct existential
amount ✓ ✓ ✓
quantity ✓ ✓ ✓
glass ✓
kilo ✓
kind ✓ ✓
Table 4.1: Available nominal interpretations: a comparison with amount
(37) a. There are those kinds of books in the library.
b. *There are those books in the library.
c. There are books in the library.
(38) a. There is that amount of apples in our kitchen.
b. There are those amounts of wine on the menu.
Comparing the sentences in (38) with (37-a), we see that amount yet again patterns with
kind : both may serve as the pivot of an existential. We return to amounts in existential
sentences and the Definiteness Restriction in Section 4.4.
Finally, Wilkinson observes that definite kind may be bound by adverbs of quantification
like indefinites (see also Zamparelli, 1998). The sentences in (39) (Wilkinson’s examples (14)
and (15), p.384) make the same assertion: it is usually the case that an equation of the
specified kind has two diﬀerent solutions .
(39) a. That kind of equation usually has two diﬀerent solutions.
b. An equation of that kind usually has two diﬀerent solutions.
(40) a. That amount of apples usually busts the bags.
b. Apples in that amount usually bust the bags.
Once again, amount patterns with kind : it, too, may be bound by quantificational adverbs,
such that the sentences in (40) are synonymous. Like kind, amount behaves as an indefinite
in certain contexts.
To review, amount may be used to reference objects directly (the definite interpreta-
tion). Under this guise, amount behaves like quantity and establishes a partition over the
overlapping substance noun denotation. Amount may also be used to reference abstract
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measurements (the direct interpretation) or make claims about objects that can instantiate
those measurements (the existential interpretation). Our focus is on the semantics of mea-
surement, so these latter interpretations of amount are our primary concern. Amount stands
out among the quantizing nouns in its ability to deliver these interpretations – container
nouns and measure terms do not admit direct or existential readings. However, names
for kinds and kind specifically do exhibit both direct and existential interpretations. We
review the possible interpretations for the nouns that we have considered in Table 4.1. Using
kind semantics as our guide, we turn now to the denotation of amount.
4.1.1 Amount semantics
In characterizing the existential interpretation of amount, we noted how objects are refer-
enced indirectly via their correspondence to abstract amounts. Moreover, we identified the
nature of this correspondence as one of measurement. Consider the existential reading
of (41):
(41) I ate that amount of apples every day for a year.
↪→ every day for a year I ate some apples that measured the relevant amount
In uttering (41), the speaker references an amount and assert that the amount was instanti-
ated each day by apples, which he ate. But what are amounts, and, crucially, how are they
instantiated?
It would appear that amounts are degrees, e.g., three kilos or four feet. Degrees are
instantiated by the individuals that hold them: apples weighing three kilos, trees reaching
four feet in height, etc. In other words, the abstract degree indicated by that amount of apples
instantiates as any set of apples that evaluates to the appropriate value with respect to the
relevant measure, i.e., that reaches the specified amount. These individuals are specified in
(42), where µf is the contextually-specified measure and ni is the relevant value in the range
of that measure. Setting µf to the measure in kilograms, µkg, and ni to 3, we get a set
of apple individuals, each weighing three kilos. (42) would thus serve as the characteristic
function for the property of holding the degree three kilos of apples.
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(42) λx. µf (x) = ni ∧ *apple(x)
However, in using amount to reference abstract representations of measurement, that is,
degrees, one crucially does not reference individuals. Uttering I want that amount of apples
with an existential interpretation, the speaker makes no claims to the apples he wants.
Instead, the speaker indicates a desired amount, which will be instantiated by apples. Thus,
the denotation in (42) is a poor candidate for amount of apples, given that (42) denotes a set
of apples whereas amount of apples denotes a set of amounts.
The language we are using to describe the referents of amount and their behavior in
the sentences that embed it reveals our strategy in formalizing amount ’s semantics: amount
references abstract representations of measurement which may be instantiated by
objects in the world. Thus, the set to which amount refers should contain abstract
entities, which must be instantiated by objects. Here we find a parallel with the semantics of
kinds: abstract entities corresponding to properties, which are defined in terms of the objects
that instantiate them. Moreover, we noted in the previous section the striking similarity in
behavior between amount and kind : both admit direct and existential interpretations
whereby abstract entities or real-world objects that instantiate them are indicated by the use
of these terms. Amount also enjoys the exceptional distribution pattern that characterizes
kind. Here is the explanation for this overlap in behavior: amount refers to a set of degrees;
kind to a set of kinds. Degrees, like kinds, are the individual correlates of properties of
individuals; kinds and degrees are the same sort of entity.
Anderson and Morzycki (2012) arrive at a similar conclusion, namely that degrees are
kinds, using a diﬀerent set of data. Their primary concern is modification as it relates to
degrees, manners, and kinds. They show a broad range of functional elements that appear to
apply to all three sorts of entities, for example English how, as, and such. They also note the
behavior of the Polish anaphoric expression tak, which refers to kinds, manners, and degrees;
for our purposes, the flexibility between kind and degree reference is relevant, as in (43) (from
their example (1)).
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(43) a. taki
such-masc
pies
dog
‘such a dog’, ‘a dog of that kind’ (kind)
b. tak
such
wysoki
tall
‘that tall’ (degree)
Their ultimate conclusion is couched in a Neo-Davidsonian framework: degrees are kinds
of states. While the proposal developed here is in principle compatible with Anderson and
Morzycki’s approach, we make do without appeal to events or states. In other words, our
kinds are of a diﬀerent sort.
First, we review the behavior of kinds. With kind-level predicates (widespread, extinct,
common, etc.), kinds enter directly into predication relations and yield a direct interpreta-
tion. The sentences in (44) ascribe properties directly to kinds.
(44) a. That kind of dog is extinct.
b. Dogs are extinct.
In generic constructions, kinds restrict the generic modal (a universal quantifier) and behave
as simple indefinites (Chierchia, 1998b). The sentences in (45) make claims about what
usually transpires with (specific types of) dogs.
(45) a. That kind of dog barks.
b. Dogs bark.
In episodic contexts, there is no modal to bind the kind and there is no kind-level predicate for
which it may serve as an argument. To compose a kind with a non-kind-selecting predicate,
the kind must undergo a type adjustment similar to noun-incorporation (cf. van Geenhoven,
1998). The result is the existential interpretation, as in (46).
(46) a. That kind of dog is barking outside my window.
b. Dogs are barking outside my window.
What follows is a brief introduction to the semantics of kinds, building on the primer given
in Chapter 1.1.3, which delivers these three distinct uses.
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PROPERTIES KINDS
‘down’
∩
P K
∪
‘up’
Figure 4.1: Diagram of property–kind correspondence from Chierchia (1998b)
Take the dog kind. It corresponds to the property of being a dog. Dogs instantiate the
dog property. Formally, kinds are built from properties via a process of nominalization via
the ‘down’ operator ∩ (see Chierchia 1998b for discussion). (Kinds may also be taken as
primitives; more on this below.) Simply put, the dog kind is the individual correlate of the
property of being a dog. Kinds behave as individuals because they are individuals. Crucially,
they may be referred to and serve as arguments to predicates. Chierchia gives the following
semantics for the ∩-operator.5
(47) For any property P and world/situation s,
∩P =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
λs. ιPs, if λs ιPs is in K (the set of kinds)
undefined, otherwise
where Ps is the extension of P in s.
Just as kinds may be constructed from properties via nominalization, properties may be
retrieved from kinds via predicativization. The ‘up’ operator ∪ applies to a kind and returns
the property from which the kind was built. Taking kinds as primitives, the ‘up’ operator ∪
applies to a kind and returns the function that characterizes it. Applied to the dog kind, ∪
returns the property of being a dog, that is, a set of possible dogs. Chierchia (1998b, p.349)
schematizes the relationship between properties and kinds in Fig. 4.1.
When viewed extensionally, the correspondence between kinds and properties may be
thought of in terms of sets and the functions that characterize them; the distinction between
kinds and properties thus boils down to one of saturation: kinds are saturated, properties
are not.
5Where we have generalized the notion of kinds to include any sortal concept (cf. Chapter 1.1.3), K, the
set of kinds, should include any kind formed on the basis of a +-closed predicate. This move precludes bare
singular nouns from enjoying kind reference.
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It bears repeating that the set of kinds is a subset of the domain of individuals. Fido is
a dog; he is also an individual. The dog kind is the individual correlate of the property of
being a dog; it, too, is an individual. When the dog kind serves as the argument to kind-level
predicates, as in (44) and (48), we reference the kind directly (and attribute properties to
it); here we have the direct interpretation.
(48) Dogs are extinct.
↪→ extinct(∩*dog) or extinct(dog)
(where dog is the property of being a dog and dog is the corresponding kind)
Generic contexts arise from uses of the generic operator, Gn, a modalized universal quan-
tifier licensed by a functional aspect head (Chierchia, 1995, 1998b, also see the other papers
in Carlson and Pelletier, 1995). This generic operator behaves like a quantificational adverb
(Lewis, 1975). It quantifies over appropriate individuals in situations, contextually restricted
by the variable C. What results is an assertion about those individuals in the appropriate
situations (e.g., dogs barking when they are awake and enervated, etc.). With kinds, the
generic operator shifts the kind to a predicative type and quantifies (universally) over the
members of the kind. Thus, in generic contexts kinds yield a universal reading. The formal-
ization of (49) may be paraphrased as, “every situation s of the appropriate type containing
appropriate instances x of the dog kind is a situation in which x barks.”
(49) Dogs bark.
↪→ Gn x,s[∪dog(x) ∧ C(x, s)][*bark(x, s)]
When the dog kind serves at an argument to a non-kind-selecting predicate in an episodic
context, there is no Gn operator to bind it. Moreover, the predicate attributes properties
not to kinds, but to objects – that is, to instances of kinds. Instead of ascribing a property
to the entire dog kind, the sentences in (50) assert that there is an instantiation of the dog
kind (i.e., some dogs) that is barking. In other words, the sentences assert that there exist
individuals belonging to the dog kind that hold the property of barking.
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(50) a. That kind of dog is barking outside my window.
b. Dogs are barking outside my window.
To compose with non-kind-selecting predicates, kinds in episode sentences are bound by an
existential quantifier. Chierchia (1998b) terms this process, whereby kinds compose with non-
kind-selecting predicates to yield an existential interpretation, Derived Kind Predication
(DKP).
(51) Derived Kind Predication:
If P applies to objects and k denotes a kind, then P(k) = ∃x[∪k(x) ∧ P(x)]
(52) [[dogs are barking outside my window]]
= barking-outside-my-window(dog)
via DKP
= ∃x[∪dog(x) ∧ barking-outside-my-window(x)]
In (50-b), DKP applies at the level of the predicate barking outside my window, which does
not select for kinds. The result is existential quantification over members of the dog kind, as
in (52). Here we have the existential interpretation. By having DKP apply at the level of
the predicate, we derive the scopelessness (i.e., obligatory narrow scope) of kinds in episode
sentences (Carlson, 1977b; Chierchia, 1998b). Compare the (a) examples, featuring overt
indefinites, with the (b) examples, featuring bare plurals (i.e., kinds). Only the former allow
scope ambiguity such that the nominal takes scope over the relevant scope-bearing element.
(53) a. John wants to see an apple. (✓ want > ∃; ✓ ∃ > want)
b. John wants to see apples. (✓ want > ∃; ✗ ∃ > want)
c. John wants to see that kind of apple. (✓ want > ∃; ✗ ∃ > want)
(54) a. John ate an apple repeatedly. (✓ repeat. > ∃; ✓ ∃ > repeat.)
b. John ate apples repeatedly. (✓ repeat. > ∃; ✗ ∃ > repeat.)
c. John ate that kind of apple repeatedly. (✓ repeat. > ∃; ✗ ∃ > repeat.)
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With DKP formulated as in (51), the scopelessness of kinds in the (b) examples falls out
straightforwardly. DKP applies at the level of the predicate; the scope of the existential
quantification contributed by DKP is thus bound to this predicate. In other words, the
existential quantifier contributed by DKP is scopally inert. Note that in the (c) examples of
(53) and (54), the noun kind patterns with bare plurals in its scopeless behavior. We expect
this behavior, given that both bare plurals and kind of x name kinds and require DKP to
compose in episodic contexts. Let us consider how by giving a denotation for kind.
First, consider a phrase like kind of dog. It denotes a set of subkinds of the dog kind,
containing, say, collies, beagles, poodles, etc. The noun kind thus extracts from its substance
noun (e.g., dog) all of its subkinds. We attribute this subkind extraction to the operator
subkind, which takes a kind and returns a subkind of it. But recall the discussion of Carlson
(1977b) above, specifically the disjointness requirement on kind : when extracting subkinds,
kind must be restricted to a certain dimension of evaluation so that kind of dog cannot denote
the set consisting of, say, collies, long-haired dogs, beagles, and big dogs. Long-haired dogs
are a subkind of dog, as are collies. But these subkinds share instantiations; they are not
disjoint. Hence, the subkind function must be restricted to a certain dimension of evaluation,
notated as subkindf , to enforce disjointness.
Next, consider the behavior of kind : in the general case, it composes with a kind-denoting
noun and returns its subkinds.6 In this use, kind is transitive, taking the substance noun
as an argument. Discussing the inherently relational semantics of kind, Zamparelli (1998)
conceives of kind as an unsaturated function, writing, “a kind is always a kind of something.”
We should encode this fact in the semantics of kind. The resulting denotation is transitive,
or relational as in (55).
(55) [[kind]] = λgλk. subkindf(g)(k)
Kind takes a kind-denoting argument, the substance noun, and returns a set of kinds. This
set contains subkinds of the substance noun. The subkinds are extracted by the subkindf
function. These subkinds are individual correlates of the properties of being a subkind of
6For now we leave aside ostensibly intransitive uses of kind, as in a dog of that kind. Zamparelli (1998)
provides arguments for treating these uses as underlyingly transitive, with kind taking dog as an argument.
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dog. A candidate denotation for kind of dog appears in (56).
(56) a. [[kind of dog]] = λk. subkindf (dog)(k)
b. [[kind of dog]] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∩λx. *collie(x)
∩λx. *beagle(x)
∩λx. *poodle(x)
. . .
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
With kind returning a set of (sub)kinds, its scopelessness is predicted in episodic sentences.
In (50-a), DKP applies at the level of the predicate to allow that kind of dog to serve as
an argument. What results is the existential interpretation, whose scope is tied to the
predicate itself.
Now we return to degrees and the word that names them: amount. As we have seen,
degrees are abstract representations of measurement. These representations behave as indi-
viduals: speakers may reference degrees and provide them as arguments to predicates. When
the predicate may apply directly to degrees, we get a direct reading. Furthermore, these
degree individuals correspond to properties: sets of individuals that hold the relevant degree.
When a predicate applies to objects, we make claims about individuals that instantiate the
relevant degrees, getting an existential reading. We thus have an association between
kinds and degrees: both are nominalizations of properties that are instantiated by objects
in the world. Amount behaves like kind because both terms denotes entities of the same
sort: nominalized properties. An existential reading results when a degree serves as the
argument to an object-level predicate and something like DKP mediates their composition.
But what sort of property begets a degree? Because they are abstract representations of
measurement, degrees must be built from properties whose semantics appeals to a measure.
In its simplest form, a degree is the nominalization of a property defined on the basis of a
measure, as in (57). By determining how the a kind instantiates for the purpose of mea-
surement, the partitioning function π internal to the semantics of degrees ensures that they
apply to contextually-supported maximal instances of stuﬀ. Degrees are thus conceived of
as information bundles with four coordinates: < µ, n, π, k >. Setting µf to the kilogram
measure, µkg, and its value n to 3, we get the three kilo degree as in (59). This degree is the
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individual correlate of the property of weighing three kilos; predicativising the degree via the
∪ operator returns the set of things that weigh three kilos.
(57) DEGREE := ∩λx. ∃k[µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
where µf is a contextually-specified measure,
n is some number in the range of the measure µf ,
and π is a contextually-supplied partition
(58) Partitioning function π:
π is a function of type ⟨k, ⟨e, t⟩⟩
such that for any k and any y in π(k),
∪k(y) & MSC(y)(k).
(59) ∩λx. ∃k[µkg(x) = 3 ∧ π(k)(x)]
Note that the property from which a degree is built is quantity-uniform with respect to the
measure µf specified in the property’s semantics: everything holding this property evaluates
to the same n with respect to µf . In (59), every object in the de-nominalized property weighs
the same: three kilos. This notion, being a quantity-uniform property, is defined in (60) (cf.
Chapter 2).
(60) Quantity-uniform property :
QUµ(P) = 1 iﬀ ∀x∀y[ P(x) ∧ P(y) → µ(x) = µ(y) ]
Degrees are thus nominalizations of quantity-uniform properties. Three kilos qua degree is
the individual correlate of the property something holds when it weighs three kilos. Similarly,
that amount is the individual correlate of the property something holds when it measures the
appropriate amount. As individuals, degrees enter into semantic computation as arguments.
Composing with a predicate that may apply directly to degrees, that amount yields a direct
interpretation. By predicativizing them via ∪, as in the process of DKP, degrees grant us
access to the individuals that instantiate them. Hence, degrees also admit an existential
interpretation.
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Finally we have the means to provide a denotation for the noun amount : it denotes a set
of degrees, nominalized quantity-uniform properties formed on the basis of a contextually-
specified measure. But as with kind, amount behaves like a transitive noun, relating a
substance with amounts thereof. Echoing Zamparelli (1998), an amount is always an amount
of something. Rarely does one find bare amount, that is, an instance of the degree noun
without a substance noun like apples specifying what the amounts are of. In (61), we attempt
to construct examples of bare amount, but the result feels inherently relational: a substance
is assumed.
(61) a. John brought that amount with him to the party last week.
b. I would like the amount that Bill had.
In both of the sentences in (61), the tendency is to assume elision of the substance noun and
attribute to amount a specific substance it is measuring, similar to the process of ∃-closure
that yields apparently intransitive measure terms. We therefore encode the substance noun,
a bare plural or mass term, as an argument of amount. Doing so allows the degrees to
which amount refers to be both quantity- and quality-uniform. In other words, the degrees
referenced by amount are tied to the kind supplied by the substance noun. To make available
salient concrete portions of the substance for measurement, the kind denoted by the substance
noun gets instantiated and partitioned by π. In (62), we illustrate a quantity- and quality-
uniform degree: every member of the denominalized property is an instance of the apple
kind.
(62) ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)
Taking amount to be inherently transitive, relating instances of the substance noun with
amounts thereof, we arrive at the following semantics for amount :
(63) [[amount]] = λkλd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
where µf is a contextually-specified measure,
n is some number in the range of the measure µf ,
and π is a contextually-supplied partition
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Transitive amount first takes the kind-denoting substance noun as an argument, partitions
it, then relates this partitioned set to a set of quantity- and quality-uniform degrees. In this
way, amounts are always of something. Simply put, amount encodes directly the kind variable
that gets existentially quantified in our degree template in (64).
(64) DEGREE := ∩λx. ∃k[µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
where µf is a contextually-specified measure,
n is some number in the range of the measure µf ,
and π is a contextually-supplied partition
Note, however, that we have encountered ostensibly intransitive uses of amount, repeated
below. Recall the scenario in which the sentences in (65) are considered: looking over a wine
menu, the speaker makes claims about the amounts on oﬀer. Here, as in (61), a substance
is assumed, namely wine. Similarly in the specificational sentence in (66), a substance is
assumed. The problematic case for quality-uniform degrees is (67). For now we set aside this
intransitive use of amount, merely noting its circumlocutory paraphrase.
(65) a. I want the largest amount.
b. That amount is too much.
(66) That amount is five kilos.
(67) I want that amount in diamonds.
↪→ I want that amount to be realized in diamonds
As with kind, amount receives a relational semantics under which it takes a kind-denoting
substance noun as an argument and relates the kind with a set of nominalized properties, that
is, with a set of degrees. By building degrees from properties, we may access the members of
those properties just as we access the instantiations of a kind. Thus, (41), repeated in (68),
references an amount (i.e., a degree) and asserts that this degree was variously instantiated
by apples, which were eaten each day over the course of a year. This instantiation process
proceeds with degrees just as it did with kinds: via existential quantification over the members
of denominalized degrees. The mechanism remains DKP, which we generalize in (69) to apply
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to both kinds and degrees, that is, to any nominalized property (cf. (51))).
(68) I ate that amount of apples every day for a year
↪→ every day for a year I ate some apples that measured the relevant amount
(69) Generalized DKP :
If P apples to objects and y denotes a nominalized property, then
P(y) = ∃x[∪y(x) ∧ P(x)]
In (70), we see a simplified derivation for the sentence in (68). Two features are crucial: first,
that amount of apples denotes a degree; second, this degree composes with the object-level
predicate eat via Generalized DKP. The result is an existential interpretation; the speaker
asserts that there was instantiation of the amount-of-apples degree that he ate.
(70) [[I ate that amount of apples. . . ]]
= ate(that-amount-of-apples)(I)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃x[∪that-amount-of-apples(x) ∧ ate(x)(I)]
By taking seriously the similarities in behavior between amount and kind, we arrived at
a kind semantics for degrees. Degrees, like kinds, are the individual correlates of properties,
for example the property of attaining a certain degree (e.g., weighing 3 kilos) or belonging
to a specific kind (e.g., being a poodle). Our aim has been the existential interpretation
whereby measurements are variously instantiated by objects that are ascribed properties.
Associating degrees with properties grants us access to the objects that instantiate them,
just as associating kinds with properties grants us access to their members. Taking degrees
as semantic primitives that merely indicate points on a scale (e.g., Kennedy, 1999), we would
have no hope of deriving the existential interpretation that characterizes amount. We
would also miss the generalization that captures the striking similarity in behavior between
amount and kind : both nouns reference nominalized properties.
Our next step is to specify how the internal composition of that amount of apples pro-
ceeds such that the result is a degree. However, before investigating the semantics of degree
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composition, we first compare the degree noun semantics for amount in (63) with the other
quantizing nouns we encountered in the previous chapter.
4.1.2 Degree nouns in our typology
We began this section by comparing the behavior of amount and quantity. Both words
admit definite, direct, and existential interpretations. Both require a substance noun.
Despite these similarities, we have posited two distinct subclasses of quantizing nouns: degree
nouns and atomizers. Here we explore this hypothesis in more detail to ensure that degree
nouns in fact inhabit a diverging subclass. We will see that the nouns amount and quantity
are more or less interchangeable, but the classes to which they belong pull apart in predicted
ways once we attribute measurement to the semantics of degree nouns and partitioning to
the semantics of atomizers.
In the previous chapter, we identified the semantics of quantity as one of atomizing; it
and the other atomizers (e.g., pile, grain, heap) establish a partition over the substances
with which they compose. The partition enforces no overlap on the basis of maximally
self-connected individuals, which creates a (relatively) atomic predicate denotation whose
elements are susceptible to counting. Quantity is the most general atomizer, presupposing
nothing about the substance with which it composes and making no claims about the (rela-
tive) atoms that result. We repeat the semantics for quantity in (71); recall that the crucial
ingredient is the partitioning function π.
(71) Atomizers:
[[quantity]] = λkλx. x ∈ π(k)
where π is a variable of type ⟨k, ⟨e, t⟩⟩
such that for any k and any y in π(k),
∪k(y) & MSC(y)(k)
With the semantics in (71), quantity yields a definite, atomic interpretation when em-
bedded in larger linguistic contexts. Its use references specific objects that instantiate the
substance noun.
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(72) a. I brought that quantity of apples.
↪→ I brought those apples there that I am pointing at
b. I want that quantity of apples.
↪→ I want those apples there that I am pointing at
For amount, we provided a measuring semantics whereby the substance noun is related
to amounts thereof. These amounts are degrees, which are built as nominalized quantity-
uniform properties. By building degrees from properties, we enable access to the objects that
instantiate degrees, a move that ultimately delivers the existential interpretation that
characterizes amount and degree nouns. We repeat the semantics for amount in (73); here
the crucial ingredient is the contextually-supplied measure µf .
(73) Degree nouns:
[[amount]] = λkλd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
where µf is a contextually-specified measure,
n is some number in the range of the measure µf ,
and π is a contextually-supplied partition
(74) a. I ate that amount of apples every day.
↪→ every day I ate some apples that measured the relevant amount
b. I want that amount of apples.
↪→ I want some apples that measure the relevant amount.
Despite the diverging semantics these nouns receive, quantity may yield an existential
interpretation and amount may yield a definite interpretation. In (75) and (76), we revisit
the relevant facts.
(75) I brought that quantity/amount of apples.
↪→ I brought those apples there that I am pointing at (definite)
(76) I ate that amount/quantity of apples every day.
↪→ every day I ate some apples that measured the relevant amount (existential)
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Have we erred in ascribing to these two nouns diverging semantics and positing distinct
subclasses of quantizing nouns to which they belong? To see that the answer to this question
is no, we must adopt a broader prospective: quantity evidences the subclass of atomizers, and
amount evidences the subclass of degree nouns. These subclasses contain other members;
quantity and amount are provided merely as the most general instances of their respective
subclass. Looking at other atomizers and degree nouns, we see that quantity and amount are
privileged by their similarities in behavior.
Consider the atomizers grain and pile. Like quantity, these nouns compose with a sub-
stance noun and yield a partitioned, atomic denotation. Their use thus yields an atomizing,
definite interpretation that references specific objects.
(77) a. I dropped that grain of rice on the floor.
↪→ I dropped that rice there that I am pointing at
b. I want to knock that pile of books over.
↪→ I want to knock over those books there that I am pointing at
However, unlike quantity, these other, more specific atomizers resist the existential usage
that characterizes amount. In (78), no measurement enters into the semantic computation;
only a definite, atomizing interpretation is possible.7
(78) a. I will eat that grain of rice again tomorrow.
b. Bring me the pile of books that you brought yesterday.
It would appear that quantity alone enjoys existential uses.
Next, consider the more specific degree nouns size and length. Like amount, these nouns
compose with a substance noun and yield a set of degrees, namely, measurements of the
substance noun. In episodic sentences, their use yields an existential interpretation impli-
cating instances of these measurements.
7Note that (78-a) also admits a subkind reading, paraphrased roughly as, “I will eat that kind of rice again
tomorrow.” Crucially, this reading does not involve measurement.
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(79) a. I dropped the size (of) rock that you dropped.
↪→ I dropped a rock of the same size as the rock that you dropped
b. I used that length of rope on all of my climbs.
↪→ on all of my climbs a used a rope that measured the relevant length
When we try to use size and length to yield a definite interpretation, we find length but
not size permits it. In (80-a), that size (of) rock cannot be used to refer to a specific rock.
However, that length of rope freely refers to a length segment. Recall that amount, like length,
admits the definite interpretation.
(80) a. I dropped that size (of) rock on the floor.
b. I dropped that length of rope on the floor.
To summarize, atomizers yield a definite interpretation, and quantity stands out among
the atomizers in its ability to also yield an existential interpretation. Degree nouns yield
an existential interpretation, and some of them also yield a definite interpretation (e.g.,
amount, length). Now for the explanation: the measuring semantics of degree nouns delivers
the existential interpretation; the partitioning semantics of atomizers delivers the defi-
nite interpretation. The process that shifts degree noun semantics to atomizer semantics is
compositional; we thus expect this process to apply broadly, and not just to amount, such
that degree nouns enjoy uses as atomizers and yield a definite interpretation. There is
no corresponding semantic shift that yields degree noun semantics from atomizer semantics;
when quantity serves as an degree noun to yield an existential interpretation, it derives
from a genuine lexical ambiguity. Let us consider each case in turn.
As with the other classes of quantizing nouns, here we see flexibility in usage such that
degree nouns may serve as atomizers, giving the definite reading of that amount of apples
in (75) and that length of rope in (80-b). This shift, from degree noun to atomizer, proceeds
compositionally as in (81): given the partition function π internal to the semantics of amount,
all we need to do is generate the set of all individuals to which the degrees denoted by amount
apply. The set contains non-overlapping instances of the relevant kind, just like the output
of quantity.
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(81) Degree noun (amt) to atomizer (atm) shift:
[[shiftamt→atm]] = λA⟨k,⟨d,t⟩⟩λkλx. ∃d∈A(k)[
∪d(x)]
a. [[amount]] = λkλd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
b. [[shiftamt→atm(amount)]](k) = λx. ∃d∈A(k)[∪d(x)]
Given the compositional nature of this semantic shift, it should come as no surprise that
it applies to more than just amount. As we saw, the more specific degree noun length also
undergoes the shift in (81) to yield a definite interpretation.
The process that builds degree nouns from atomizers is less straightforward. The problem
lies in the measure inherent to a degree noun’s semantics. We faced a similar problem in
formalizing the shift from container nouns to measure terms in the previous chapter. Shifting
glass qua container, (82-a), to a name for a measure, (82-b), requires a correspondence
between containers and standard units of measure.
(82) a. I broke three glasses of water.
b. I drank three glasses of water.
From these standard units we extrapolate a standard measure, whether in the case of con-
tainer nouns like glass or atomizers like quantity. But for this process of extrapolation, we
simply do not possess enough information within the semantics of these nouns to straight-
forwardly build a continuous measure. Instead, we saw that the process is indirect, starting
with the association between containers and standard units of measure, and from these units
deriving a measure. Given its non-compositional nature, we therefore expect the shift from
partitioning, atomizer semantics to measuring, degree noun semantics to apply less liberally
than the compositional shift in the opposite direction (cf. (81)).
In fact, we have seen that quantity stands out among the atomizers in its ability to possess
degree noun semantics; none of the other atomizers admit the existential interpretation
that characterizes degree nouns. It would appear, then, that quantity alone enjoys uses as a
degree noun because of a genuine lexical ambiguity: it has both partitioning and measuring
variants (atomizing: quantityatm; and amount-like: quantityamt). There is no compositional
process that builds measuring quantityamt from partitioning quantityatm. Without such a
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process, it should come as no surprise that the other atomizers fail to exhibit this ambiguity.
By comparing not just quantity and amount, but a broader class of atomizers against a
broader class of degree nouns, we find justification for treating these two nouns as belonging
to distinct subclasses of quantizing nouns. Atomizers deliver an atomizing, definite in-
terpretation via their partitioning semantics. Degree nouns have a measuring semantics and
yield an existential interpretation. Compositionally, the measuring degree noun semantics
may be shifted to a partitioning, atomizer semantics; when degree nouns yield a definite
interpretation they have undergone this shift. There is no complementary process that shifts
atomizers to degree nouns, delivering an existential interpretation for atomizers. Quantity
alone yields existential uses because the word is ambiguous.
We thus have evidence for treating the class of atomizers as distinct from the class of
degree nouns. But before adopting degree nouns as a subclass of quantizing noun, let us
check the behavior of degree nouns against the behavior of the other subclasses we identified
in the previous chapter. In addition to atomizers, we have container nouns like glass and
measure terms like kilo. Container nouns are simple predicates (they reference objects) with
no measurement in their semantics, so amount stands apart if only on the basis of its appeal
to measurement. However, as their name suggests, measure terms like liter do appeal to
measures; in fact, they name them. But as we saw above, neither container nouns nor measure
terms may receive the existential reading that characterizes degree nouns. The relevant
examples are repeated in (83) and (84); these sentences receive only the (highly implausible)
definite interpretation whereby a specific instance of water is consumed repeatedly. They
contrast with the degree nouns in (85), which readily yield the existential interpretation.
(83) Container noun:
a. I drank that glass of water every day for a year.
b. I drank the glass of water that you drank.
(84) Measure term:
a. I drank that liter of water every day for a year
b. I drank the liter of water that you drank.
151
(85) Degree noun:
a. I drank that amount of water every day for a year.
b. I drank that size (of) glass every day for a year.
It would appear, then, that degree nouns do stand apart from container nouns and measure
terms. Only degree nouns reference degrees, which may be instantiated by objects in episodic
contexts via the process of Generalized DKP. As we saw in the previous subsection, it is the
application of Generalized DKP to the degree ultimately denoted by degree nouns that deliv-
ers the existential interpretation. Container nouns and measure terms reference objects,
so Generalized DKP has no opportunity to apply.
What we have is a distinct subclass of quantizing noun. In addition to container nouns and
measure terms and atomizers, we also have degree nouns, as evidenced by amount. Degree
nouns reference abstract representations of measurement (i.e., degrees) by appealing to mea-
surement directly in their semantics. The subclasses that result, together with representative
examples and denotations, appear in (86).
(86) Subclasses of quantizing nouns
a. Container nouns:
[[glass]] = λx. glass(x)
b. Measure terms:
[[kilo]] = λkλnλx. µkg(x) = n ∧ ∪k(x)
c. Atomizers:
[[quantity]] = λkλx. x ∈ π(k)
where π is a variable of type ⟨k, ⟨e, t⟩⟩
such that for any k and any y in π(k),
∪k(y) & MSC(y)(k)
d. Degree nouns:
[[amount]] = λkλd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
where µf is a contextually-specified measure, and
n is some number in the range of the measure µf
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object nominalized
property
partition measurement
container noun ✓
measure term ✓ ✓
atomizer ✓ ✓
degree noun ✓ ✓ ✓
kind ✓
Table 4.2: Summary of quantizing noun semantics; comparison with kind
To summarize: Container nouns (e.g., glass) are simple predicates, denoting a set of objects.
Measure terms (e.g., kilo) are number-seeking relations, composing with a substance noun
and a numeral; the result is a set of instances of the substance noun that, when measured
by the measure named, evaluate to the extent specified by the numeral. Atomizers (e.g.,
quantity) are partitioning functions; they compose with a substance noun and return an
atomic (i.e., non-overlapping) set of objects, susceptible to counting. Degree nouns (amount)
are context sensitive relations between a substance noun and amounts thereof; they yield
a set of degrees, which are nominalized quantity-uniform properties formed on the basis of
a contextually-supplied measure. Table 4.2 summarizes the sorts of entities each subclass
references, together with the feature that characterizes their semantics (e.g., measuring vs.
partitioning). We include the noun kind as a reminder of the similarity between it and amount
– both reference nominalized properties; amount is endowed with a measuring semantics.
Our next task is to investigate how semantic composition proceeds in the structures that
contain amount. Doing so allows us to evaluate the conception of degrees as nominalized
quantity-uniform properties.
4.2 Referencing amounts
To review: amount relates a kind-denoting substance noun with a set of amounts of that
substance. This set is a set of degrees; degrees are conceived of as nominalized quantity-
uniform properties formed on the basis of a measure. Amount is highly context-sensitive,
such that this measure µf and its value n are contextually determined. Additionally, the
partitioning function π that returns instances of the substance noun receives its specification
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from context. The resulting denotation for the phrase amount of apples appears in (87).
(87) a. [[amount]] = λkλd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
b. [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)]
Amount inhabits the subclass of degree nouns. The class stands apart from container nouns
(e.g., glass), measure terms (e.g., kilo), and atomizers (e.g., grain) in its ability to yield the
existential interpretation in (88).
(88) I ate that amount of apples every day for a year.
↪→ every day for a year I ate some apples that measured the relevant amount
Kind and other kind-denoting nominals pattern with amount and deliver the existential in-
terpretation in episodic contexts. Hence the conception of degrees, like kinds, as nominalized
properties.
Having settled on a semantics for amount, our task now is to determine how this semantics
interacts with the structures in which amount participates. We start modestly, taking notice
of the complex degrees that result from the composition of amount with the substance noun.
Our focus will be the existential interpretation that characterizes degree nouns. Consider
amount of apples. We saw that the substance noun is an argument of amount. We therefore
treat amount as a transitive noun; the particle of makes no semantic contribution (as in the
treatment of of for measure terms or atomizers in the previous chapter). The structure in
(89) results.
(89) NP
N
amount
of nP
apples
For our purposes, treating the bare plural/mass substance noun as referring to a number-
neutral property or to a kind makes little diﬀerence; as with the other quantizing nouns,
we proceed under the assumption that it refers to a kind in order to exclude singular count
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nouns from this position. By composing with its substance noun argument and contextually
determining the measure in its semantics, amount returns a set of nominalized quantity-
and quality-uniform properties. This set is a set of degrees, ordered on the basis of the
contextually-determined measure. In (90), we have context set this measure to µkg, the
measure in kilograms. The result is a set of kilograms-of-apples degrees.
(90) [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)]
[[amount of apples]] =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∩λx. µkg(x) = 1 ∧ π(apple)(x)
∩λx. µkg(x) = 2 ∧ π(apple)(x)
∩λx. µkg(x) = 3 ∧ π(apple)(x)
. . .
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
How do we get from a set of degrees to the relevant degree? In other words, how do we
arrive at a single degree from the NP denotation in (90)? Consider the behavior of amount
of apples when it serves as the argument of the demonstrative that.
(91) John bought that amount of apples.
DP
D
that
NP
NP
amount
of nP
apples
Here is a situation in which the sentence in (91) may be uttered felicitously: a quantity
of apples sits on a table; the speaker points to these apples, and intends an existential
interpretation. The speaker conveys that John bought some apples equal in amount to the
apples to which the speaker points. Suppose amount of apples denotes a set of kilograms-
of-apples degrees as in (90). The demonstrative that takes this set of degrees and returns
the maximal degree that applies to those apples on the table. In other words, we access this
abstract degree through the objects that instantiate it. This process obtains for that when
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it composes with nominalized properties elsewhere (cf. Partee, 1987): through the indicated
object that instantiates it, we access the property.
(92) a. I love that color of shirt!
b. That style of art never took oﬀ.
c. I wish that kind of animal would stay out of my garden.
Inherent to the semantics of demonstrative that is the individual that, that is, the salient ob-
ject that is indicated. To access the kind/degree-level entity the indicated object instantiates,
demonstrative that receives the semantics in (93).
(93) [[that]] = λA. ιy[A(y) ∧ ∪y(that)]
where A is a set of individuals, either nominalized properties or objects,
and that is the salient object indicated in the use of the demonstrative
The ∪ operator in the semantics of that predicativizes the individuals its argument denotes,
which allows them to apply to the specified object that. When that composes with a set of
nominalized properties, that is, kinds or degrees, ∪ predicativizes these entities to return the
properties from which they are built. We now have the means by which to compositionally
reference specific, complex degrees.
In (91), we access the abstract amount of apples by first identifying the relevant apples
(i.e., by establishing a pointer to them with that) and then picking out the degree that
applies to these apples. Suppose the relevant apples comprise the object a+b+c, and that
µkg(a+b+c) = na+b+c. What results is (94), where that amount of apples references the
kilograms-of-apples degree that a+b+c holds.
(94) [[that]]([[amount of apples]])
= [[that]](λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)])
= ιy[λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)](y) ∧ ∪y(that)]
= ιy[λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)](y) ∧ ∪y(a+b+c)]
= ∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ π(apple)(x)
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The result references a degree: a nominalized quantity-uniform set of apples; everything in
that set evaluates to na+b+c with respect to the kilogram measure. For this degree to compose
with the structure that embeds it, we apply Generalized DKP to type-shift the nominalized
property for object-level argument slots.
(95) [[John bought that amount of apples]]
= bought(∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ π(apple)(x))(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ π(apple)(x))(y) ∧ bought(y)(John)]
Here we have the existential interpretation: (95) asserts that John bought some apples
equal in weight to the salient apples indicated by that.
To see that the semantics for that in (93) applies in the same fashion for kinds, consider
the derivation in (96). Assume the indicated dog, b, is a beagle.
(96) John bought that kind of dog
a. [[that kind of dog]]
= [[that]](λk. subkindf(dog)(k)
= ιy[(λk. subkindf(dog)(k))(y) ∧ ∪y(b)]
= ∩λx. beagle(x)
b. [[John bought that kind of dog]]
= bought(∩λx. beagle(x))(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(∩λx. beagle(x))(y) ∧ bought(y)(John)]
The sentence in (96) asserts that John bought some dog that belongs to the beagle kind, that
is, that John bought a beagle. We have successfully derived the existential interpretation
for both degrees and kinds on the basis of the semantics for demonstrative that in (93).
Verifying that we have not lost anything in our new semantics for that, let us consider its
more basic uses: when that takes a simple predicate as an argument, as in that boy, it returns
the individual in the denotation of the predicate that is identical to the specified individual
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that. In other words, when that takes a set of objects as an argument, it returns the unique,
salient object from this set. To see how this proceeds on the basis of the semantics for that
in (93), we must understand how the predicativizing ∪ operator works when it apples to an
object-level individual.
Applied an object a, the ∪ operator shifts that object into a property. What results in
the property of being identical to a. Here we make use of the ident operator from Partee
(1987), defined as in (97).
(97) Object predicativization:
∪a := ident(a) = λx. x = a
Suppose we have the boy a (i.e., Alan). Predicativizing a, ∪a, yields the property of being
identical to Alan. In other words, it yields the property of being Alan, true only of a. Thus,
when that composes with a simple predicate as in (98), it returns the unique individual
identical to the specified object that. Simply put, it returns the object that.
(98) a. [[boy]] = {a, b, c}
b. that = a
c. [[that boy]] = ιy[boy(y) ∧ ∪y(a)]
[[that boy]] = ιy[boy(y) ∧ ident(y)(a)]
[[that boy]] = a
We now have a generalized semantics for that which allows us to specify individuals, and by
specifying those individuals to reference the properties that are true of them.
Next, consider what happens with sets of degrees when they serve as the argument of
the definite determiner the. We take the to be a maximality operator, composing with a
set and returning its maximal element (Sharvy, 1980; Chierchia, 1998b; Zamparelli, 1998).8
Chierchia (1998b, ex. (11a), p.346) defines the iota operator ι as in (99).
(99) ι A = the largest member of A if there is one (else, undefined)
8Sharvy (1980) observes that the Russellian view of definiteness, whereby its primary function is to signal
uniqueness, fails once we expand our coverage beyond singular definite descriptions. He shows that definiteness
instead serves to identify maximal elements; uniqueness falls out as a side eﬀect of maximality.
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Defining ι as a maximality operator allows the to compose with a set of degrees. These
degrees are ordered on the basis of a measure, and the returns the largest degree. In (100),
we provide a derivation to illustrate this process; max stands for the largest possible value in
the domain of the measure. The result has the amount of apples denote the maximal apple
degree.
(100) a. [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)]
b. [[the(amount-of-apples)]] = ι λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)]
[[the(amount-of-apples)]] = ∩λx. µf (x) = max ∧ π(apple)(x)
Unmodified, definite amount is often infelicitous. Consider the sentence in (101); its awkward-
ness arises because definite amount references a maximal degree, which in most circumstances
will be impossible to instantiate. In the absence of context, which could establish a salient
partition, (101) asserts that John bought some apples that measure the maximal degree, that
is, that he bought the totality of apples.
(101) #John bought the amount of apples.
To be used felicitously, definite amount must be modified, as in (102). This modification
restricts the set of degrees to just those that are relevant. In (102), the degrees are restricted
to just those that apply to the apples on the table. Maximality selects the largest such degree.
(102) John bought the amount of apples on the table.
Under the existential reading, (102) asserts that John bought some apples equal in amount to
the apples on the table. If there are three kilograms of apples on the table, then (102) asserts
that John bought three kilograms of apples. But here we must understand how the PP on
the table restricts amount of apples to just those apple-degrees that apply to the objects on
the table. We start by identifying the ingredients of this modification.
First, we have the NP amount of apples, a set of degrees as in (103-a). To this NP we
adjoin the PP on the table, a set of objects as in (103-b). In (103-c), we have the structure
that results.
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(103) a. [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)]
b. [[on the table]] = λx. on-table(x)
c. NP
NP
N
amount
of nP
apples
PP
P
on
DP
the table
To derive the existential reading of (102), we need the maximal NP in (103-c) to denote a
set of apple degrees restricted to just those degrees that apply to objects on the table. As was
the case when we had nominalized properties serving as arguments to object-level predicates,
here we assume that this restriction involves existential quantification over instances of the
de-nominalized properties. This restrictive, existential modification is defined as in (104);
the derivation for (102) appears in (105). Note that the eﬀect of composing the modified set
of degrees with maximal the is to add the restriction as a presupposition on this degree set.
(104) Existential Modification:
A⟨d,t⟩ ∩E P⟨e,t⟩ = λd. A(d) ∧ ∃y[P(y) ∧
∪d(y)]
(105) John bought the amount of apples on the table.
a. [[the amount of apples on the table]]
= the [λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apples)(x)]] ∩E [λx. on-table(x)]
via Existential Modification
= the [λd. ∃n[(d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apples)(x)) ∧
∃y[on-table(y) ∧ ∪d(y)]]
via Maximality
= ∩λx: ∃y[µf (y) = max ∧ π(apples)(y) ∧ on-table(y)]. µf (x) = max ∧
π(apples)(x)
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b. [[John bought the amount of apples on the table]]
= bought(the-amount-of-apples-on-the-table)(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(the-amount-of-apples-on-the-table)(y) ∧ bought(y)(John)]
By making use of existential degree modification, maximality in the semantics of the, and type
adjustment via Generalized DKP, the sentences in (105) asserts that John bought some apples
equal in amount to the apples that are on the table. These tools, all of them independently
justified, thus deliver the existential interpretation for modified amount. Note that by
restricting the degrees denoted by amount, its use suddenly describes a much more plausible
state of aﬀairs: rather than buying the totality of apples, (105) has John buying merely a
small portion of this totality. In the next section, we investigate another way that amount
may be modified: relativization.
4.3 Amount relatives
We begin with a note on terminology. The name “amount relative” (sometimes “degree
relative”) often indicates a peculiar class of there-existentials that ostensibly flout the Defi-
niteness Restriction (Milsark, 1974; Carlson, 1977a; Heim, 1987; Grosu and Landman, 1998).
Examples of these so-called “amount relatives” are provided in (106).
(106) a. I bought the books that there were on the table.
b. I ate the cake that there was in the bakery.
These constructions are analyzed in the following section. For now, our aim is true amount
relatives, that is, relative clauses headed overtly by amount. These amount relatives evidence
another strategy for modifying degrees (cf. the existential modification of the previous sec-
tion). The objective here is to show that on the basis of the proposed semantics for degrees
and amount, standard takes on relative clauses yield the right interpretations. Consider the
sentence in (107).
(107) John ate the amount of apples that you ate.
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We encountered examples like the sentence in (107) at the beginning of this chapter, using
them to highlight the existential interpretation of amount. Under this reading, (107)
asserts that John ate some apples equal in amount to the apples the addressee ate. What
follows is an investigation of how this reading results.
Regarding the structure of amount relatives, the literature on relative clause syntax is vast
and complicated, informed by many nuanced facts from many diﬀerent languages. Deciding
the syntax of relative clauses could fill an entire thesis (in fact it has, many times). But our
focus is the semantics of measurement. Therefore, before we make sense of this semantics as it
pertains to amount relatives, let us make some assumptions about the syntax of relativization.
The literature provides many options for the analysis of relative clause syntax, among
them head-external (Montague, 1974; Partee, 1975; Chomsky, 1977), raising (A˚farli, 1994;
Kayne, 1994), matching (Sauerland, 1998), and head-raising (Donati and Cecchetto, 2011)
analyses. We provide derivations with head-external and raising syntax for explicative pur-
poses; the semantics that derives the existential interpretation for amount relatives remains
the same: degree abstraction/modification at the CP level, and maximality contributed by
definiteness. We begin with head-external syntax.
4.3.1 Head-external syntax
Suppose the NP amount of apples heads the amount relative in (107) and the CP that you
ate serves as a modifier to this NP; they compose via intersective modification (Scontras and
Nicolae, to appear). Composing the resulting NP with the, we get the DP in (108). Central
to the head-external analysis is the origination of the head NP outside of the relative clause
CP. Within the relative clause, a relative operator A′ moves from VP-internal object position
to the specifier of CP, binding its trace.
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(108) DP
the NP
NP
amount of apples
CP
Opi
(that) TP
you ate ti
Whether the relative operator Op binds an object-level trace, type e, or a degree trace changes
the strategy needed to compose the DP meaning in (108). This choice, however, does not
aﬀect the meaning that results: both types of trace will yield the existential reading we
are after.
Suppose the relative operator binds an object-level trace. The CP will denote a simple
predicate, the set of objects that the addressee you ate. This CP adjoins to the degree-set
NP amount of apples. In other words, a predicate of degrees composes with a predicate of
individuals. Modification results. Here we need to restrict the degrees in the NP denotation
to just those degrees that apply to things the addressee ate. We encountered this sort of
restrictive, existential degree modification in the previous section for the modification of
amount by PP predicates. The mechanism is repeated in (109); a set of degrees composes
with a set of objects through a process akin to Generalized DKP. By maximizing these
restricted degrees, the predicate information contributed by the relative clause CP results as
a presupposition on the degree set that we form. To see this process at work, consider the
derivation for the amount relative in (108), provided in (110). Again, we assume here the
binding of an object-level trace internal to the CP.9
9We use the shorthand “λx” to indicate the result of moving an operator from object position to the
specifier of CP.
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(109) Existential Modification:
A⟨d,t⟩ ∩E P⟨e,t⟩ = λd. A(d) ∧ ∃y[P(y) ∧
∪d(y)]
(110) [[the amount of apples that you ate]]
= the [amount of apples] [λx. you ate x]
= the [λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apples)(x)]] ∩E [λx. ate(x)(you)]
via Existential Modification
= the λd. ∃n[(d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apples)(x)) ∧ ∃y[ate(y)(you) ∧ ∪d(y)]]
via Maximality
= ∩λx: ∃y[µf (y) = max ∧ π(apples)(y) ∧ ate(y)(you)]. µf (x) = max ∧ π(apples)(x)
Through the process of existential modification and the contribution of maximality by definite
the, the DP the amount of apples that you ate references a single degree. Concretely, this
referent is an apple-degree presupposed to instantiate as something the addressee ate. Simply
put, this degree is the largest amount of apples that the addressee ate. In (111), we complete
the derivation for the amount relative in (107). The DP denotation in (110) is abbreviated
as the degree name the-amount-of-apples-that-you-ate.
(111) [[John ate the amount of apples that you ate]]
= ate(the-amount-of-apples-that-you-ate)(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(the-amount-of-apples-that-you-ate)(y) ∧ ate(y)(John)]
Generalized DKP delivers the existential interpretation of the amount relative in (107):
(111) entails that John ate some apples equal in amount to the apples the addressee ate.
Now, suppose that instead of binding an object-level trace, the relative operator Op
binds a degree trace. At the CP level, instead of a predicate of individuals we would have
a predicate of degrees. This degree-denoting CP composes with the NP amount of apples,
itself a predicate of degrees. Here we implicate run-of-the-mill modification: two elements of
the same type compose to yield a new element of the same type (see McNally (to appear)
for a discussion of modification). Before seeing how this modification proceeds semantically,
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consider the elements involved. We have the denotation for amount of apples in (112). In
(113), we derive the set of degrees denoted by the relative CP. Note that Generalized DKP
allows the degree trace to compose with the object-level predicate.
(112) [[amount of apples]] = λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apples)(x)]
(113) [[λd. you ate d]] = λd. ate(d)(you)
[[λd. you ate d]] via Generalized DKP
[[λd. you ate d]] = λd. ∃y[∪d(y) ∧ ate(y)(you)]
The relative CP in (113) denotes a set of degrees that apply to things that you ate. Composing
the two sets of degrees in (112) and (113), we get a new set of degrees: amounts of apples that
the addressee ate. Note that the quantificational force contributed by existential modification
in (110) is now supplied by Generalized DKP. This moves allows us to simply restrict the
set of degrees in (112) by the set in (113). This modification, together with the maximality
contributed by the, specifies the maximal amount of apples that the addressee ate. The
derivation of the amount relative appears in (114). Again, here we have a RC-internal degree
trace (cf. the object-level trace in (110)).
(114) [[the amount of apples that you ate]]
= the [amount of apples] [λd. you ate d]
= the [λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apples)(x)]] ∩ [λd. ∃y[∪d(y) ∧
ate(y)(you)]]
via Intersective Modification
= the [λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(apples)(x)] ∧ ∃y[∪d(y) ∧ ate(y)(you)]]
via Maximality
= ∩λx: ∃y[µf (y) = max ∧ π(apples)(y) ∧ ate(y)(you)]. µf (x) = max ∧ π(apples)(x)
Comparing the derivations in (110) and (114), we see that whether the relative operator
binds an object-level trace or a degree trace, the same denotation results. With object-level
traces, we employ Existential Modification to compose a simple predicate with a predicate
of degrees. With degree traces, RC-internal Generalized DKP contributes existential force,
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and simple restrictive modification composes two predicates of degrees. In either case, the
maximality contributed by the leaves us with the degree equal to the amount of apples that
the addressee ate. Generalized DKP applies at the matrix level, and the sentence in (107)
entails that John ate some apples equal in amount to the apples that the addressee ate.
We thus observe the success of head-external syntax in the derivation of the existential
interpretation for amount relatives.
4.3.2 Raising syntax
Despite the ubiquity of head-external analyses of relative clause syntax, many arguments
have been presented in favor of a raising syntax instead (for discussion, see Bhatt, 2002). The
latter has the relative clause head originate within the relative CP, then move to a clause-
external position. Arguments for this raising approach often involve evidence of semantic
reconstruction, where scope-bearing elements interact across a relative clause boundary (e.g.
Scontras et al., 2014; Tsai et al., 2014). Here we do not settle the debate between raising
and head-external approaches. We merely demonstrate the success of both approaches in the
semantics of amount relatives.
Applied to the amount relative in (107), raising syntax yields the structure in (115).
Note that the NP amount of apples raises with the relative operator to the specifier of the
relative CP, leaving behind a trace. It then raises again, this time to an RC-external position.
Reconstructing the moved elements, the DP receives the LF in (116).
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(115) DP
the NP
NPj
amount of apples
CP
[Op tj ]i
(that) TP
you ate ti
(116) [[the amount of apples that you ate]] = the [λd. you ate Op amount of apples]
To interpret the reconstructed phrase, we must first adjust its type: amount of apples is a
predicate of degrees, but we need an individual to serve as an argument to ate. Note that
Generalized DKP will not help us here. Generalized DKP allows nominalized properties
(e.g., degrees) to compose with object-level predicates. But amount of apples denotes a set
of degrees. Before Generalized DKP can apply, we must convert amount of apples into a
single degree. Here we follow Bhatt (2002) in adopting the operation of Trace Conversion
from Fox (2002). This process shifts reconstructed predicates (like amount of apples in (116))
into individuals. The operation is described in (117).
(117) Trace Conversion (Fox, 2002):
a. Variable Insertion:
(Det) Pred → (Det) [Pred λy. y = x]
b. Determiner Replacement:
(Det) [Pred λy(y = x)] → the [Pred λy. y = x]
Trace Conversion proceeds in two steps. First, Variable Insertion injects the identity function
λy. y = x. The variable x is free, bound at the CP level as a result of the movement that
raises the RC head to a position external to the clause (Heim and Kratzer, 1998). The
identity function composes with the reconstructed predicate via restrictive modification. For
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this modification to obtain, we must assume that the variable that is inserted is of the same
sort as the moved phrase (Chierchia, 1998b); doing so allows the identity function to denote
a predicate of degrees, just like amount of apples. Next, Determiner Replacement replaces
the relative operator Op with the, that is, the maximality-seeking ι operator. The result of
Trace Conversion applied to the (reconstructed) amount relative head in (116) appears in
the derivation in (118). We abbreviate the predicate of degrees denoted by amount of apples,
(112), as amount-of-apples.
(118) [[Op amount of apples]]
= Op amount-of-apples
via Variable Insertion
= Op amount-of-apples λd. d = d′
via Intersective Modification
= Op λd. amount-of-apples(d) ∧ d = d′
via Determiner Replacement
= ιd[amount-of-apples(d) ∧ d = d′]
After Trace Conversion, the reconstructed RC head denotes the maximal degree identical
to the inserted variable, d′. Simply put, the reconstructed head now denotes the degree d′,
which is restricted by amount-of-apples such that it is a degree of apple-amounts.
With an individual in the object position of the RC predicate, composition may proceed
in a familiar fashion. Note that this individual is a degree, so Generalized DKP will apply
as ate composes with its argument. The derivation for the amount relative in (112) appears
in (119).
(119) [[the amount of apples that you ate]]
= the [λd′. you ate ιd[amount-of-apples(d) ∧ d = d′]]
via Generalized DKP
= the [λd′. ∃y[∪(ιd[amount-of-apples(d) ∧ d = d′])(y) ∧ ate(y)(you)]]
via Maximality (and unpacking the degree predicate amount-of-apples)
= ∩λx: ∃y[µf (y) = max ∧ π(apples)(y) ∧ ate(y)(you)]. µf (x) = max ∧ π(apples)(x)
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The combination of Generalized DKP at the level of the RC predicate with the maximality
contributed by the returns the maximal degree that is an amount of apples eaten by you.
In other words, the amount relative denotes the amount of apples the addressee ate (i.e., a
degree). Generalized DKP at the matrix level delivers the existential interpretation of this
amount relative. Once we have a denotation for the amount relative, the process proceeds
in (120) exactly as it did in (111) for head-external syntax.
(120) [[John ate the amount of apples that you ate]]
= ate(the-amount-of-apples-that-you-ate)(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(the-amount-of-apples-that-you-ate)(y) ∧ ate(y)(John)]
The derivation of the amount relative semantics diﬀers depending on the structure we assume,
but the result is the same: (107) entails that John ate some apples equal in amount to the
apples the addressee ate.
4.3.3 Summary
Relative clauses headed by amount allow for the modification of degrees. We began this
section by noting the existential interpretation that arises for amount in (121). The sen-
tence privileges this interpretation, whereby the degree denoted by the amount of apples that
you ate is instantiated by diﬀerent apples, because the alternative, definite interpretation
describes a highly unlikely state of aﬀairs: John and the addressee eating the same apples.
(121) John ate the amount of apples that you ate.
↪→ John ate some apples equal in amount to the apples that you ate
For the existential interpretation to result, the relative clause in (121) must reference a
degree, namely, the amount of apples that the addressee ate. Our focus was therefore the
semantic composition of this degree.
We considered two analyses for the syntax of relativization, head-external (e.g., Chomsky,
1977) and raising (e.g., Kayne, 1994). Under the first, head-external approach, the head
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amount of apples originates outside of the RC; the relative operator introduces a variable in
the RC-internal object position. Determining the semantic type (i.e., sort) of this variable,
we faced two options: it either stands for an object (type e) or a degree (type d). Taking the
RC-internal variable to be an object, the RC denotes a simple predicate: the set of things the
addressee ate. The process of Existential Modification that we encountered in the previous
section (composing, e.g., the amount of apples on the table) allows for the modification by this
predicate of the RC head amount of apples. What results is a set of apple-degrees restricted
such that they apply to things eaten by the addressee. Maximality and Generalized Derived
Kind predication deliver the existential interpretation.
Treating the RC-internal variable as a degree yields identical results, although the mech-
anism that derives them is slightly diﬀerent. With a degree variable, we require Generalized
DKP at the level of the RC predicate. Abstracting over this degree at the CP level, the
result is a predicate of degrees, which may compose with the RC head via simple, intersective
modification. Maximality and another instance of Generalized DKP at the level of the matrix
predicate deliver the existential interpretation.
Raising syntax necessitates a more complicated derivation for the degree denoted by an
amount relative. At issue is the interpretation of the reconstructed head, which originates
within the RC and raises out. In its reconstructed position, amount of apples denotes a
predicate of degrees. To interpret this predicate as an argument, we apply the operation of
Trace Conversion (Fox, 2002). The result is a degree variable bound at the CP level. As was
the case when we assumed a degree variable with head-external syntax, this move necessitates
RC-internal Generalized DKP and degree abstraction at the CP-level. The remainder of the
composition proceeds as above: intersective modification, maximality, and another instance
of Generalized DKP deliver the existential interpretation.
While it might seem overly pedantic to go through derivations for each of these possible
choices, their success demonstrates the robustness of the proposed program: conceiving of
degrees as nominalized properties delivers the existential interpretation that characterizes
amount with a minimum of added technology. Regardless of the approach we take in building
their structure, the semantic computation of amount relatives involves two basic operations:
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Generalized DKP, which contributes existential force; and the maximizing ι operator inherent
to the semantics of definiteness. Both moves are independently motivated.
4.4 Degree relatives
This chapter concludes with an investigation of so-called “amount” relatives (Carlson, 1977b).
We will see that, despite their suggestive name, these constructions do not involve the noun
amount. They do, however, involve degrees. For this reason, we follow Grosu and Landman
(1998) in adopting the more transparent name “degree” relative. These degree relatives
provide another proving ground for our conception of degrees as nominalized properties.
We begin by summarizing the Definiteness Restriction, which precludes individuals from
the post-verbal, pivot position of existential sentences (Milsark, 1974; Safir, 1982; Heim,
1987). Understanding the Definiteness Restriction highlights the peculiar behavior of degree
relatives, which at least on the surface appear to flout this constraint. We then turn to the
account of degree relatives proposed by Grosu and Landman (1998). These authors follow
the literature that precedes them in positing degree abstraction in the semantics of degree
relatives. Doing so explains the exceptional behavior of degree relatives with respect to the
Definiteness Restriction: degrees, unlike individuals, may occur in pivot position. Grosu and
Landman show, however, that degrees-as-points are insuﬃcient to account for the behavior of
degree relatives. The construction ultimately references individuals, so degrees must contain
information about the objects that instantiate them. The authors therefore propose a new,
enriched semantics for degrees, similar in spirit to what we have here. Like Grosu and
Landman and the work that informs their account, our proposal here will also feature degree
abstraction as a means to derive degree relatives. We will see, however, that our conception
of degrees as nominalized properties allows for a straightforward account of degree relatives
without the ad-hoc machinery of Grosu and Landman (1998).
4.4.1 Existential sentences and the Definiteness Restriction
Before we can appreciate the exceptional behavior of degree relatives, we must understand the
constraint that they ostensibly violate: the Definiteness Restriction. Milsark (1974) observes
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that existential sentences restrict definite and universally quantified NPs from occurring in
their postverbal, pivot position. He provides the examples in (122) to illustrate this restriction
(Milsark’s examples (64) and (65), p.195). Crucially, the indefinite, existentially quantified
NPs in (123) freely serve as pivots to existentials.
(122) a. *There is
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
the dog
John’s dog
that dog
John
him/he
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
in the room.
b. *There
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
are
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
all dogs
both dogs
is
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
every dog
each dog
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
in the room.
(123) There
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
was a dog
were
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
several dogs
at least five dogs
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
in the room.
Milsark recasts the Definiteness Restriction as a restriction on quantification. He divides DPs
into two classes: those that may express cardinality (headed by, e.g., a, some, few, three),
and those that must express quantification (headed by, e.g., each, both, every). By treating
definiteness as a special type of universal quantification, to this latter class he adds definite
DPs like proper names and those headed by the.
Quantificational DPs are precluded from serving as pivots to existential predicates because
of a semantic clash that results from their own quantificational force and the quantificational
force contributed by the existential predicate. Treating the semantic contribution of the
existential predicate exist as simple existential quantification, that is, the operator ∃, Milsark
demonstrates that a quantified DP in pivot position yields vacuous binding of the variables
introduced. The problem is that two quantifiers, the one internal to the pivot DP and the
one in the semantics of exist, target the same variable. Consider the LF in (124).
172
(124) a. *There is every man in the room.
b. ∃x[∀x[man(x) → in-room(x)]]
b′. ∃y[∀x[man(x) → in-room(x)]]
In (124), existential ∃ introduces a variable that either is bound already by the quantificational
DP, (124-b), or appears nowhere in the resulting LF, (124-b′). In either case, the contribution
of the existential predicate is the vacuous abstraction of a variable. When the pivot is not
quantificational, as in (125), abstraction is no longer vacuous and the construction is well-
formed.
(125) a. There are men in the room.
b. ∃x[men(x) ∧ in-room(x)]
Milsark’s Definiteness Restriction thus serves as a constraint on vacuous abstraction, which
results when quantificational DPs serve as pivots to existentials.
Heim (1987) also takes up the Definiteness Restriction and shows that it operates not
merely at the level of surface representations, giving the contrast between (122) and (123),
but at the level of LF. In addition to the patterns originally noted in Milsark (1974), Heim
focuses on the following class of examples. In (126), overt bound variable pronouns fail
to serve as the pivot to an existential. In (127), indefinite pivots obligatorily receive a
narrow scope interpretation. In (128), Heim reproduces judgments from Safir (1982) that
demonstrate the inability of definite wh-phrases to target the pivot position.
(126) a. *Few people admitted that there had been them at the party.
b. *No perfect relationship is such that there is it.
(127) a. Ralph believes that there is someone spying on him.
b. There must be someone in John’s house.
(128) a. *Which one of the two men was there drunk?
b. *Which actors were there laughing?
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Each type of ruled-out construction has in common a variable standing in pivot position at
LF. For example, the impossible wide-scope reading of (127-b) would have the (simplified)
LF in (129). The wh-movement that yields the ill-formed questions in (128) leaves behind a
trace in pivot position, interpreted as a variable as in (130).
(129) *Someone x: there must be x in John’s house
(130) *Which actors x: there were x laughing
Classifying individual variables as the same sort of entity as names, Heim describes the
Definiteness Restriction as a prohibition on this sort of entity occurring in pivot position.
Her formulation of the Definiteness Restriction appears in (131).
(131) Definiteness Restriction:
*There be x, when x is an individual variable (Heim, 1987)
The LFs in (129) and (130) are straightforwardly ruled out by the prohibition in (131):
quantifiers and wh-phrases leave variables in pivot position, which violate the Definiteness
Restriction. Whether we treat proper names as quantifiers like Milsark (1974) or as sim-
ple individuals, the prohibition in (131) precludes them from serving as pivots in a similar
manner. Once we understand the Definiteness Restriction as a ban on individuals in pivot
position, the sentences that avoid this ban become much more interesting.
Heim provides two classes of apparent exceptions to the Definiteness Restriction: certain
wh-traces in questions, and traces in relative clauses. Consider first the case of questions.
We saw in (128) that definite which cannot target the pivot of an existential. Heim explains
this fact by assuming that wh-phrases move and leave behind an individual variable, a con-
figuration ruled out by the constraint in (131). But if all wh-phrases leave variables of the
same sort, we have no explanation for the contrast between which in (128) and what or how
many in (132) (Heim’s examples (14) and (18), p.27).
(132) a. How many soldiers were there in the infirmary?
b. What is there in Austin?
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To explain the acceptability of the questions in (132), Heim proposes that the traces of these
questions are more complex than they at first appear. For how many N in (132-a), Heim
assumes a trace that takes the form x-many N. For what in (132-b), Heim first notes that
the question asks about the kind of things one finds in Austin, and then formulates the trace
of what to reflect this fact: something of kind x. Both sorts of trace, Heim argues, avoid the
Definiteness Restriction.
Turning to relative clauses, Heim reproduces the following examples from Safir (1982).
In each, we have a gap in pivot position due to relativization. Assuming that relativization,
like wh-movement, leaves an individual trace in gapped pivot position, the relative clauses in
(133) pose a puzzle: the Definiteness Restriction should rule them out.
(133) a. The very few books that there were on his shelves were all mysteries.
b. Every single man that there was in the castle was ready to fight for his life.
c. All of the men that there were in the garrison sallied forth en masse to meet
the enemy.
To explain the acceptability of relativization in the existential constructions in (133), Heim
draws on the in-depth study of this phenomenon provided in Carlson (1977a).
Carlson (1977a) argues that in addition to restrictive and non-restrictive (i.e., appositive)
relative clauses, English contains yet a third class of relative clauses: degree relatives. These
relative clauses stand apart from the other two classes on the basis of their limited, pecu-
liar distribution. According to Carlson, only degree relatives may relativize the pivot of an
existential as in (133). Additionally, degree relatives may not be introduced by wh-form rela-
tivizers. To see the interaction of these properties of degree relatives, compare the sentences
in (134).
(134) a. John ate the apples that/Ø there were on the table.
b. *John ate the apples which there were on the table.
In (135-a), where the relative clause is introduced by that or Ø, the sentence is acceptable.
According to Carlson, (134-a) is acceptable because it features a degree relative. In (135-b),
where which introduces the relative clause, the sentence is unacceptable. If only degree
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relatives can relativize the pivot of an existential, and if degree relatives cannot be introduced
by the wh relativizer which, then the relative clause in (134-b) cannot be a degree relative,
hence its ungrammaticality.
Carlson (and later Heim) analyzes these exceptions to the Definiteness Restriction as
involving a degree variable in the pivot position internal to the relative clause, similar to
the x-many N trace Heim posits for how many N in (132-a).10 In other words, the books
that there were on the shelves gets treated as the books that there were (d-many books) on
the shelves. Crucially, degree variables but not individual variables may serve as pivots to
existentials, at least as far as the Definiteness Restriction is concerned.
In essence, Carlson’s analysis of degree relatives has them directly name amounts of stuﬀ.
To support this prediction, Heim provides the following example, stressing that it admits
a reading where “only identity of amounts, not identity of substances, is required for [its]
truth” (Heim, 1987, 38); (135) would be paraphrased as in (136). Heim’s identity-of-amounts
reading is our existential reading.
(135) It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne that they spilled that
evening.
(136) It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the amount of champagne that they
spilled that evening.
↪→ it will take us the rest of our lives to drink an amount of champagne equal to
the amount they spilled that evening
It bears noting here that (135) does not involve a there existential. This is no accident.
According to Carlson and later accounts his inspires, a degree relative is any relativization
structure with a degree variable in the gapped position.
Current theories of degree relatives follow Carlson and Heim in positing degree variables
and something like a null many in the gapped position of these relative clauses. In the
following subsection, we consider the proposal of Grosu and Landman (1998) in some detail.
Understanding their proposal will help to clarify the empirical terrain that ought to be
10Carlson (1977a) uses the term “amount” to describe what we here call degrees, namely, abstract measure-
ments of stuﬀ. Hence his use of the term “amount” relative.
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covered, and provide a rich testing ground for degrees-as-kinds.
4.4.2 Grosu and Landman (1998) and enriched degrees
Two factors inform the account of degree relatives in Grosu and Landman (1998): First,
as we saw in the previous subsection, degree relatives do not fall under the scope of the
Definiteness Restriction; second, the identity-of-amounts reading noted by Heim (1987) for
(135) very rarely obtains. To handle the first point, Grosu and Landman follow Carlson
(1977a) and subsequent accounts that posit degree variables internal to degree relatives.
To handle the second point, they propose a richer notion of degrees. In what follows, we
summarize the relevant aspects of their proposal for degree relatives, taking special note of
the construction-specific machinery that we will later improve on.
Grosu and Landman start from the observed restriction on degree relative relativizers
from Carlson (1977a). Repeated in (137), that and the null relativizer Ø may introduce a
degree relative, but wh relativizers may not.
(137) a. John ate the apples that/Ø there were on the table.
b. *John ate the apples which there were on the table.
Following Heim (1987), Grosu and Landman take this fact to suggest that degree relatives
feature a degree variable in the gapped position, a variable which is abstracted over at the CP
level. The degree variable avoids the Definiteness Restriction. (137-b) is ruled out because wh
forms cannot bind a degree variable; the construction in (137-b) features instead an individual
variable in gapped position, which violates the Definiteness Restriction.
Now, assuming a degree variable in gapped position, Grosu and Landman propose the
LF for degree relatives in (138-b). Note that they also assume a silent many to relate the
degree variable with the reconstructed head. The resulting denotation for a degree relative
appears in (138-c).
(138) a. (apples) that there were on the table
b. (apples) that there were (d many apples) on the table
c. {d: ∃x[apple(x) and |x| = d and on-table(x)]}
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In eﬀect, the degree relative apples that there were on the table denotes a set of degrees:
those degrees that correspond to the cardinality of apples on the table. More accurately, this
set will contain every cardinality that applies to the apples and all of their possible subsets.
Assuming three apples, those cardinalities will be 3, 2, and 1.
To derive the LF in (138), Grosu and Landman adopt a raising structure for the relative
clause. In gapped position, we have the degree phrase d many apples. This degree phrase
moves to the specifier of CP, and from this position the head apples moves to a position
external to CP. The structure in (139) results.
(139) DP
D
the
NP
NP
apples
CP
NP
d many apples
CP
C
(that)
S
there were [d many apples] on the table
Given the structure in (139) and the LF in (138-c), Grosu and Landman propose that
the semantic contribution of the head noun is one of a sortal. Here is what sets degree
relatives apart from run-of-the-mill relative clauses: the latter compose with their head noun
via restrictive modification. But degree relatives cannot compose restrictively, as they denote
sets of degrees and the nominal head a set of individuals. The trick, then, is to allow the
degree relative head to be interpreted inside the CP, restricting the set of degrees to just
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those degrees that apply to objects in the denotation of the head. So far, all of this should
sound familiar from our discussion of amount relatives in Section 4.3 above.
At this point, Grosu and Landman have simply implemented the proposals from Carlson
(1977a) and Heim (1987). Degree variables internal to degree relatives avoid the Definiteness
Restriction, and preclude wh-form relativizers. A degree relative denotes a set of degrees,
restricted by the head noun’s semantics. Here, crucially, we are assuming that degrees are
semantic primitives, i.e., basic numbers. This means that a degree relative like apples that
there were on the table in (138) denotes a set of numbers – nowhere do we have information
about apples or the table. Here we confront the problem with the Carlson/Heim analysis:
“it just can’t be correct” (Grosu and Landman, 1998, p.132).
Despite Heim’s example of an identity-of-amount reading for the relative clause repeated
in (140), Grosu and Landman observe that degree relatives rarely admit such a reading.
(140) It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne that they spilled that
evening.
(141) John ate the apples that there were on the table.
In (141), the speaker asserts that John ate the apples on the table, not an amount of apples
equal to the amount of apples on the table. Using our terminology, the sentence receives a
definite interpretation, not an existential one. But if degree relatives denote just sets of
simple degrees, this existential, identity-of-amount interpretation should be only reading
available. Something has to give: we need a way to retrieve individuals from degrees.
Grosu and Landman arrive at the same conclusion that we did above: we need richer
degrees so that a degree keeps track of what it is a degree of. Doing so will allow the
semantics to retrieve from the set of degrees denoted by a degree relative the objects that
instantiate those degrees. The authors therefore propose the definition of degrees in (142).
The degree function, degree(x), takes a plural individual and maps it to a tuple with three
coordinates. The first element is the cardinality of the plural individual, |x|. The second
element is the sortal predicate P to which degree(x) is relativized; this sortal predicate
constrains the measure domain. The third element is the plural individual itself.
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(142) Enriched degrees from Grosu and Landman (1998):
For all plural individuals x: degreeP (x) = ⟨|x|, P, x⟩
This enriched notion of degrees includes within degrees themselves information about what
the degree is of, just as the authors intended. Note, however, that the notion of degrees in
(142) diﬀers fundamentally from our conception of degrees as nominalized quantity-uniform
properties. For Grosu and Landman, a degree is a bundle of information that includes a
plural individual, its sortal class (a predicate), and its cardinality. An individual is retrieved
because it exists internal to the degree itself. For us, a degree is the nominalization of,
say, the property of weighing three kilos or measuring ten liters; a degree is the individual
correlate of a property that is formed on the basis of a measure. And individual is retried
via the property it instantiates, which may be reconstructed from the information structure
of degrees
Now, consider how Grosu and Landman handle their sort of degree in the context of
degree relatives. In gap position we have d many apples, interpreted as in (143). We repeat
the LF the authors assume in (144).
(143) [[d many apples]] = λx. apples(x) ∧ degreeapples(x) = d
(144) a. (apples) that there were on the table
b. (apples) that there were (d many apples) on the table
c. {d: ∃x[apple(x) and degreeapples(x) = d and on-table(x)]}
Because degrees are tagged to individuals, degreeapples(x) = ⟨|y|, P, y⟩ just in case x = y.
We therefore unpack the degree relative denotation in (144-c) so that it denotes the set of
enriched degrees in (145). The existential quantifier plays no role, so the denotation reduces
to (146).
(145) {⟨|y|, apples, y⟩: ∃x[apples(x) ∧ x = y ∧ degreeapples(x) = ⟨|x|, apples, x⟩ ∧
on-table(x)]}
(146) {⟨|x|, apples, x⟩: apples(x) ∧ on-table(x)}
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To the CP denotation in (146) Grosu and Landman propose that an operation of maximal-
ization applies. Maximalization takes a set of degree triples and selects the singleton set
consisting of the unique triple whose coordinates are maximal. The operation is defined as
in (147).
(147) Maximalization from Grosu and Landman (1998):
a. Let CP be a set of degrees of the form ⟨|y|, P, y⟩,
max(CP), the maximal element in CP, is defined by:
max(CP) = ⟨|∪{y: ⟨|y|, P, y⟩ ∈ CP}|, P, ∪{y: ⟨|y|, P, y⟩ ∈ CP}⟩
b. MAX(CP) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{max(CP)} if max(CP) ∈ CP
undefined otherwise
In (147-a), max(CP) builds the maximal degree triple by maximizing its cardinality coor-
dinate, |y|, and its individual correlate, y. Simply put, the operation finds the maximal
individual y and its cardinality, |y|. In (147-b), MAX(CP) creates a singleton set containing
the maximal degree triple max(CP).
Suppose there were three apples on the table: a, b, c. The derivation in (148) yields the
denotation for the degree relative apples that there were on the table.
(148) [[(apples) that there were (d many apples) on the table]]
= MAX{⟨|x|, apples, x⟩: apples(x) ∧ on-table(x)}
= MAX{⟨1, apples, a⟩, ⟨1, apples, b⟩, ⟨1, apples, c⟩,
MAX{⟨2, apples, a+b⟩, ⟨2, apples, a+c⟩, ⟨2, apples, b+c⟩,
MAX{⟨3, apples, a+b+c⟩}
= {⟨3, apples, a+b+c⟩}
After maximalization, a degree relative denotes a maximal degree triple. In (148), this is the
triple consisting of the maximal apple individual on the table, a+b+c, the apples predicate
to which this individual belongs, and the cardinality of this individual, 3. Now, what do we
do with this triple?
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As mentioned above, Carlson/Heim approaches to degree relatives fail by supposing that
these constructions denote degrees. Crucially, the apples that there were on the table refers
to the apples that were on the table, not to their cardinality. At this point, Grosu and
Landman face a similar problem: their degree relatives also denote degrees, even if these
degrees keep track of what they are degrees of. To retrieve the relevant individual from the
degree denoted, Grosu and Landman therefore propose the SUBSTANCE operator, which
turns a degree relative from a (singleton) set of degrees into a set of individuals. The operation
is defined in (149).
(149) Shifting a set of degrees to a set of individuals:
SUBSTANCE(CP) = {x: ⟨|x|, P, x⟩ ∈ CP}
According to Grosu and Landman, SUBSTANCE applies in the unmarked case. This move
means that degree relatives behave as they ought to: after SUBSTANCE transforms a degree
into an individual, the apples there were on the table references apples, not a degree that
applies to them. The full derivation appears in (150); again, suppose three apples were on
the table.
(150) [[the (apples) that there were (d many apples) on the table]]
= the({⟨|x|, apples, x⟩: apples(x) ∧ on-table(x)})
via obligatory MAX
= the({⟨3, apples, a+b+c⟩})
via obligatory SUBSTANCE
= the({a+b+c})
= a+b+c
Recall the steps leading to the derivation in (150): degree abstraction in the relative CP
avoids the Definiteness Restriction, degrees-as-triples allows degrees to keep track of the
objects they are degrees of, MAX ensures we retrieve the maximal degree from the relative
CP, and SUBSTANCE takes this maximal degree triple and returns its individual coordinate.
The result has the apples that there were on the table refer to the apples that were on the
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table, albeit in a circuitous manner that requires constructing and then decomposing degree
triples.
The question now is whether we can make do without the added machinery of MAX(CP)
and SUBSTANCE(CP) to derive degree relatives. In the following subsection, we see that the
answer to this question is yes. Conceiving of degrees as nominalized quantity-uniform proper-
ties, degree relatives fall out in a relatively straightforward manner without the construction-
specific machinery needed by Grosu and Landman.
4.4.3 A novel account: property-denoting degrees
Recall the facts: Relative clauses introduced by that or the null relativizer Ø may participate
in existential constructions, ostensibly flouting the Definiteness Restriction. Relative clauses
introduced by the wh-form relativizers cannot participate in existential constructions. We
thus get the contrast in (151).
(151) a. John ate the apples that/Ø there were on the table.
b. *John ate the apples which there were on the table.
Heim (1987) expands on the Definiteness Restriction from Milsark (1974) and conceives of
it as a ban on the sorts of entities that may occur in the post-verbal pivot position of an
existential. Individuals (in our terms, objects) are not allowed in this position. (151-b) is
ruled out because an individual variable sits in gap position, a configuration rule out by the
Definiteness Restriction.
The work lies in explaining the success of (151-a). Following Carlson (1977b) and Heim
(1987) (and later Grosu and Landman (1998)), we should take the relativizer fact as informa-
tive: wh-forms necessitate individual abstraction in the degree relative, hence the violation
of the Definiteness Restriction. However, that and Ø are more permissive in the abstraction
they sanction, admitting more than just individual abstraction. Following the Carlson/Heim
approach to degree relatives, these constructions succeed because they feature variables of
a diﬀerent sort in pivot position: they feature degree variables.11 Now, let us see whether
11For this reason alone, we should settle on a degrees-as-kinds approach as a means to capture the parallels
in behavior between degrees and kinds in pivot position.
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conceiving of degrees as nominalized properties sheds any light on the analysis of degree
relatives.
First, to see that that but not which may bind degree variables, compare (152-a) with
(153-a). Furthermore, note that kind variables pattern with degree variables: with that in
(152-b) kind abstraction succeeds, but with which in (153-b) kind abstraction fails.
(152) a. I ate the amount of apples that you ate.
b. I ate the kind of apple that you ate.
(153) a. #I ate the amount of apples which you ate.
b. #I ate the kind of apple which you ate.
The facts in (152) and (153) confirm that degree abstraction lies at the heart of the relativizer
restriction on degree relatives and, moreover, align degrees yet again with kinds. Both are
entities of the same sort: nominalized properties.
We therefore posit a degree variable in pivot position. Unlike Grosu and Landman (1998)
and their predecessors, here we need not assume additional material in this position (cf. the
silent many that allows the degree to compose). Our degrees contain information about the
measure that determines them, so there is no need for a silent many or something similar that
would deliver this measure information. As nominalized properties – individuals – our degrees
may also sit in argument position, composing with an object-level predicate via Generalized
DKP. All we need, then, is a degree in pivot position and degree abstraction at the CP level,
as in (154).
(154) the apples λd. (that) there were d on the table
To hold on to the assumption that something moved leaves behind a trace of the same sort,
here we adopt a head-external syntax for degree relatives.12 The structure for (154) appears
in (155); note that the structure is largely the same as what Grosu and Landman propose
(cf. (139)).
12Raising syntax that moves the NP head from RC-internal position and leaves behind a degree trace would
work equally well.
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(155) DP
D
the
NP
NP
apples
CP
λd C′
C
(that)
TP
there were d on the table
Before we can make sense of the semantics of the degree relative, we ought to understand
better the structure of predication internal to the existential CP. As we did in the case of
settling on a syntax for relative clauses in the previous section, here we make assumptions
about structure in service of making explicit the semantics at play. These assumptions should
by no means be taken as the final word on the complex and well-studied topic of existentials.
Suppose the existential predicate takes a small clause (SC) argument (Stowell, 1981). This
small clause contains the degree variable and its PP modifier. Suppose further a symmetric
structure internal to the small clause: the degree is a sister of its PP modifier (Moro, 2000;
Citko, 2011b; see Citko, 2011a, for discussion).
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(156) DP
D
the
NP
NP
apples
CP
λd C′
C
(that)
TP
there T
T VP
V
be
SC
d PP
on the table
Internal to the small clause we have a degree composing with an object-level predicate. In
Section 4.2, we developed the operation of Existential Modification to compose a set of degrees
with an object-level predicate, allowing for the modification of degrees as in the amount of
apples on the table. Here, however, we must modify a single degree, the degree variable, with
an object-level predicate, the modifying PP. To do so, we denominalize the degree, turning it
into a property, and intersect this property with the property denoted by the degree’s sister.
The process of Degree Modification is defined as in (157). Note that we are dealing with a
single degree, so the value of its measure µ is fixed to some value ni.
(157) Degree Modification:
d ∩ P⟨e,t⟩ =
∩(∪d ∩ P) = ∩λx. µf (x) = ni ∧ P(x)
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The denominalized degree, ∪d, intersects with the predicate P. Re-nominalizing the product
of this intersection, ∩(∪d ∩ P), the result is a complex degree that contains the information
contributed by P. In (158), we have the derivation for the complex degree that results as the
denotation of the small clause in (156).
(158) [[d on the table]]
= d ∩ λx. on-table(x)
via Degree Modification
= ∩(∪d ∩ λx. on-table(x))
= ∩λx. µf (x) = ni ∧ on-table(x)
In the small clause we now have the complex degree which applies to quantities of things
on the table. The existential predicate takes this complex degree as an argument; supposing
that the existential predicate applies at the level of objects, Generalized DKP mediates the
composition of this predicate with its degree argument. Its eﬀect has the degree relative
assert the existence of an instantiation of the complex degree, as in (159).13
(159) [[be d on the table]]
= exist(∩λx. µf (x) = ni ∧ on-table(x))
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[µf(y) = ni ∧ on-table(y)]
Now we have asserted that some quantity of stuﬀ exists on the table. But recall the relativizer
facts, which suggest degree abstraction within the relative clause. This abstraction should
target the complex degree that results when the material within the small clause composes,
as schematized in (160).
(160) λd. ∃y[∪don-table(y)]
As in Grosu and Landman (1998), after degree abstraction our degree relative denotes a
set of degrees. These degrees are complex, incorporating the predicate information within
13Chierchia (1998b, p.378) provides a similar treatment of kinds in existential constructions.
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the small clause. Therefore, these degrees will apply only to things for which this predicate
information is true – in other words, to objects on the table. Unlike Grosu and Landman,
we have not yet interpreted the head of the degree relative, which sits external to the clause.
Because Grosu and Landman interpret the head within the degree relative, they must go
through the trouble of extracting from the set of degrees that results a set of individuals via
the SUBSTANCE operator. We can do without SUBSTANCE.
First recall the motivation behind SUBSTANCE. Grosu and Landman take the name
“degree relative” to heart, such that degree relatives denote degrees. They want degree
relatives to denote degrees in order to capture the identity-of-amount interpretation noticed
by Heim (1987) for sentences like (161).
(161) It will take us the rest of our lives to drink the champagne that they spilled that
evening.
↪→ it will take us the rest of our lives to drink an amount of champagne equal to
the amount they spilled that evening
But, as Grosu and Landman themselves observe, this reading is not available to degree
relatives. Uttering (162), the speaker does not convey that John ate some apples equal in
amount to the apples on the table. Instead, he conveys that John ate the apples on the table
– those objects that are indicated. Whence comes SUBSTANCE, which applies in the general
case: to the complex degree Grosu and Landman construct in the denotation of the degree
relative, SUBSTANCE applies and extracts the relevant individual.
(162) John ate the apples that there were on the table.
Grosu and Landman (1998) observe that the identity-of-amount reading is a marginal phe-
nomenon requiring a special interpretation strategy. To the example in (161) they add the
following sentences.
(163) We will never be able to recruit the soldiers that the Chinese paraded last May Day.
(164) At passover I drink the four glasses of wine that everybody drinks.
188
The authors speculate that the presence of a modal, generic, or habitual plays a non-trivial
role in all of these examples. For our purposes, note simply that none of these examples are
clear degree relatives. That is, none features an existential construction.
It would appear, then, that Heim’s champagne is a red herring. So why go to so much
trouble to allow an identity-of-amount reading when it does not arise for degree relatives? In
other words, why posit the construction-specific SUBSTANCE operator, rather than derive
the fact that a degree relative names objects, not degrees?
We are in a position to avoid the unnecessary stipulation of SUBSTANCE or something
similar. Our degree relative does denote a set of degrees, but the head (e.g., apples) is a
simple predicate, denoting a set of objects. To compose this predicate with a set of degrees,
we need only appeal to the operation of Existential Modification. In this case, it is a predicate
of degrees that restrictively modifies an object-level predicate. The result of this modification
is itself an object-level predicate. This process of Existential Modification is defined as in
(165). Note that Existential Modification is head-driven, so that when the head is a predicate
of degrees we create a predicate of degrees, (165-a), and when the head is an object-level
predicate we create an object-level predicate, (165-b). It is this latter situation that we face
in the case of degree relatives.14
(165) Existential Modification:
a. A⟨d,t⟩ ∩E P⟨e,t⟩ = λd. A(d) ∧ ∃y[P(y) ∧
∪d(y)]
b. P⟨e,t⟩ ∩E A⟨d,t⟩ = λx. P(x) ∧ ∃d[A(d) ∧
∪d(x)]
Consider how Existential Modification as in (165-b) applies in the case of degree relatives.
The head noun gets modified by the relative CP, itself a set of complex degrees.
14Note that if the first option,(i-a), were used instead, such that the result was a set of degrees, we would
derive the identity-of-amount reading for Heim-style sentences: the degree relative would denote a degree,
DKP would allow this degree to compose with the rest of the sentence, and the resulting assertion would be
an existential one.
189
(166) [[apples that there were on the table]]
= apples ∩E λd. ∃y[∪don-table(y)]
via Existential Modification
= λx. apples(x) ∧ ∃d′[(λd. ∃y[∪don-table(y)])(d′) ∧ ∪d′(x)]
= λx. apples(x) ∧ ∃d′[(λd. ∃n[d = ∩λy. µf (y) = n ∧ on-table(y)])(d′) ∧ ∪d′(x)]
This modification restricts the set of apples to just those apples for which there is an on-table
degree that faithfully applies. In other words, the modification restricts the set to just those
apples that are on the table. Definiteness, conceived of as a maximality operator, selects
from this set the maximal apple individual. Concretely, maximality selects the apples that
there were on table. Using a perhaps more familiar semantics for degrees that captures
the striking parallels in behavior between degrees and kinds, we have successfully derived the
object-level interpretation for degree relatives. This interpretation results without stipulating
SUBSTANCE.
What about MAX? Recall the claim from Grosu and Landman that MAX applies at the
CP-level in degree relatives to return the maximal degree. This move allows the authors
to account for one final peculiarity of behavior that degree relatives exhibit, namely the
restrictions they impose on the determiners that may compose with them. Picking up on
an observation from Carlson (1977a), Grosu and Landman point out that only universal and
definite determiners are felicitous in degree relatives. Moreover, the authors remark on the
cross-linguistic stability of these determiner restrictions. Compare the sentences in (167).
(167) a. I took with me
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
every book
any books
the books
the three books
three of the books
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
that there was/were on the table.
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b. #I took with me
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
three books
few books
many books
some books
most books
no books
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
that there were on the table.
(Grosu and Landman, 1998, ex.(22), p.136)
By requiring MAX to apply at the CP level, degree relatives will always denote a singleton
(i.e., the maximal degree). In other words, MAX ensures that uniqueness is built into the
analysis of degree relatives. It is this property of uniqueness that Grosu and Landman use to
derive Carlson’s determiner restrictions. However, uniqueness alone will not limit the set of
possible determiners to just definites or universals. Two additional constraints are proposed.
The first constraint prohibits existentials from applying to singleton sets, like the Def-
initeness Restriction, presumably because the result would be definite anyway. This move
rules out most of the determiners in (167). To handle most, the authors need a more ver-
bose story. Simply put, they claim that the eﬀect of quantification in the specific case of
degree relatives must be cardinality-preserving. The details appear in (168).
(168) Grosu and Landman (1998, p.146) on determiner restrictions:
a. Definition: Given a quantificational DP D(NP) based on a degree relative NP,
max is preserved into the quantification iﬀ for every predicate P: in normal
contexts for D(NP, P), |MAXA| = max.15
b. Constraint : An NP based on a degree relative can only be combined with
determiners that preserve max into the quantification.
c. Consequence: The only determiners that preserve max into the quantification
are the universals like every and definites like the. Hence, these are the only
determiners that can head a DP with a degree relative.
15MAXA is the object of quantification. In the books that there were on the table, MAXA would be the set
of books that were on the table.
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Suppose Grosu and Landman are on the right track with their strategy to force a singleton
denotation for degree relatives in order to preclude indefinite (i.e., existential) determiners.
We may do the same. What we need is the means to intelligently link the apples on the table;
the partitioning function internal to the semantics of a degree stands to deliver this result.
Our goal is to restrict the set of determiners that may apply to degree relatives to just
universals or definites. Following Grosu and Landman, the strategy is to ensure that the
degree relative denotes a singleton set. Ideally, this restriction falls out from the machinery
we already have; that is, we make do without MAX.16 Recall that under our proposal, apples
that there were on the table will denote the set of apples that were on the table, as in (169)
(the derivation appears in (166) above).
(169) [[apples that there were on the table]]
= λx. apples(x) ∧ ∃d′[(λd. ∃n∃k[d = ∩λy. µf (y) = n ∧ π(k)(y) ∧ on-table(y)])(d′)
∧ ∪d′(x)]
Now, consider what the maximizing partition function internal to the semantics of the degree
variable contributes to the denotation of the entire phrase. We motivated the function by
the requirement that degrees receive suitable objects to measure. The partition, π, applies
to a kind and returns maximal instances of the kind supported by context.
Imagine a context where three apples and four bananas sit on a table; the table is otherwise
empty. In this context, without any additional structure to further divide the fruit, there
are two amounts of stuﬀ on the table, corresponding to the two kinds of entities that are
there: the amount instantiated by apples (with cardinality 3) and the amount instantiated
by bananas (with cardinality 4). In other words, at the CP internal to the degree relative
denotes the set in (170).
(170) λd. there were d on the table
= {∩λx. µcard(x) = 3 ∧ π(apple)(x) ∧ on-table(x),
{∩λx. µcard(x) = 4 ∧ π(banana)(x) ∧ on-table(x)}
16If we ultimately do require an operator like MAX in the semantics of degree relatives, we will have at
least made do without SUBSTANCE. More importantly, we will have derived using standard machinery the
existential reading of degrees.
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Now, suppose the degree relative head apples denotes the +-closed predicate in (171),
where the apples a, b, and c are on the table together.
(171) [[apples]] = {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}
The degree relative head and the degree relative CP compose via Existential Modification;
the result restricts the head apples to just those apple individuals to which a degree denoted
by the CP applies. There is only one such individual, namely the totality of apples on the
table: a+b+c. Thus, the degree relative denotes the singleton set consisting of the apples on
the table.
(172) [[apples that there were on the table]]
= λx. apples(x) ∧ ∃d′[(λd. ∃n∃k[d = ∩λy. µf (y) = n ∧ π(k)(y) ∧ on-table(y)])(d′)
∧ ∪d′(x)]
= {a+b+c}
Using only the maximizing partition function internal to the semantics of degrees, we have
derived the fact that a degree relative denotes a singleton. In other words, we have achieved
the goal of Grosu and Landman (1998) without the construction-specific MAX operator.
Assuming that only a limited set of determiners may apply to a singleton set, we have addi-
tionally derived the determiner restrictions that characterize degree relatives. Now, spelling
out how these restrictions fall out will likely require many additional assumptions (as in
(168)), but for our purposes it suﬃces to show that our semantics for degrees gets us at least
as much coverage for degree relatives as the degree-triple approach from Grosu and Landman
without the need of SUBSTANCE or MAX. Moreover, our degrees-as-kinds approach gives
us a straightforward account of the existential interpretation, something that eludes the
degree-triple approach.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter provides a case study of the quantizing noun amount. We began with the
observation that amount stands apart with other degree nouns in its ability to deliver what
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we termed an existential interpretation, as in (173).
(173) I ate that amount of apples every day for a year.
↪→ every day for a year I ate some apples that measured the relevant amount
The existential interpretation of amount derives from the direct interpretation, under
which amount names an abstract measurement (i.e., an amount). We identified these entities
amount names as degrees. Given the behavior of the existential interpretation, we must
have enough information in the semantics of a degree to determine the objects that instantiate
them.
Here we found inspiration for the semantics of amount from one of the few nouns that
also admits an existential reading: kind, as in (174).
(174) I ate that kind of apple every day for a year.
↪→ every day for a year I ate some apples of the relevant kind
The nouns kind and amount behave similarly because they reference the same sort of thing:
degrees, like kinds, are nominalized properties. Degrees stand apart because the properties
from which they are built are quantity-uniform, formed on the basis of a measure. We thus
arrive at the definition for degrees in (175) and the semantics for amount in (176), which
names a set of degrees.
(175) DEGREE := ∩λx. ∃k[µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
where µf is a contextually-specified measure,
n is some number in the range of the measure µf ,
and π is a contextually-supplied partition
(176) [[amount]] = λkλd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µf (x) = n ∧ π(k)(x)]
For our degrees to compose with the structures that embed them, we adopted the following
technology. Given the conception of degrees as kinds, the tools we develop here apply gener-
ally in the realm of kind semantics. First, we take the ι operator to be a maximality-seeking
function, selecting from a set its maximal member; uniqueness results as a side eﬀect of max-
194
imality (Sharvy, 1980). Next, we proposed the following semantics for demonstratives; this
semantics identifies nominalized properties through the salient objects that instantiate them.
In that amount of apples or that kind of dog, we establish a pointer to a real-world object
and access the kind it instantiates.
(177) [[that]] = λA. ιy[A(y) ∧ ∪y(that)]
where A is a set of individuals, either nominalized properties or objects,
and that is the salient object indicated in the use of the demonstrative
We deliver the existential interpretation for degrees the same as for kinds by generalizing
the operation of Derived Kind Predication, which quantifies over instantiations of nominalized
properties to allow these entities to serve as arguments to object-level predicates (Chierchia,
1998b).
(178) Generalized DKP :
If P apples to objects and y denotes a nominalized property, then
P(y) = ∃x[∪y(x) ∧ P(x)]
To see these tools at work, consider the derivation in (179). Suppose there are three
salient apples: a, b, c. Suppose also that the kilogram measure, µkg, is relevant, and that
µkg(a+b+c) = na+b+c.
(179) John bought that amount of apples.
a. [[that]]([[amount of apples]])
= [[that]](λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)])
= ιy[λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)](y) ∧ ∪y(that)]
= ιy[λd. ∃n[d = ∩λx. µkg(x) = n ∧ π(apple)(x)](y) ∧ ∪y(a+b+c)]
via Maximality
= ∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ π(apple)(x)
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b. [[John bought that amount of apples]]
= bought(∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ π(apple)(x))(John)
via Generalized DKP
= ∃y[∪(∩λx. µkg(x) = na+b+c ∧ π(apple)(x))(y) ∧ bought(y)(John)]
We have derived the existential interpretation for amount. Through Generalized DKP,
(179) asserts that John bought some apples equal in weight to the salient apple individual
a+b+c. In other words, John bought apples equal in amount to the salient apples indicated.
We next considered how degrees are modified, for example by prepositional phrases as in
(180) or by relative clauses as in (182). For a predicate of degrees – amount of apples – to
get modified by an object-level predicate – on the table – we apply Generalized DKP in a
point-wise manner as the two predicates intersect. This operation of Existential Modification
is head-driven, defined as in (181); if a predicate of individuals is modified by a predicate of
degrees, restrict the first predicate to just those instances for which a degree applies.
(180) John ate the amount of apples on the table.
(181) Existential Modification:
a. A⟨d,t⟩ ∩E P⟨e,t⟩ = λd. A(d) ∧ ∃y[P(y) ∧
∪d(y)]
b. P⟨e,t⟩ ∩E A⟨d,t⟩ = λx. P(x) ∧ ∃d[A(d) ∧
∪d(x)]
With relative clauses, we can make do with simple, intersective modification once we assume
degree abstraction at the level of the relative CP. This degree abstraction is schematized in
(182-b).
(182) a. John ate the amount of apples that you ate.
b. John ate the [amount of apples] [λd. you ate d]
Finally, we saw how degree abstraction also applies in degree relatives, constructions where a
degree variable sits in the pivot position of an existential predicate, as in (183). By conceiving
of degrees as nominalized properties and applying the operation of Existential Modification
in (181-b) to compose its head with the degree relative, we derive the desired result that the
apples that there were on the table refers to the apples that there were on the table (and not
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to a degree; cf. Carlson, 1977a; Heim, 1987; Grosu and Landman, 1998).
(183) John ate the [apples] [λd. that there were d on the table]
Because degrees apply to contextually-supported maximal instances of stuﬀ on the basis of
a partition function π, we derive the fact that degree relatives denote a singleton set and
therefore compose only with a limited set of determiners.
Our semantics for amount yields a new semantics for degrees, which aligns degrees with
kinds on the basis of the sort of entity they reference: a nominalized property. As we have
seen, this new semantics delivers otherwise elusive interpretations (e.g., the existential
reading), interacts with standard theories of syntax (e.g., relativization structures), and pro-
vides a straightforward account of problematic constructions (e.g., degree relatives).
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
In our investigation of measurement in the nominal domain, we have focused on three themes:
1) number marking as a morphological reflex of measurement, 2) the semantics of nouns that
perform or facilitate measurement, and 3) the linguistic representation of measurement itself
(i.e., degrees). The account of the linguistic phenomena considered relies primarily measure
functions in the compositional semantics. These measures are introduced by various items
in the lexicon, and serve to map individuals to numbers. In other words, measures relate
individuals to points on a scale.
For number marking, we saw how nominal semantics interacts with morphology via the
one-ness presupposition attributed to the singular form of nouns. Flexibility in the selection of
the measure µ determining this presupposition allows for a unified system of number marking
cross-linguistically. Languages vary in what they attend to as they check for singularity. For
example, English firsts evaluates the structure of a nominal predicate, checking to see whether
there are measures that uniformly apply to the members of the predicate; if every member
evaluates to 1 by these measures, singular morphology surfaces. Turkish, on the other hand,
checks always for relative atomicity via the measure in P-atoms.
Measures also feature prominently in the semantics of nouns. In English, measure terms
like kilo directly name a measure and, through the named measure, delimit sets of individuals.
Other quantizing nouns facilitate measurement by specifying discrete quantities. For example,
container nouns like glass package our surroundings on the basis of the quantities that they
contain. Similarly, atomizers like grain partition substances into stable minimal units. Once
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packaged or partitioned, these elements may be counted by the measure in cardinality.
In addition to performing measurement, language allows us to reference the outcome of
this process: degree nouns like amount name the abstract representations of measurement.
These representations, degrees, contain four pieces of information. A degree contains infor-
mation about the measure µ that determines it, the value n to which this measure evaluates,
the kind of thing k which gets measured, and the means by which the kind gets instan-
tiated π for the purpose of being measured. A degree is thus a collection of coordinates,
the 4-tuple < µ,n, k,π >; the degree named by three kilos of apples may be represented as
d<µkg,4,apple,πc>. By conceiving of degrees as nominalized properties, we may manipulate
them as we do kinds and access their instantiations.
What results is a program for representing and making claims about the world that
is centered around measurement. Measurement specifies individuals, builds properties and
sorts, and determines the form of words as we speak them. In the semantics, we partition
the world into discrete chunks that serve as arguments to measure functions, which translate
these chunks onto a specified scale. Scalar representations of real-world objects allow for a
richer understanding not only of the objects themselves, but of their relationships to other
objects in the world. Although we have considered mostly nouns in English to shape the
proposal, the architecture of and machinery within this system of measurement should be
viewed as constituting a theory of language broadly speaking. Its proving ground will be the
application of this theory to other languages and domains of linguistic phenomena. What
follows is a discussion of three such applications.
5.1 Extending the system
Given our new conception of degrees, we should check to see that this system is compatible
with the existing accounts of degree constructions. We start there. Then we turn to mass
nouns, which have received relatively little attention so far in this thesis. By explicating the
process that determines number marking in the absence of numerals, we will see that our
system of number marking stands to derive the lack of plural morphology on mass nouns.
Finally, we turn to the similarities and diﬀerences between classifiers and classifier languages
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on the one hand, and quantizing nouns and number marking languages on the other.
5.1.1 Degree semantics
Under the current proposal, degrees are nominalized quantity-uniform properties. Internal to
these nominalized properties is the measure µf , which maps individuals to numbers; degrees
are ordered on the basis of this measure. The template for a degree appears in (1).
(1) DEGREE := ∩λx. ∃k[µf (x) = n ∧ fp(k)(x)]
where µf is a contextually-specified measure,
n is some number in the range of the measure µf ,
and fp is a contextually-supplied partition.
This notion of degree stands as a perhaps drastic departure from standard theories of degrees.
For clarity’s sake, we distinguish the two approaches as ‘degrees-as-kinds’ vs. ‘degrees-as-
points’. In what follows, we review standard theories of degrees-as-points and their applica-
tions, then consider how the degrees-as-kinds approach fares. We will see that our notion of
degrees-as-kinds merely enriches traditional conceptions. Nothing is lost by this move, and
we spent the previous chapter spelling out what is gained.
Degrees feature prominently in much of the work on the formal semantics of gradability
and comparison. Degrees enter into the ontology as abstract entities; they are points (or
intervals) ordered along some dimension. In other words, degrees are numbers tagged with
information about the dimension to which they pertain (e.g., height, width, cost, beauty,
etc.). Along a given dimension, the set of ordered degrees constitutes a scale. Scales provide
the structure for comparison: By establishing a correspondence between individuals and
degrees, we map individuals onto scales; the relative position of these individuals on the scale
determines comparison.
According to degree approaches to gradability, lexical predicates establish the correspon-
dence between individuals and degrees (Kennedy, 1999; see also Seuren, 1973; Cresswell,
1976; von Stechow, 1984; Heim, 1985). Concretely, gradable predicates denote relations be-
tween individuals and degrees. For example, the predicate tall expresses the relation between
individuals and degrees of height, as in (3-a).
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(2) [[six feet]] = 6ft
(3) a. [[tall]] = λdλx: d is suitable for height. tall(d)(x)
b. [[tall]] = λdλx: d is suitable for height. µtall(x) ≥ d
(4) [[six feet tall]] = λx. µtall(x) ≥ 6ft
For many degrees-as-points approaches, the tall relation decomposes as in (3-b) into a
measure function, µtall, which maps individuals onto the height scale. Composing with the
degree of height six feet, tall in (4) returns the set of individuals that are six feet tall.
Consider how degrees-as-kinds interacts with the semantics of gradability assumed in (3-a)
for tall. First, let us continue to suppose that gradable predicates take a degree argument.
These degrees are no longer simple points on a scale; six feet would denote the degree in (5),
which is the nominalization of the property of measuring six feet (in height).1
(5) [[six feet]] = ∩λx. ∃k[µft(x) = 6 ∧ π(k)(x)]
Now, for tall to relate individuals with a degree-kind as in (5), it no longer needs to perform
the height measurement itself: degrees contain measure functions. Therefore, tall may com-
pose individuals and degrees directly, presupposing that the degrees are degrees of height.
The modified semantics for tall appears in (6).
(6) [[tall]] = λdλx: d is suitable for height. ∪d(x)
(7) [[six feet tall]] = λx. ∃k[µft(x) = 6 ∧ fp(k)(x)]
Just as before with degrees-as-points, once tall in (7) composes with the degree of height six
feet, it returns the set of individuals that are six feet tall. However, there is an important
diﬀerence between the sets denoted by the predicates in (4) and (7): In the former, where
degrees are construed as points, we return the set of individuals that are at least six feet tall;
in the latter, where degrees are construed as kinds, we return the set of individuals that are
exactly six feet tall. An ‘exactly’ semantics for degree predicates has been supplanted by the
‘at least’ semantics in order to capture facts concerning modified numerals and scope-bearing
1The measure internal to this degree is, more precisely, the height measure in feet.
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elements.
To derive an ‘at least’ semantics for our degrees-as-kinds, we could take one of two ap-
proaches. The first approach builds ≤ ‘at least’ into the basic semantics for degrees, as
in (8).
(8) DEGREE := ∩λx. ∃k[µf (x) ≤ n ∧ fp(k)(x)]
Where exactness is required of degree constructions, some other mechanism (like the maximality-
seeking ι operator) would have to deliver it. Rather than construct sub-maximal degrees as
the default, we could instead follow the degree literature and derive sub-maximal degrees
from properties of lexical predicates.
The other approach to an ‘at least’ semantics for degrees-as-kinds reconsiders the rela-
tionship between individuals and degrees that gets supplied by gradable predicates. First,
let us define an interval of ‘at least’ degrees as in (9).
(9) D≥n =
⋃
i=n
di
The degree interval D≥n contains every degree at least as great as dn. For example, suppose
dn is the degree of height six feet. D≥n will be the set of degrees of height at or above six
feet. A degree interval holds of an individual just in case it contains a degree true of that
individual.
(10) D≥n (x) = 1 iﬀ ∃d∈D
≥
n [
∪d(x)]
Now, suppose gradable predicates relate individuals with these degree intervals. Composition
would proceed as in (11). Note that the basic semantics for degrees-as-kinds has not changed:
six feet continues to denote the degree in (5).
(11) a. [[tall]] = λdnλx: dn is suitable for height. D≥n (x)
b. [[six feet tall]] = λx. D≥6ft(x)
[[six feet tall]] = λx. ∃d∈D≥6ft[
∪d(x)]
By construing gradable predicates as relations between individuals and degree intervals, the
semantics in (11-b) for six feet tall matches that found in the degrees-as-points approach:
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the denotation identifies the set of individuals whose height measure at least six feet. Here
we have the ‘at least’ semantics for gradable predicates.
We have captured gradability in degree constructions using degrees-as-kinds. Now let us
consider comparison. Here we assume a standard a-not-a analysis of the semantics of com-
paratives (see Schwarzschild, 2008, for a primer on comparative semantics). A comparative
sentence like in (12-a) receives the paraphrase in (12-b), with the logical translation in (12-c).
(12) a. John is taller than Bill is.
b. There is some degree of height true of John that is not true of Bill.
c. ∃d[tall(d)(j) ∧ ¬tall(d)(b)]
With degrees-as-points, (12) amounts to the assertion that John attains a degree of height
that Bill does not. This semantics translates straightforwardly into our degrees-as-kinds
framework. Recall that we have defined the relation specified by gradable predicates as one
that exists between individuals and degree intervals. As a result, comparatives quantify not
over single degrees (points or kinds), but over degree intervals as in (13).
(13) a. ∃D≥n [tall(D
≥
n )(j) ∧ ¬tall(D
≥
n )(b)]
b. ∃D≥n [(∃d∈D
≥
n [
∪d(j)]) ∧ ¬(∃d∈D≥n [
∪d(b)])]
Despite looking a great deal more complex than (12-c), (13-b) delivers the same truth condi-
tions: John is taller than Bill just in case there is some degree interval that contains John’s
height and does not contain Bill’s. Because the height degree interval is lower bounded,
(13-b) amounts to the assertion that John’s height is greater than Bill’s.
A more straightforward way to capture the same behavior would have the gradable ad-
jective quantify over degrees directly, as in (14). Six feet tall would be a predicate true of
individuals whose height is at least six feet.
(14) [[tall]] = λdλx: d is suitable for height. ∃d′[d′ ≥ d ∧ ∪d′(x)]
Whether we adopt the more complex notion of degree intervals, or we suppose that gradable
adjectives create these intervals, we arrive at the same result: an ‘at least’ semantics for
gradability.
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In summary, we have seen how degree-as-kinds are compatible with standard approaches
to gradability and comparison. Because they contain more information than simple degrees-
as-points, no ground is lost by switching to degrees-as-kinds. A host of additional issues
arise within the domain of degree semantics, but for now it suﬃces to show how degrees-as-
kinds behave within this framework. Crucially, in addition to losing nothing with respect to
standard theories of gradability, degrees-as-kinds capture the parallels in behavior between
degrees and kinds and deliver the existential interpretation.
5.1.2 Mass nouns
Mass nouns like water and rice feature prominently in the typology of quantizing nouns.
Without stable minimal parts or well-defined notions of what counts as a whole entity, they
must be parceled out to be referenced. Put diﬀerently, mass nouns stand apart because they
lack stable atoms, which is why mass nouns so often provide the substance to be quantized.
Quantizing nouns package the substance denoted by mass nouns into stable wholes so that
they may serve as arguments to object-level predicates and, more importantly, numeral quan-
tifiers. In Chapters 3 and 4, we considered in detail the way that mass noun interact with
the semantics of quantizing nouns; here we review the properties of mass nouns and consider
them in light of the proposed system for number marking developed in Chapter 2.
Chierchia (2010) identifies three properties of mass nouns that are (‘tendentially’) constant
across languages. The first property Chierchia calls the ‘signature property’ of mass nouns,
namely their inability to compose directly with numerals. Compare the phrases in (15);
unlike count nouns, mass nouns resist direct counting.
(15) a. three apples/hamburgers/grapes.
b. *three waters/silvers/oils
To count instances of the substance denoted by mass nouns, we make use of a quantizing
noun as in (16). Note that even when a quantizing noun mediates counting, mass nouns
never appear as morphologically plural.
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(16) a. three cups of water
b. three pounds of silver
c. three quantities of oil
Next, mass nouns track the language-independent substance/object contrast. When two ob-
jects, say two books, meet, the objects retain their identities; we are left with two books.
When two quantities of some substance, say water, meet, a single quantity of that sub-
stance results. Moreover, substances are continuous: a portion of some quantity of water
is still water, whereas a portion of a book is not necessarily a book. Infants are attuned
to these properties of their environment (Spelke, 1991; Carey, 1992), and languages are too:
substances are named by mass nouns.2
Lastly, the mass/count distinction is flexible. A canonical mass noun may admit count
uses, as in (17) and (18).3 However, this flexibility is firmly (and illuminatingly) con-
strained. The interpretations of count uses of mass nouns fall into two categories: either
some contextually-supplied partition (i.e., a silent atomizer) quantizes mass nouns into dis-
crete and stable portions for counting, (17), or counting proceeds over subkinds of the sub-
stance named, (18).4
(17) John ordered three waters.
↪→ John ordered three glasses/bottles of water
(18) a. The hospital has three bloods on hand.
↪→ the hospital has three kinds of blood on hand
b. You will find ten beers on tap at the bar.
↪→ you will find ten kinds of beer on tap at the bar
In sum, mass nouns name substances which cannot be directly counted. They also preclude
plural morphology. However, mass nouns may be coerced into count uses; when they are,
2Chierchia (2010) is careful to delimit the scope of this claim: whereas substances are coded as mass,
objects are not always coded as count (cf. fake mass nouns like furniture).
3Conversely, count nouns admit mass uses, as in John ate a salad with apple in it or there is table all over
the floor. We ignore count→mass shifts for present purposes, but see Pelletier (1975) for discussion of the
‘Universal Grinder’ that handles these shifts.
4Note that this second shift, into subkinds, also applies to count nouns. For example, three dogs could be
interpreted as referencing three kinds of dogs.
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they deliver either quantized (i.e., atomizing) or subkind interpretations and can appear
morphologically plural. Now, how do these properties conspire to inform the semantics of
number marking on mass nouns?
We want to exclude mass nouns from composing with the pl #-head. One move would
be to say that DPs containing mass nouns lack #P altogether. In other words, mass nouns
lack a number feature. However, this move would have undesirable consequences for the
number agreement these DPs eﬀect in the sentences that contain them (e.g., the water is/*are
boiling). Moreover, conjunctions of mass nouns display regular agreement (e.g., the water and
rice *is/are in the pot). It would seem, then, that we cannot simply omit number features
from these nominals.
Recall that our system of number marking decides number morphology via competition
between sg and pl: when sg, which has a stronger meaning, can be used, it is; otherwise
pl must be used. In other words, to preclude the appearance of plural morphology, mass
nouns must always satisfy the one-ness presupposition of sg. The semantics of the #-heads
is repeated in (19). Recall that English number morphology is sensitive to measures that
determine quantity-uniform predicates, defined in (20).
(19) English #-heads:
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∀µ∀x∈P[ QUµ(P) → µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
(20) Quantity-uniform:
QUµ(P) = 1 iﬀ ∀x∀y[ P(x) ∧ P(y) → µ(x) = µ(y) ]
For mass nouns to always appear singular, their denotation must be quantity-uniform with
respect to some measure, and by that measure every element in the denotation must evaluate
to 1. Here mass nouns place into focus a more general question concerning the semantic
account of number marking, namely how the one-ness presupposition of sg gets checked in
the absence of a numeral, that is, in the absence of a M(easure) head.
Before tackling mass nouns, let us take a step back and consider number marking on
count nouns proceeds in the absence of M. Count nouns denote simple predicates that come
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as either semantically singular, (21-a), or semantically plural, that is, closed under sum-
formation, (21-b).
(21) Semantic number (assuming three books):
a. [[book]] = {a, b, c}
b. [[*book]] = {a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c}
Semantically singular book straightforwardly satisfies the one-ness presupposition of sg: the
predicate denotation in (21-b) is quantity-uniform with respect to the measure in relative
atoms, µP-atom, and every member of this denotation measures 1 P-atom. However, seman-
tically plural *book also satisfies the one-ness presupposition of sg: the predicate is not
quantity-uniform, so there is no measure against which the one-ness presupposition must
be checked. In other words, a semantically plural predicate vacuously satisfies the one-ness
presupposition by virtue of there being no measure which this presupposition checks. But
if this process of vacuously satisfying the one-ness presupposition actually transpired, then
singular the book should be able to refer to a plurality of books; it cannot.
It would appear that we need to say something additional about the semantics of sg to
rule out singular morphology on semantically plural predicates (in the absence of numerals),
namely that a predicate must be quantity-uniform before it may satisfy the one-ness presup-
position of sg. Put diﬀerently, the one-ness presupposition should require that there exist at
least one measure by which a predicate counts as quantity-uniform, and that every member
of the predicate evaluates to 1 with respect to this measure. The revised semantics for the
English #-heads appears in (22).
(22) English #-heads (revised):
a. [[sg]] = λP: ∃µ[QUµ(P)] & ∀µ∀x∈P[ QUµ(P) → µ(x) = 1 ]. P
b. [[pl]] = λP. P
Applied to a numeral-less semantically singular predicate like book in (21-a), the revised
one-ness presupposition of sg is satisfied: the predicate is quantity-uniform with respect
to the P-atom measure, and every element of the predicate denotation evaluates to 1 with
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respect to this measure. Thus, we correctly predict singular book to reference only individual
books.
Applied to a numeral-less semantically plural predicate like *book in (21-b), the one-
ness presupposition of sg is not satisfied: the predicate is not quantity-uniform. Without a
measure to check its presupposition against, sg cannot appear. The elsewhere condition, pl,
therefore applies and we correctly predict plural books to include sums in its reference.
Now, let us return to mass nouns. Without shifting to a count interpretation, mass nouns
never appear plural.5 To derive this fact, our system of number marking must allow sg to
compose with mass nouns; because sg may compose, it must. For sg to compose, every
member of a mass noun’s denotation must measure 1 P-atom.
When referring to the corresponding kind, mass nouns trivially satisfy the one-ness pre-
supposition of sg. Ontologically, a kind is an individual, and there is only one such individual
in the denotation of a mass noun. The semantics in (23) illustrates this fact for the mass
noun water.
(23) [[water]] = water (i.e., the water kind)
The problem with number marking on mass nouns centers around uses where concrete in-
stances of the kind are referenced, as in (24).
(24) a. John drank the water that you poured for him.
b. The oil in Sue’s car needs changing.
Now, consider the denotation of a mass noun. We could align such denotations with count
nouns. Just like book denotes a set of minimal book individuals (i.e., a set of books), water
denotes a set of minimal water quantities; these quantities would be unstable across worlds
(Chierchia, 2010). In other words, the size of these minimal quantities would vary across
situations. However, given that they are minimal, the elements in the denotation of a mass
5The lack of plural marking on mass nouns is a relatively stable phenomenon cross-linguistically. However,
a handful of languages do pluralize their mass nouns. Tsoulas (2006) observes that Modern Greek allows
the pluralization of mass nouns, and Gillon (2010) observes the same for Innu-aimun. Crucially, mass noun
pluralization in these languages retains the mass character of the interpretation; in other words, the meaning
that results is not a packaged, count interpretation. However, pluralization of mass nouns does delimit a
narrow range of possible meanings, for example signaling that a striking amount of the relevant substance gets
referenced.
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noun would each constitute a single P-atom: no element has a proper part that is also an
element (if it did, the element would not be minimal. While this approach would deliver
singular morphology on mass nouns, it would also shrink the conceptual and formal distance
between mass nouns and count nouns. For example, with minimal instances in its denotation,
we might expect to be able to count mass nouns directly with numerals; like count nouns,
mass nouns would have stable (relative) atoms suitable for counting.
Another option, attributed by Chierchia (2013) to G. Magri, treats mass nouns as naming
singleton properties.6 The result has mass nouns name the contextually relevant totality of
some substance. Using the language of mereotopology from Chapter 3, a mass noun would
contain in its denotation only the maximally self-connected instance of the corresponding
kind. Under this singleton property approach to mass noun semantics, water would receive
the denotation in (25).7
(25) [[water]] = λx. x =
⋃
water
The mass noun water names the property of being the supremum of the water property,
which is always a singleton. In this way, the semantics in (25) will satisfy the numerical
presupposition of sg: the predicate is quantity-uniform (there is some measure by which every
member evaluates to the same value, namely the measure in P-atoms) and every member of
the predicate measures 1 with respect to this quantity-uniform measure (as a singleton, its
one member is necessarily a minimal element). To summarize: In order to ensure singular
morphology on mass nouns in the general case, we may take advantage of the cumulative
nature of the substances that they so often name and mandate that their denotation is always
a singleton containing the (relevant) totality of substance. These current musings are not
intended to decide the issue of mass noun semantics, but rather to demonstrate possible
directions in which to pursue an account.
6Zamparelli (2008) suggests a similar move.
7Note that by necessarily denoting a singleton, we would expect the same determiner restrictions that were
observed for degree relatives in the previous chapter.
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5.1.3 Classifier languages
In our discussion of quantizing nouns in Chapter 3, we saw that classifiers are taken to be
an epiphenomenon of classifier languages. In these languages, counting proceeds on the basis
of a closed, contrasting set of morphemes that designate countable units (Greenberg, 1972;
Allan, 1977a,b; Denny, 1976, 1979; Adams and Conklin, 1973). These morphemes, classifiers,
mediate the relationship between numerals and nouns. Consider the obligatory status of the
classifier ge in (26).
(26) san
three
*(ge)
cl
ren
people
‘three people’ (Chinese Mandarin)
Measure heads, both card and measure terms like kilo, mirror true classifiers: they are a
set of morphemes that mediate the relation between numerals and nouns. But classifiers
also resemble atomizers, partitioning instances of kinds into discrete units for the purpose of
counting. In fact, we will see that classifiers subsume most of what we have considered quan-
tizing nouns. Furthermore, any instance of counting (or measuring more broadly) appeals to
one of these elements, both in classifier and number marking languages.
Viewed through the lens of the system described in Chapter 2, classifier languages stand
apart because they lack card: what number marking languages can do covertly with card
(i.e., compose numerals with nouns for the purpose of counting), classifier languages must do
overtly with a classifier. But there is more to the dissimilarity between classifier and number
marking languages, as evidenced by the following cross-linguistic generalizations: First, if a
language has obligatory classifiers, then it freely allows bare arguments (Chierchia, 1998b);
and second, if a language has obligatory classifiers, then it lacks obligatory number marking
(Greenberg, 1972). Both of these generalizations receive an account once we augment our
semantics of number marking with the assumption that nouns in classifier languages refer to
kinds, whereas nouns in number marking languages may denote predicates. The semantic
import of number marking always yields redundant information in a classifier language. We
therefore settle on the claim that obligatory number marking is only allowed if it delivers
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otherwise unrecoverable information.8 To see how this claim falls out within the current sys-
tem, we first consider in more detail the relevant cross-linguistic generalizations concerning
classifiers and number marking. We then see how classifiers conform with the syntax and
semantics of nominals proposed in the previous section.
Cross-linguistic generalizations
The first generalization concerns the lack of number marking in classifier languages. Green-
berg (1972) reproduces the following claim, attributed to an unpublished manuscript by
Slobin, later appearing in Sanches and Slobin (1973).
(27) Slobin–Greenberg–Sanches Generalization:
“If a language includes in its basic mode of forming quantitative expressions numeral
classifiers, then [. . . ] it will not have obligatory marking of the plural on nouns.”
(Greenberg, 1972, 286)
In other words, classifier languages do not have obligatory systems of number marking: if a
language requires classifiers in the presence of numerals, morphological number will not be
(necessarily) expressed.9 Conversely, if a language has obligatory number marking, then it will
not have a generalized system of classifiers. Specifying obligatory number marking is crucial:
the Slobin–Greenberg–Sanches generalization does not rule out number marking altogether
in classifier languages, allowing for optional number marking in a classifier language, as with
Chinese men or Japanese tati (e.g., Li, 1999; Kurafuji, 2004).
Knowing what we do about the semantic import of number marking – namely, that it
indexes the one-ness of nominal predicates – our task is to understand the connection between
classifiers and number marking such that the two are incompatible. Before exploring this
connection, however, we consider another property of classifier languages that will quickly
become relevant to the task at hand.
8This section expands on a proposal put forth in Scontras (2013a).
9See Doetjes (2012) for a fuller discussion of this generalization and potential counterexamples to it.
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In addition to necessitating classifiers for counting, classifier languages freely allow bare
nominal arguments: nouns appear bare (i.e., determiner-less) in argument position (cf. dogs
in the sentence dogs are widespread). Chierchia (1998b; see also Chierchia 1998a, 2010)
provides an account of bare arguments in classifier languages via his Nominal Mapping Pa-
rameter, whereby nouns in classifier languages are born argumental, referring at the kind
level. Contrasting with classifier languages, English and other number marking languages
map their nouns to predicates (of type ⟨e, t⟩), while functional structure (e.g., determiners or
other methods of type-shifting) transforms nouns into arguments.10
Because nouns are born as kinds in classifier languages, classifiers are required to access
the members of a kind for the purpose of counting. A classifier transforms a kind – a name
for the maximal plural individual (i.e., the supremum) instantiating that kind – into the set
of individuals belonging to the kind. We consider the semantics of classifiers in more detail
presently; for now it suﬃces to adopt the view under which nouns in classifier languages
are kind-denoting unless they appear with a classifier, which shifts kind-denoting nouns into
predicates. In number marking languages, nouns are born as predicates and shift to kinds
as needed. Thus, bare arguments are restricted in number marking languages: a predicate-
denoting noun must shift to an argumental type. In classifier languages, bare arguments are
freely allowed: a kind-denoting noun is born argumental. To see how this nominal mapping
interacts with the Slobin–Greenberg–Sanches generalization, we turn now to the semantics
of classifiers.
Classifier semantics
The structure attributed to classifiers should look familiar from our discussion of Measure
Phrases in Chapters 2 and 3: classifiers compose first with a nominal and then with a numeral,
projecting a classifier phrase (e.g., Li, 2011; Jiang, 2012; Li and Rothstein, 2012).
10This description of the Nominal Mapping Parameter is a simplification for the sake of perspicuity; the
reader is referred to Chierchia (1998b) for the details.
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(28) Cl(assifier)P(hrase)
Num
san ‘three’
Cl′
Cl
ge
NP
ren ‘people’
Note the similarity between the classifier phrase in (28) and MP: in both cases the classifier/M0
heads the structure, intervening between a nominal and a numeral. Semantically, the type
we attribute to measure heads also applies to classifiers (Li, 2011; Krifka, 1995). In light
of our discussion of nominal mapping, the only diﬀerence between the M0-head card and
classifier semantics is that the former composes first with predicates (type ⟨e, t⟩), whereas
the latter composes with kinds (type k).11 A candidate classifier semantics appears in (29-a);
the semantics for card is repeated in (29-b).
(29) a. [[cl]] = λkλnλx. ∪k(x) ∧ µcard(x) = n
b. [[card]] = λPλnλx. P(x) ∧ µcard(x) = n
Given the parallels in both structure and semantics between classifiers and measure heads,
it seems no great stretch to align the two: classifiers are yet another instantiation of M0.
However, classifiers also serve the role of atomizers; they deliver maximal instances of the kind
supported by context for the purpose of counting. Thus, rather than merely instantiating
a kind via the ∪-operator in (29-a), the template for classifier semantics should include a
partitioning function π, as in (30). The partitioning function will necessarily vary across
classifiers, which delivers their broad range of meaning.
(30) [[cl]] = λkλnλx. π(k)(x) ∧ µcard(x) = n
With a semantics for classifiers and an understanding of the nominal system in languages
that use them, we stand to account for the lack of number marking in classifier languages.
11Recall that assigning to kinds the type k is merely a shorthand; kinds are individuals (or individual
concepts) just like the president or John.
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Linking classifiers, bare arguments, and the lack of number marking
Having aligned classifier and number marking languages such that both appeal to MP in
the formation of a numeral-modified nominal, we turn now to the diﬀerence between the
two types of languages that precludes obligatory number marking in classifier languages. We
begin by recapping the discussion thus far.
Assume a version of the Nominal Mapping Parameter whereby languages either map their
nouns to kinds (type k) or to predicates (type ⟨e, t⟩) (Chierchia, 1998b). In an Nk language,
nouns are born argumental, so we predict nouns to freely appear bare, without determiners,
in argument positions. However, assuming that counting proceeds over members of a set and
that kinds are individuals, classifiers are required in the presence of a numeral to shift the
kind-denoting noun to a predicate, that is, a set of individuals (the maximal instances of the
kind supported by context and meeting the restrictions of the classifier).
Next, consider the role of number marking: number morphology is realized on nouns and
gives information about the quality of the nominal denotation. Only when every member of
a noun’s denotation evaluates to 1 by the relevant measure does singular morphology surface.
In an N⟨e,t⟩ language where nouns denote predicates, number marking is (at least sometimes)
informative. For example, in the case of the boy ate the cake, we know on the basis of the
singular morphology expressed on boy that the intended referent is a singular individual,
not a plurality; only singular individuals may be included in the denotation of the singular-
marked boy because of the one-ness presupposition of sg. In this way, number marking in an
N⟨e,t⟩ language provides information about the denotation of nominals that would otherwise
be unrecoverable from the larger linguistic structure; only the number marking clues us in to
the number of boys referenced.
In a classifier language, the singular/plural distinction is uninformative: nouns in these
languages denote kinds, and (intensionalized) individuals are not something that can be closed
under sum-formation. Moreover, kinds are concepts that require more than one instantiation,
so it should never be the case that the kind’s instantiation has cardinality 1 (Chierchia,
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1998b). Evaluating the one-ness of a kind therefore necessarily fails, owing both to the type-
mismatch between predicate-selecting #-heads and to the conceptual diﬃculty associated
with evaluating the one-ness of a kind. Thus, indexing kind-denoting nouns with number
morphology is nonsensical. In the general case, introducing a system of number marking
into a Nk language makes no semantic contribution: Nouns denote kinds and so the one-ness
presupposition always fails (assuming it could apply at all), necessitating plural morphology
in all cases.
Note, however, that nominal predicate semantics may be derived in a classifier language
via a numeral-classifier construction. The role of a classifier is to mediate between a noun’s
kind referent and a numeral, forming a predicate of individuals (type ⟨e, t⟩). However, in
any such construction, the resulting denotation will be quantity-uniform, determined by the
numeral present. For example, the predicate one-cl-person/people will denote the quantity-
uniform set of people pluralities, each with cardinality 1; the semantics for this construction
and its parts appears in (31).
(31) yi ge ren ‘one person’
a. [[yi ]] = 1
b. [[ge]] = λkλnλx. π(k)(x) ∧ µcard(x) = n
c. [[ren]] = person (i.e., the people kind)
d. [[yi ge ren]] = λx. π(person)(x) ∧ µcard(x) = 1
The semantic contribution of number morphology on a derived predicate like in (31) is redun-
dant: the numeral delivers the information that the resulting denotation is both quantity-
uniform and has members all with cardinality 1. Number morphology on such a derived
predicate would therefore be uninformative – the information it could convey is already
present in the numeral ‘one’ (and similarly with all other numerals; in three-cl-person the
numeral ‘three’ clues us in to the fact that more than one person is referenced, namely three).
We see that in a Nk, that is, a classifier language, number morphology fails to contribute
meaningful information both in the general case of kind-denoting bare nouns and in the case
of derived nominal predicates.
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Nk ✓ classifiers ✗ number marking
Nominal Mapping- ✓ number marking
N⟨e,t⟩ ✗ classifiers ✗ number marking
Figure 5.1: Relating the Nominal Mapping Parameter and number marking.
These facts lead to the following constraint, meant to explain the lack of obligatory num-
ber marking in classifier languages: Only allow a system of number marking in a
language if there are instances where the system delivers otherwise unrecover-
able information (about nominal denotations). We have seen that in N⟨e,t⟩ languages there
are cases, namely non-quantified nominals, where number morphology is informative. We
therefore correctly predict the presence of number marking in such a language. In Nk lan-
guages, either the noun refers directly to a kind and is not eligible to be checked by the
one-ness presupposition of singular morphology, or a numeral-classifier construction derives
a nominal predicate and the numeral itself provides the information about one-ness that
number morphology would have delivered. Therefore, given the constraint just stated, in Nk
languages we predict the absence of obligatory systems of number marking. Fig. 5.1 diagrams
the implicational connections that lead to this conclusion.
First, the Nominal Mapping Parameter determines whether a language maps its nouns to
kinds or to predicates. If the former holds, classifiers are required for the purpose of counting
with numerals. However, once there is a generalized classifier system, number marking loses
its informativity and so obligatory number marking is ruled out. If the Nominal Mapping
Parameter has a language map its nouns to predicates, number marking stands to provide
information about the one-ness of these nominal predicates and so number marking is allowed.
Note that we do not necessitate number marking in N⟨e,t⟩ languages, which map their
nouns to predicates; we merely rule out obligatory number marking in Nk languages. Our
typology therefore predicts languages that we have heretofore not considered: ones in which
nouns map to predicates, type ⟨e, t⟩, thus precluding classifiers, but in which number marking
is also absent. In other words, we predict languages that lack both classifiers and obligatory
number marking. Fortunately, such languages are attested (e.g., De¨ne Su$line´, Wilhelm, 2008;
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Tagalog, Doetjes, 2012).
One last aspect of the implications diagramed in Fig. 5.1 warrants further scrutiny: We
have said that classifiers are required in Nk languages to retrieve the members of kind-
denoting nominals for the purpose of counting. However, we have aligned true classifiers
with all measure heads, including card. Functionally, classifiers and card serve a similar
purpose: to mediate the relation between numerals and nouns. Classifiers perform the added
step of accessing, or partitioning the members of a kind. Now we return to the point that
began this section: what number marking languages may do covertly with card, classifier
languages must do overtly with classifiers. So what prohibits a null measure head like card
from entering into the functional lexicon of classifier languages? While the answer to this
question requires future study, consider the following observation, which will likely constrain
the set of possible explanations.
Classifiers and card diﬀer in two ways. First, classifiers are overt while card is silent.
Second, classifiers take a kind-denoting argument, whereas card selects for predicates. Could
these diﬀerences be related? Consider the possibility that only covert measure heads like
card compose with predicates, whereas overt measure heads and other quantizing nouns
necessarily compose with kinds. The quantizing nouns we have considered – crucially, measure
terms and atomizers – support this link between phonologically realized measure heads and
kind-selection. Measure terms and atomizers thus align with classifiers to the exclusion of
card: the former take kind-denoting arguments, while card composes with a predicate.
It would appear, then, that only covert card selects for predicates; overt classifiers and
quantizing nouns compose with kinds. While the reason why overt measure heads should
select for kinds and covert ones for predicates remains an open question, this tendency stands
to clarify the implication between nominal mapping and the presence/absence of classifiers
in Fig. 5.1. Nk languages lack covert measure heads like card because their nouns, the
arguments of measure heads, denote kinds, not predicates, and overt measure heads are
required in the presence of kind-denoting nouns. Put diﬀerently, kind-selection in nominal
semantics requires an overt element that determines how the kind will instantiate. In an N⟨e,t⟩
language, nouns denote predicates at base and so for counting to proceed over members of
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their denotation we make do with a covert, predicate-selecting measure head like card.
5.2 Looking forward
In addition to the extensions the current program suggests in the three domains outlined
in the previous section, this thesis has advanced a semantics of measurement that stands to
inform future work on nominal semantics and on natural language more generally. The most
interesting – and most elusive – answers such work can uncover concern the nature of the
linguistic (i.e., mental) representations we create for the world that surrounds us. Let us
highlight two points from this thesis that make predictions about these representations.
First, we have seen that speakers employ diverging criteria to evaluate whether or not
something counts as singular (i.e., as one thing), at least grammatically so. In languages
like Turkish, which require singular morphology with a quantized predicate, singular-marked
nominals enjoy plural reference. Taking singular morphology as an unambiguous cue for
one-ness cross-linguistically, we saw that speakers of these languages evaluate one-ness in
a relative manner, on a predicate by predicate basis. If a predicate (e.g., iki c¸ocuk ‘two
boy’) contains in its denotation only minimal elements, that is, relative atoms, then that
predicate will spell out as singular. However, in languages like English, one-ness is evaluated
with respect to the measures that are relevant, for example basic cardinality or the measure
named by the linguistic expression used. We might therefore expect to find a behavioral
reflex of these grammatical strategies, such that one-ness judgments beyond the domain of
number marking show an influence of these strategies.
Second, on the basis of the existential interpretation observed for degree nouns, we have
seen that abstract representations of measurement are richer than mere points on a scale.
The result of this observation is in fact a simplification of the ontology: rather than positing
degree primitives, we make do with independently-motivated semantic objects, namely nom-
inalized predicates, or kinds. Here the claims are even more far reaching than in the case of
grammatical number. Whenever language encodes reference to these abstract representations
of measurement, the representations themselves must contain information about the objects
that instantiate them.
218
This new semantics for degrees highlights the four basic elements of the semantics of
measurement that are hypothesized to be stable across languages. First, and perhaps most
obviously, we have measure functions in our semantics. These measure functions translate
objects onto a scale, allowing for the encoding of gradability. Scales are composed of the sec-
ond element in our measurement semantics: numbers. Numbers, specifically non-negative real
numbers, are taken as semantic primitives. The third semantic element, kinds, often provides
the objects of measurement. Kinds are abstract, intensional entities, the nominalizations of
properties, so the fourth element in our measurement semantics, partitions, delivers maxi-
mal instances of the kind (i.e., real-world objects) for the purpose of measurement. With
measures, numbers, kinds, and partitions, we now have a semantics of measurement.
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